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Wilfred Cantwell Smith's Concept of F<1ith: 
A Critical Srudy of His Approach to Islam and Ch!ristiaruty 
Philip Terence Stevens, MA, 1985. 
ABSTRACT 
The aim of this study is to present and evaluate Wilfred Cantwell 
Smith's concept of faith, and to examine the way in which he uses it to 
approach and understand material from the traditions of Islam and 
Christianity. 
Chapter one consists a brief introduction and a biography of Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith. The second chapter analyses Smith's concept of faith, 
relating it to cumulative tradition, belief, truth and his vision of a 
world community. 
Chapter three examines Smith's treatment of various material from the 
Islamic tradition: the meaning of Islam, the shahadah, truth, the Qur'an, 
and some studies of faith. Chapter four examines material from the 
Christian tradition: faith in the New Testament, faith in the baptismal 
rites of St Cyril of Jerusalem, and religious pluralism. These items 
illustrate his concept of faith and the way in which it is used in his 
approach and understanding of Islam and Christianity. 
Chapter five provides an evaluation of Smith's concept of faith and of 
his approach to Islam and Christianity. It is argued that although the 
concept of faith helps the student of religion in general and Islam and 
Christianity in particular to keep his eyes open to the personal 
existential aspects of human religious life, Smith's approach has some 
serious deficiencies. In particular faith itself is difficult to study 
other than in a selective, subjective way. His approach undervalues the 
corporate, institutionalized aspects of religious life, and the symbolic 
function played by the externals of religion. Furthermore, his 
understanding of faith is ill-equipped to handle the conflicting 
truth-claims found amongst the various traditions. 
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Notes on the transliteration of arabic words. 
The following system of transliteration has been used where necessary: 
d J:' 
b ..... t 1 
t ..... z 1 
. c t th ..._ 
r. gh t 
h C f u 
kh C q J 
d J k (!) 
dh J J 
r J m r 
z J n 0 
s '-"' h .A 
. 
sh U"" w J 
s ~ y LS 
The dipthongs and vowels are written: 
a for fathah 
i for kasrah 
u for c;lammah 
a for alif 
u for waw 
T for ya 
ay for 0 
aw for J 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
The following abbreviations are used to refer to works of Wilfred Cantwell 
Smith: 
B&H Belief and History, Charlottesville, University Press of 
Virginia, 1 977. 
F&B Faith and Belief, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979. 
FOM The Faith of Other Men, New York, New American Library, 1963. 
QR T Questions of Religious Truth, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1967. 
MER The Meaning and End of Religion: A New Approach to the Religious 
Traditions of Mankind, New York, Macmillan, 1963. 
OUI On Understanding Islam, The Hague, Mouton, 1981. 
TWT Towards a World Theology, London, Macmillan, 1981. 
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Chapter One Introduction 
Section 1.1. Scope and Limits of the Study 
The aim of this study is to expound and illustrate Wilfred Cantwell 
Smith's concept of faith, and to assess its value as a conceptual tool for 
understanding religious life and approaching Islam and Christianity. 
Since Smith nowhere defines his concept of faith systematically, it is 
analysed in Chapter two in the light of some of his other major concerns. 
Chapters three and four serve to illustrate and test his concept of faith 
by looking at the way in which it is applied to specific material from the 
Islamic and Christian traditions. This procedure has been adopted in order 
to demonstrate Smith's own use of the concept, to assess critically its 
value as a conceptual tool, and to examine Smith's approach in the light of 
the Islamic and Christian material under discussion. The concluding chapter 
evaluates .the concept of faith, with reference to the responses of various 
scholars. 
The traditional names of the 'religions' Islam and Christianity have 
been deliberately retained in the title, notwithstanding Smith's own 
rejection of such usage. 1 Even Smith himself would not pretend that what 
has customarily been termed Christianity and Islam do not exist. 2 Rather he 
claims to offer a more appropriate conceptualization by which to understand 
the whole range of human life conveyed by these terms. Hence it is 
appropriate to retain these customary names in the title rather than to 
3 presume upon the results of the study. 
The primary sources for this study are the written works of Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith. A complete list of Smith's works consulted in English is 
provided in the Bibliography, Section 1. 4 Secondary sources include the 
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growing body of articles and books which study or build upon Smith's 
concept of faith and approach to religious life. These and other works used 
for this study are listed in the Bibliography, Section 2. 5 
This study is inevitably constrained by a number of limitations. The 
first is the wide spread of Smith's intellectual interests. Even limiting 
the discussion to his treatment of Islamic and Christian traditions it is 
necessary to be very highly selective, since he covers a vast range of 
topics in considerable detail. 
Secondly, a full evaluation of his early historical works6 has been 
omitted despite the continuing significance of these works for Islamic 
Studies. Although these works illustrate in many places Smith's approach to 
Islam they were written before his conceptual framework was formulated. 
Following from the decision to omit a full discussion of these earlier 
works, a full analysis of Smith's historical method has also been omitted. 
Smith frequently insists that he is primarily a historian, bringing an 
historical and global perspective to the attention of theologians. A full 
treatment of his historical assumptions or method would require a 
theological critique of history, which is beyond the scope of this study_? 
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Section 1.2. Biographical Introduction to Wilfred Cantwell Smith8 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith was born on 21st July 1916 in Toronto, Canada. 
His early religious faith was fashioned by the Presbyterian allegiance of 
his father, a strict morality and disciplined personal life, and a 
Calvinistic orthodoxy. As an undergraduate at the University of Toronto he 
was active in the leadership of Christian and missionary groups. There he 
gained his basic grounding in the Semitic languages and Near Eastern 
history, graduating in Oriental Studies in 1938. In 1939 he married Muriel 
Mackenzie Struthers, and subsequently had five children. 
He gained his theological training at Westminster College, Cambridge, 
whilst further pursuing Arabic and Islamic studies under H.A.R.Gibb at St. 
John's College, Cambridge. From there he went to India in 1941 to serve in 
a number of capacities. He taught Islamic History at Forman Christian 
College, Lahore; he represented the Canadian Overseas Missions Council; and 
he was ordained and recognized by the Presbyterian Church of Canada. In 
1943 he published his first book, Modern Isiam in India: a Social Analysis. 
After the war Smith took a doctorate at Princeton University, studying 
under Philip K. Hitti. He submitted his dissertation 'The Azhar Journal: 
Analysis and Critique' in 1948. 
He then held academic posts in three universities. From 1949 - 1964 he 
was at McGill University in Montreal. He was appointed W.M.Birks Professor 
of Comparative Religion and in 1951 became first director of the 
University's new Institute of Islamic Studies. The Institute, under Smith's 
direction was notable for its insistence that half the student and staff 
bodies should be Muslims so that all the statements about Islam could be 
verified by the Muslims present. It was here in the context of working 
alongside Muslims and listening to their views that he produced what is 
10 
perhaps ;-,is rndjur deposit to Islamic Studies as such, Islam in Modern 
History, and also his important methodological essay 'Comparative Religion: 
Whither - and Why?• 9 It was also here that his concept of faith was 
developed, and presented beyond the confines of Islamic Studies in his 
seminal work The Meaning and End of Religion. 
In 1964- he became Professor of World Religions at Harvard University. At 
Harvard Smith was forced to consider in greater detail the implications of 
his approach to religion for Christian theology, and to consider wider 
interfaith issues. He then spent a few years back in Canada as Professor of 
Religion at Dalhousie University, 1973 - 1978 during which time he was able 
to devote himself more fully to the research which went into his books 
Belief and History and Faith and Belief. He then returned to Harvard as 
Professor of the Comparative History of Religion, and Chairman of the 
Committee on the Study of Religion. 
Throughout his career Smith has travelled widely, and this has enabled 
him to experience in action the faith of many Muslims from various 
differing backgrounds, and to engage in lively dialogue with them. 
In addition to his academic career and a concern for Western scholarship 
m its widest sense, he has engaged in the life and work of the United 
Church of Canada. One of his most notable contributions being the 
reformulation of the Church's doctrinal statements about 'non-christian 
religions', taking into account the existence of faith as a quality of 
human life for all people. 1 0 
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Chapter Two Th(:.: c.=or:.--:~~1~~·;. ,\. _=';-)_ ,_:; 
--- ·-----~--~~---
This chapter gives an analysis of Wilfred Cantwell Smith's concept of 
faith as it is presented in his major written works. Smith himself has 
always been hesitant to define faith in too much detail, preferring to see 
it as a personal quality; a mundane historical reality rather than a 
philosophical abstraction. It is possible, however, to show the meaning of 
his concept by relating it to his other major religious concerns: 
cumulative tradition, belief, truth, world community. This is the procedure 
adopted in this chapter, as it seems the best way to gain an understanding 
of his concept. A critique of his concept of faith is to be found in the 
conclusion, chapter five. 
As a working introduction, Smith's concept of faith might be outlined 
thus: faith is a personal quality or characteristic by which the 
participants in religious (or non-religious) cumulative traditions are 
enabled to find meaning in and live out their lives. It is not a matter of 
assent to certain credal formulations or beliefs. These are observable 
deposits of faith (itself, of course, unobservable); they may point to the 
truth; and they may nurture faith. But faith itself is a personal 
affirmative response to the transcendent, by which the truth is actualized 
in the individual's and the community's life. The idea of response must be 
balanced by the idea that faith is given or evoked by God (or the Truth, 
the Transcendent) within human life, thus making that life fully human. As 
such faith is a universal quality of human life, which though not 
automatic, is not limited to any one religious tradition. Faith is 
therefore to be seen as the major asset and driving force in the formation 
of a world community. 
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Section 2.1. Faith and Cumulative Tradition 
This section is devoted to a survey of the background and content of The 
Meaning and End of Re1igion 1 in which Wilfred Cantwell Smith's concept of 
faith was first explicitly presented. Smith's early understanding of 
religion is examined in the first subsection; this is followed by a 
subsection on his rejection of 'religion' as given in the first five 
chapters of The Meaning and End of Religion. This paves the way for an 
examination of Smith's new conceptualization of religious life in terms of 
faith and cumulative tradition in the third subsection. 
The Meaning and End of Religion is a highly original and influential 
book which aimed to initiate a new way of understanding the religious life 
of man. Smith argued that it is misleading to focus attention in religious 
studies upon 'religions' as though these were distinct entities of great 
significance. Instead he argued that we should see the religious life of 
mankind as made up of an inner and an outer dimension. The outer dimension, 
comprising the external paraphernalia of religious practice, institution 
and doctrine, he called 'cumulative tradition'. This is the dimension of 
religious life which is open to empirical observation, and it is subject to 
continual change. The inner component, whereby these externalities gain 
meaning for the devout, Smith termed 'faith'. Faith is not of itself open 
to empirical observation, since it has to do with the person's relationship 
with the transcendent; but the effects of faith can be observed in his 
life. It is this inner dimension which is seen by the religious man to be 
central to his life, and thus it cannot be ignored by the student of 
religion. Furthermore, since the very word 'religion' tends either to 
confuse the picture, or to focus attention misleadingly upon the externals, 
Smith argued that this word (together with all the 'names' of the 
'religions') should be abandoned unless used in an adjectival sense. 
13 
(i) Smith's Early Understanding of Religion 
Although the concepts of faith and cumulative tradition were first 
presented in detail in The Meaning and End of Religion, the development of 
these notions can be traced in his earliest works. Wilfred Cantwell Smith 
had been conscious of the need to devise an appropriate definition of 
religion, and method for its study, from his earliest days in Lahore. His 
early works reveal that he was already concerned to understand the 
relationship between the observer and the religious man, between the 
historical and the eternal, between the external observables of religion 
and their inner meaning. These two themes from his early works are now 
sketched as a backcloth to the study of The Meaning and End of Religion: 
(a) the inner dimension of religion - the man of faith, and (b) the outer 
dimension of religion - the observable data. 
(a) The Inner Dimension of Religion - The Man of Faith 
Smith's longstanding desire to accept the judgement of religious men 
themselves when trying to understand their religious life led him to 
observe in 1943 that 'A scientific study of religion waits upon many 
things; of which one is a clear definition of its terms.• 2 He went on to 
use the following definitions in that book: 
'religion: that aspect of a person's life, or of his society's life 
which that person regards as religion. 
Muslim: any person who calls himself a Muslim. 
Islam: the religion of the Muslims.' 3 
Whilst these definitions are ultimately inadequate,4 they reveal Smith's 
refusal to impose an outsider's judgement on that which religious people 
hold dear. 
The same preoccupation 1s to be found in Pakistan as an Islamic State 
a preliminary draft 5 published in 1951. Again and again he refers to the 
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need to understand and speak of Isli:.t:·~,ic ;:1<.ttters thro~.:gh rvluslim eyes. For 
example: 
'What does it mean to speak of Pakistan's becoming Islamic? To be more 
precise, or anyway more methodical: what does this phrase mean to the 
Pakistani Muslims?' 6 
'Only a Muslim has a right to expound what an Islamic state ought to 
be.'. 7 
In his inaugural lecture of 1949, given on his appointment as W.M.Birks 
Professor of Comparative Religion at McGill University, Smith graphically 
dismisses the work of those historians of religion who fail to grasp the 
inner meaning of a religion for its adherents: 
'Such scholars might uncharitably be compared to flies crawling on the 
outside of a goldfish bowl, making accurate and complete observations 
on the fish inside, measuring their scales meticulously, and indeed 
contributing much to a knowledge of the subject, but never asking 
themselves, and never finding out, how it feels to be a goldfish.' 8 
In the preface to Islam in Modern History Smith insists that his work 
should be regarded as a failure if 'Muslims are not able to recognize its 
observations as accurate, its interpretations and analyses as meaningful 
and enlightening•. 9 This concern was later expressed by Smith in the form 
of a proposition: 'that no statement about a religion is valid unless it 
can be acknowledged by that religion's believers•. 1 0 This proposition has 
since been dubbed 'Smith's method of verification•. 11 
This concern for understanding became for Smith increasingly a concern 
for mutual understanding. He summarized his methodological argument in a 
widely quoted passage from the important essay 'Comparative Religion: 
Whither - and Why?' 
'The argument may be summarized briefly, in pronominal terms. The 
traditional form of Western scholarship in the study of other men's 
religion was of an impersonal presentation of an "it". The first great 
innovation in recent times has been the personalization of the faiths 
observed, so that one finds a discussion of a "they". Presently the 
observer becomes personally involved, so that the situation is one of 
15 
a "we" talking about a "they". The next step is a dialogue, where "we" 
talk to "you". If there is listening and mutuality, this may become 
"we" talk with "you". The culmination of this process is when "we all" 
are talking with each other about "us".' 12. 
To a large extent, then, 'the study of religion is the study of 
persons•. 13 It involves understanding what religious life means to those 
who participate in it. This principle was embodied institutionally at 
McGill University: 'it is formal policy at its Institute of -Islamic Studies 
that half of the teachers .and half of the students be Muslims.' 14 In such 
an atmosphere all the statements may be verified by the Muslims present, 
and the inner meaning of the externalities may be articulated by them. 
(b) The Outer Dimension of Religion - The Observable Data. 
In addition to his emphasis on the meaning of the religious data for men 
of faith, Smith also insisted in these early days that the study of 
religion must involve the historical study of persons. In other words the 
comparative religionist is preserved from gullibility by his historical and 
empirical appreciation of the religious material. The student of religion 
must know that different men will acknowledge different statements at 
different times in his life. Smith was therefore able to write, in the face 
of (for example) a sophisticated Muslim who disparaged village Islam as not 
the real Islam: 'The ,religious historian, of course, with less subtle 
distinctions, takes a religion as he finds it, and has no prejudice which 
keeps him from seeing that a religion, though it uses the same name, may be 
essentially different in different environments•. 15 
In May 1948 Wilfred Cantwell Smith presented his doctoral thesis 'The 
Azhar Journal - Survey and Critique', to the Department of Oriental 
Languages and Literature, Princeton University. This journal, published 
monthly in Cairo, is the official organ of the Azhar Mosque, a great 
16 
Islamic centre in Cairo. Smith examined the content of the editorials and 
articles appearing in the journal since its inception in 1930, noting the 
different stances adopted by contributors during its two editorships: the 
first editor was one of the traditional culama' or classical scholars of 
Islam; the second was a modernist under whom 'a subtle irreligiousness' can 
be discerned to permeate the journal's presentations. Smith's conclusion is 
stated thus in his own summary: 'Those who, in the fullest sense, know the 
religion, have largely lost contact with the modern world, while those 
generally orientated to modernity have to a remarkable degree lost contact 
with their religion'. Smith managed in that work to come to an 
understanding of some of the modern developments in the Arab world as they 
have been seen through Muslim eyes, whilst retaining a right to criticise 
and assess as an outsider. 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith's early approach to the study of religion is 
therefore inherently both personalistic and historical. A know ledge of the 
historical and phenomenological data must be accompanied by, and 
interpreted by, a knowledge of the persons who participate in the religion. 
'To know Islam, as to know any religion, is not only to be appraised 
of, even carefully acquainted with, its institutions, patterns and 
history, but also to apprehend what these mean to those who have the 
faith'. 16 
Both the inner and outer dimensions of religion were important, but it is 
clear that the inner dimension was central to Smith: 
'We hold that behaviour, institutions, creeds and other externalities 
are real and significant, but are not religion. At least they are not 
all of it, and particularly are not faith. Religion, we suggest, is 
what these things mean to men. A study of religion, then, to be 
scientific must deal with meaning, with the personal considered as 
personal, not as an "object".' 17 
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(ii) Smith's Rejection of 'Religion' 
The above survey has shown that these two aspects of the study of 
religion concerned Smith greatly in his early works. It is now possible to 
turn to an analysis of The Meaning and End of Religion in which Smith came 
to reject 'religion' as an unhelpful concept, and developed his own 
understanding of religious life in terms of the personal faith of the 
participants and the cumulative tradition which is accessible to the 
observer. The book is treated here in some detail because of its 
significance for an understanding of all Smith's work, and especially of 
his concept of faith. 
The first chapter introduces some of the major considerations which have 
to be taken into account in the study of religion. In particular, Smith 
points to: the data and methodology of scientific analysis; the 
multiplicity of religious traditions, brought into closer contact by the 
developments of the modern world; the diversities within each tradition; 
the sheer fact of change, affecting all aspects of human life, including 
the religious; and the persistence and 'vitality of faith' despite 'the 
onslaught of modernity•. 18 Most study of religion fails to do justice to 
all these factors, and especially it fails to hold together both the 
external data accessible to the observer and the depth of insight 
intelligible to the man of faith. These difficulties have led some to 
suppose that the whole attempt is futile, preferring either to limit their 
scope to the 'mundane manifestations' 19 of religion, leaving aside 
questions of meaning and transcendence as inaccessible, or to follow their 
own religion without facing the facts of comparative religious history. For 
Smith the quest for an inte11ectua1 understanding of religion is part of a 
larger practical task in the modern world: at the individual level, one 
must ask 'how to find meaning in life'; and at the group level one must ask 
18 
. 'how to turn our nascent world society into a world community'. 20 These 
primarily practical problems nevertheless call for an understanding of 
religion which can do justice to its inner and outer dimensions. 
Intellectual and spiritual questions are forced upon us by the need for 
harmonious coexistence between men of faith; and these are serious 
challenges. As Smith puts it: 
'Unless a Christian can contrive intelligently and spiritually to be a 
Christian not merely in a Christian society or a secular society but 
in a world .... a world in which other intelligent, sensitive, 
educated men are .... Muslims .... then I do not see how a man is to 
be a Christian .... at all.' 21 
In view of the fact that no general definition of religion has been 
fully adequate, Smith suggests that we should shift our attention away from 
a concentration on 'religion' in search of other, more manageable 
categories. He wants to avoid questions about 'the nature of religion', or 
'the essence of Christianity', aiming to approach these issues from another 
perspective - not focusing on 'religion', but rather on 'faith' and 
'cumulative tradition'. Chapters two to five are taken up with an 
his tor leal survey of the use of the term 'religion' and the names of the 
'religions' (Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, etc.) and chapters six to eight 
are a presentation of his alternative perspective. 
Chapter two traces the use of the word and concept 'religion' in the 
West from pre-Christian times to the present day. Smith tries to show that 
major developments have taken place in the usage of this term. 
Pre-Christian images of religio included the designation of 'a power 
outside man obligating him to certain behaviour under pain of threatened 
awesome retribution, a kind of tabu', but it also implied 'the feeling in 
' 22 man vis-a-vis such powers'. It was used of ritual practice and cultlc 
observance and also of personal piety. These two uses are to be found, for 
example, in Lucretius and Cicero respectively, and Smith observes that: 
19 
'/\ great deal of all studies of religion since, including the most 
modern, can be arranged in effect on the one side or the other of this 
dichotomy. There are those on the one hand primarily concerned with 
objective realities, with that outside man to which he is related in 
religion; and those on the other hand primarily concerned with 
subjective attitudes, with the involvement by which he is related'. 23 
The word was taken over into Christian usage, and was frequently used in 
the early centuries to distinguish Christian from pagan rites and 
observances. Religio was used to designate the structural organization of 
the church, 24 and became a title applied to bishops and other clergy. 25 
Smith is greatly interested in the meaning of this word which 'reflects the 
clash of religious systems and the new exclusivist situation•. 26 /\ 
distinction began to be drawn between 'our way of worshipping' and 'your 
r itua1 practices'. 27 Further, these ceremonies and practices could be 
designated vera religio or falsa religio, but not, says Smith, in the sense 
of the 'much more sophisticated and developed notion' that 'one religion is 
true, others fa1se•. 28 St. Augustine used the term, as in the book title De 
Vera Religione, meaning 'On Proper Piety', or 'On Genuine Worship•. 29 For 
Augustine 'true religion means the worship of the one true God•, 30 and it 
represented a personal relationship with the divine. Smith argues that this 
emerging notion of true religion paved the way for a later 
institutionalized meaning. The personal focus of Augustine was nevertheles 
given 
'a Platonic form .... which perhaps enabled others later to think of 
it as a general community possession, eventually identifiable with an 
overt institutional phenomenon.' 31 
After Augustine, religio was little used until the renaissance/ 2 except 
that in the Middle Ages it was used as a designation of the monastic life. 
The major concept was faith. 
In 1474 Ricino published De Christiana Religione, in which the word 
receives a 'new orientation•. 33 In contrast to all the changing customs and 
practices of man, Fucino wrote that religio 'is universal to man .... the 
20 
fundamental distinguishing human characteristic, innate, natural, .... 
primary •... stab1e•. 34 This might be translated as 'religiousness', 
possessed in varying degrees by all men. The ideal, in the platonic sense, 
is the Christian religion, ie., that pertaining to Christ. For whilst it is 
better, in Fucino's eyes, to worship God in any way than not to worship at 
all, the best form of religiousness is that which takes its example from 
Christ. Fucino also wrote a major work entitled Theologica Platonica, in 
which he assigned the name religio to 'his idea of a universal instinct in 
mankind to seek the good, which .... is to seek the divine•. 35 
Luther did not address himself to a concept of religion, being more 
concerned with faith (fides, Glaube). Zwingli and Calvin, however, used 
religion widely. Zwingli 's De Vera et Falsa Religione Commentarius (1525) 
is not concerned to prove 'Christianity' as a better religion than other 
religions, one true and others false. This idea would have been quite 
foreign to him. Instead 'religio is a relation between man and God' and the 
work deals 'with the true and false religio of Christians'. He called men 
from the false religion of 'an oversanctification of popes, councils, 
church authorities', and in modern terminology, from 'the tend<ancy whereby 
men give their allegiance to religion rather than to God'. 36 
Smith suggests that the popularity of Calvin's Christianae Religionis 
Institutio in its many editions and translations had much to do with the 
increasing currency of the phrase 'Christian Religion'. But Smith maintains 
that for Calvin the phrase would not have been understood to mean 'one of 
the religious sytems of the world'; it still carried the sense of 
'Christian piety'. 
It was during the Enlightenment that the name 'religion' was applied to 
the systematic and abstract intellectual constructs which they devised. The 
term was given to the system of the Christian 'religion', and it could be 
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tJsed in the plural to compare systems elaborated in other 'religions'. 
Smith designates that change in use as a change 'from a Platonic to a 
37 propositional concept of truth'. In the case of Hugo de Groot, for 
instance, 
'Traces of the former orientation are to be found, viewing the 
Christian as one instance of a general (Platonic) type, but a 
surpassingly excellent instance, so that it is true religion. On the 
whole, however, he is concerned to show that it is the true religion, 
by proving that its precepts are statements of fact'. 38 
The Enlightenment was a time of schematization, and religion was seen in 
precisely this way: 'Christianity is a scheme•. 39 It was also 'an age of 
controversy and conflict in the religious realm•.40 Religious groups may 
consider their own religion in personal terms 'piety, faith, obedience, 
worship and a vision of God', but controvert with an 'alien "religion" (as) 
a system of beliefs or rituals, an abstract and impersonal pattern of 
observables•. 41 This treatment of religion was essentially that of the 
outsider; but in order to defend his own religion from attack, insiders 
adopted the same stance. This gave nse to the plural 'religions', in 
contrast to words like 'piety, obedience, reverence, worship', none of 
which permit a plural form. Another concept to arise was that of 'religion' 
as 'the total system', a generalization of 'the sum of all systems of 
beliefs•. 42 
The nineteenth century saw three further developments in the notion of 
religion. The first change is to be found in Schleiermacher's On Religion, 
which Smith designates as 'the first book ever written on religion as 
such'. 43 The significance of this work for Smith's purpose is that religion 
is not to be understood as that which is observed but as the inner 
'emotions and dispositions' of the heart. 4 4 Those things which could be 
observed were designated the 'positive religions' by Schleiermacher, and 
the rise of the historical and comparative study of these phenomena gave 
rise to the second develcpment: the concept of religion as 'a 
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self-subsisting transcendent idea that unfolds itself in dynamic expression 
in the course of ever-changing history•. 45 The t~ird development was that 
proposed by Ludwig Feuerbach in his books The Essence of Christianity 46 and 
The Essence of Religio~, 47 namely that religion, and each individual 
religion, has an essence. 'Ever since the hunt has been on', 48 says Smith, 
to find that essence. He comments, 
'This is to carry the process of reification to its logical extreme: 
endowing the concepts that an earlier generation has constructed 
(rather haphazardly, and dubiously, in this case) with a final and 
inherent validity, a cosmic legitimacy'. 49 
This whole development in the word and concept 'religion', Smith calls a 
process of reification, by which inner piety and outward practices are 
turned into systematized entities or constructs which somehow exist 
independently of those who may or may not experience them.50 
Smith concluded chapter two by identifying ways in which 'religion' is 
used today. First there is the sense of personal piety; secondly it refers 
to beliefs, practices, values, etc., as a system of ideals; thirdly it 
relates to these beliefs, practices, values, etc., as they really are 
historiGllly and sociologically; and finally, the word is used to mean 
religion as a generic aspect of human life. Smith proposes that the word 
'religion' be dropped in all but the first sense. 
The third chapter of The Meaning and End of Religion is entitled 'Other 
Cultures. "The Religions"', and here Smith considers whether and how the 
process of reification has affected other cultures and other religious 
traditions. First he notes that among non-civilized peoples, and among 
51 
ancient civilizations and non-European cultures, there are no words 
corresponding to our systematized or generic notions of 'religion'. These 
cultures had words for personal piety, and for aspects of their practices 
and beliefs, but they lacked terms to conceptualize institutional religion, 
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or 'tc;, .. ,_-ri,,·,i:dt:::. ··.:jncep.:ually between the religious and the other 
aspects of (their) society's life•. 52 This lack has caused several cultures 
to adopt words to cover the modern notion. 
Smith next addresses the question as to the way in which the individual 
'religions' have been named. He found that this practice of naming 
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religious traditions is a very late one. With the exception of Islam, 
most of the religions were named for the first time by Westerners in the 
nineteenth century.54 In the seventeenth century most traditions were 
referred to as 'the religion of .... ' and prior to that Smith found 
references to 'the sect of •... '. But with the exception of 'Muhammadanism' 
and its derivatives, the religious '-isms' were an invention of the 
nineteenth century. 55 Only those traditions which did not develop beyond 
the boundaries of the civilizations or communities in which they arose 
escaped this process of naming. Such traditions remained as 'the religion 
of the Incas', etc. 
Smith also observed that this process of naming 'religions' is now to 
some extent being reversed. As western scholars studying Hinduism, 
Buddhism, and so on, have reached a greater appreciation of the 'religions' 
they study, they have increasingly realized that these abstract nouns are 
inappropriate to describe the religious life they observe. For example, one 
scholar writes 'Confucianism, a misleading general term •... '. 56 The 
appellation 'Hinduism' is 'a particularly false conceptualization' in 
Smith's judgement. 57 'Hindu' originally meant the river Indus, and thus the 
territory around it.58 It was not applied as a religious expression until 
the Muslim invasion of India,59 when foreigners, and then natives began to 
so designate the 'indigenous' peoples and their traditional ways. The term 
'Hinduism' did not appear until 1829, when it was applied by Westerners. 
These designations remain confusing to those to whom they are applied,60 
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and distort their rc:iigious life by irnplying a conceptual unity which 
Hindus themselves deny. Smith gives similar accounts of the rise of the 
terms 'Sikhism', 'Buddhism', 'Confucianism', 'Taoism' and 'Shintoism'. 
These terms, and the conceptualizations they imply, were invented and 
applied by people who stood outside the traditions they sought to describe 
and the notions remain foreign to most of the people whose religious life 
they attempt to describe. 
At the end of the chapter Smith turns to 'Judaism' and 'Christianity'. 
The notion of 'Judaism' arose as the Jewish community fought against the 
threatening impact of Greek ways. This was recorded in II Maccabees as a 
struggle primarily, Smith argues, for 'Jewishness'. 61 Whether it originally 
implied an ideal 'Judaism' or an adjectival 'Jewish ness', it soon came to 
be used and seen as the n arne for the Jewish religion. The name 
'Christianity' is first used by Ignatius, whilst under sentence of 
martyrdom. He uses it (Christianismos) in the sense of an ideal by which 
individual Christians should live, and in contrast to that by which Jews 
lived (Iudaismos). 62 But the term was not commonly used until the 
f . 63 re ormatwn. 
Smith concludes that the process of naming a religion is basically the 
work of outsiders, or the product of struggle and conflict. The names, once 
coined, have tended to be used to refer to the historical and empirical 
data, and especially to the doctrines, formulated as abstract intellectual 
constructs. He further concludes that the process of reification, whereby 
the emphasis has shifted from the inner heart to the external and abstract 
aspects of religous life, is common to all the religious traditions as a 
result of Western influence. Thus a large amount of valuable material is 
accumulated by the 'Historians of Religion', but Smith regrets a lack of 'a 
sympathetic insight' into the heart of people's faith: 
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'We havco: learned rnore about "the re!Jgions'', but this has made us 
perhaps less, rather than more, aware of what it is that we have tried 
to mean by "religion".' 64 
Chapter four, entitled 'The Special Case of Islam', shows that despite 
initial appearances to the contrary, the same processes are at work in the 
case of Islam. In Smith's view, the name Islam has come to stand for the 
external, observable data rather than the inner piety of Muslims. Smith 
also traces the emergence of the concept of religion in ancient Persia, and 
its influence on the three great monotheistic traditions.65 
In the fifth chapter of The Meaning and End of Religion, Smith looks 
back over his analysis of religion, and concludes that the concept of 
religion is inadequate. He does not wish to suggest that what we have 
tended to call 'religion', or 'Buddhism', or 'Hinduism', or whatever, do 
not exist. Nor does he claim that these concepts are incapable of making 
any meaningful sense of the religious data. What he does contend is that 
these concepts are 'imprecise and liable to distort what they are asked to 
66 
represent'. 
Smith lists several Christian and other writers who support this view 
that the concept of 'religion' and the names of the 'religions' are 
inadequate.67 No great religious leader68 ever 'founded a religion', and no 
reformer preached religion. All called men from a preoccupation with 
mundane institutions and systematic formularies, to the transcendent beyond 
them, to an awareness of life in all its wholeness. The engage' participant 
is not able to recognise in 'religion' an adequate account of his personal 
relationship with the divine; the notion misses the heart of the matter. 
The concept is essentially that of the outsider. But Smith urges that it is 
ultimately inadequate for the outsider or observer as well: the concept 
fails to grasp the heart and transcendent context of the religious man's 
life, and thus gives the outsider a distorted view. 'Outsiders, .... in 
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their conception of other ;ner.'s celjgions, !lave tended to drain these of 
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any but mundane content'. Further, the notion of an essence of religion, 
or of a particular religion, is too rigid to encompass the rich diversity 
of a dynamic life of faith. For, 'what exists cannot be defined•. 70 It 
might be possible to define 'an ideal Christianity', for instance, but 'not 
the empirical Christianity of history, not the actual religious life or the 
actual institutions of Christians in all their ramifying and diverse 
b . . . I 71 o Jectlvlty. 
Smith concludes the chapter by stating and demonstrating the inadequacy 
of five ways of understanding the names of a particular religion. (i) To 
see it as the earliest form of religion is 'virtually to .... assert that 
. h h d h. ' 72 ( .. ) T . h 1 d . It as a no Istory. 11 o see It as t e owest common Enorrunator 
between a group of people is to deny its richness. (iii) To see it as a 
transcendent ideal having 'a succession of mundane and therefore imperfect, 
compromised manifestations• 73 is to miss the point that it is predse1y 
mundane and imperfect human beings who are involved with religion. (iv) To 
see it as a series of ideals that (eg.) 'Muslims have held of Is1am• 74 IS 
both to overlook the imperfections of the Muslim and to ignore the Muslim's 
claim that Islam is beyond his own understanding of it. (v) To limit the 
term to history alone is to forget that 'faith is greater than its 
history•. 75 The transcendent, the abiding, the ideal, is tied up with the 
mundane, with the changes and imperfections of history. 
So Smith rejects the concept of religion as inadequate to comprehend 
human religious life, and proposes two new concepts: faith and cumulative 
tradition. 
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(Iii) Smith's New Concepts: Faith and Cumulative Tr;;.:,;_ion 
In the first five chapters of The Meaning and End of Religion which have 
been examined above, Smith has striven to demonstrate the inadequacy of the 
concept 'religion' and the distortions implicit in naming the 'religions'. 
It was against this that he offers his own conceptualization of religious 
life in term of cumulative tradition and faith. The analysis arose from the 
recognition that the man of religious faith lives, as it were, in two 
worlds: the mundane and the transcendent. The existence and nature of the 
transcendent sphere, and its relationship with the mundane are issues which 
have long taxed students of religion, and Smith proposes that scholars must 
acknowledge that these are open questions. He therefore proposes to bypass 
these questions in order to continue with the study of religious life, 
rather than to postpone the study until these questions have been resolved. 
Whatever the link between these two spheres metaphysically or 
theologically, the link historically is man. Man's involvement with the 
transcendent Smith calls faith. The externals of religious life are part of 
the mundane world with which the man of faith is involved, and Smith gives 
them the name cumulative tradition. In his view this way of conceptualizing 
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mankind's religious life is acceptable to both participant and observer. 
The first example given of cumulative tradition in chapter six is that 
of the Hindus. The unknown writer of the Creation hymn in Book X of the 
J3-g-Veda inherited a particular tradition up to his time including ' 
almost certainly, many of the other hymns now collected into the f3.g-Veda, 
••.• rites and practices, norms, ideas, group pressures, family influences, 
b 1 . 1 . . . d h '77 All voca u ary, soc1a mst1tutwns, an w at not .... these were 
external to him, and may be observed by analysts. He received this 
cumulative tradition, and added to it new hymns. 
'He added to it something that emerged from the interaction within his 
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own personality between that external tradition and some p.-:rsona] 
quality of his own .... ' 
' ..•. inside that man's person something un<;>bservable happened of 
which the outward consequence was a new hymn. And this product of his 
faith was thereupon added to the cumulative tradition, which has 
therefore never been quite the same since.'78 
The cumulative tradition Is thus seen as a constantly changing 
historical deposit which 'sets the context for the faith of each new 
generation•/ 9 serving as 'windows through which' men and women of faith 
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'see a world beyond'. It inspires in those who inherit it an 
understanding of its meaning and a vision of transcendent truth, which, 
when expressed, modifies and transforms the tradition. Likewise the humble 
participant in just one small segment of the cumulative tradition 
'interiorizes it to make what she can or will of its meaning, 
translating the outer forms into a personal faith, petty or profound; 
and then in turn she hands it on to her son, modified in an outward 
sense perhaps only minutely or negligibly, yet personalized. If it 
meant nothing to her inside, the historian may be sure that the next 
generation would handle even its externals differently.' 81 
The notion of cumulative tradition is then illustrated from Islam and 
Christianity. In these 'historically orientated' faiths82 historical events 
may themselves be transcendent (eg. the figure of Jesus as divine, or the 
Qur'an) but this does not invalidate Smith's analysis. Instead it fully 
recognizes that the study of 'religion' must adequately account for both 
the mundane and the transcendent. The Islamic cumulative tradition as an 
evolving historical phenomenon was altered, for example, by the elaboration 
c . c 
of the shari ah as a legal system by a1 - Shafi r. It is possible, and 
important to see how the Islamic tradition became 'what it has observably 
become •..• by gradual and complex historical processes that can be 
studied'. 83 The meanings and interpretations which Muslim faith may find do 
not invalidate the recognition that there are observable historical forces 
at work here. Again, the Christian cumulative traditions known to different 
Christians at different places and in different eras have been profoundly 
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divergent, but within or through them, the transcendent has been perceived 
by men of faith. The idea of cumulative tradition aJJows the observer 'to 
do justice to the diversity of the phenomena and at the same time not to do 
violence to a conviction of those involved that through it all there is a 
common element of transcendence•. 84 
Smith is concerned to show that his concept is not to be seen as an 
entity in its own right, as the concept of religion has been (wrongly) 
seen. Instead he claims that it is 
'a human construct offered to order what is given. It is a devise by 
which the human mind may rewardingly and without distortion introduce 
intelligibility into the vast flux of human history or any given part 
of it. It refers •... to something intelligible, and empirically 
knowable, though not to an independent entity, intrinsically coherent 
or self-subsisting'.85 
Smith's exposition of the notion of faith is contained in the seventh 
chapter of The Meaning and End of Religion. The chapter is taken up 
primarily, however, not with faith itself, but with the observable 
expressions of faith. Faith itself is not open to observation, but the 
outsider can see 'the role that it has played in the religious history of 
mankind•.86 Faith expresses itself 'in words, both prose and poetry; in 
patterns of deeds, both ritual and morality; in art, in institutions, in 
87 law, in community, in character; and in still many other ways'. In each 
case it is impossible to grasp fully the outward phenomena without an 
appreciation of the inner faith of which it is an expression. 
Religious art 1s the first obvious example discussed by Smith. The 
materials of the work are mundane, but 'its significance lies in the fact 
that it points beyond itself' first 'to the spirit of the man who framed it 
and beyond him to the transcendent vision that he saw•.88 It thus gives 
expression also to the faith of those 'who continue reverently to cherish' 
the work of art. 89 
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Secondly he considers the expressions of faith in community. Although 
Smith believes that religious faith is personal, he does not accept that it 
1s 'individualistic'. 9° Community and social institutions are cohesive 
because they express personal faith, and whilst these obtain a momentum and 
life of their own once formed, they gradually disintegrate if members fail 
to see them as expressions of personal faith. 
Next Smith comments on the expressions of faith in character, and m 
ritual and moral practice. Then comes an important section on the 
expressions of faith in prose formulations of creed and theology. The 
peculiarly high significance attached to these in the Christian tradition 
has been due in part to the influence of Greek thought. Another factor to 
affect Western Christendom was the lack of a verb associated with the noun 
'faith' (fides, foi) such that the verb 'believe' (credo, croire, etc) has 
had to be used, giving rise to considerable confusion. 91 Smith holds that 
language is the instrument of meaning for persons, as such it cannot be 
meaningful in itself. Religious language is not statements of propositional 
truth, but can be the vehicle for expressing the faith of persons who are 
involved with transcendence. Questions of truth, Smith argues, should not 
be asked until we have understood that religious statements are expresswns 
of personal faith rather than of propositional truth. 92 
This procedure ensures that our presuppositions do not distort our 
analysis. Smith does not exclude a critical assessment of doctrines: 'I 
certainly do not mean that all religious doctrines are equally true, just 
as one would hardly hold that all works of art are equally beautiful or all 
ethical systems equally good'. 9 3 Intellectual formulations refer to a 
transcendent reality only indirectly, that is, through the life of those 
persons whose faith the formulations express. Smith quotes Aulen in 
support: 'Theology .... does not determine faith, but analyses Christian 
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faith as it actually is•. 94 The section ends with the following summary: 
'Theology is part of the traditions, is part of this world. Faith lies 
beyond theology, in the hearts of men. Truth lies beyond faith, in the 
heart of God'.95 
So Smith begins to show how faith functions in the religious life of 
mankind. Like all the really significant human qualities: love, loyalty, 
despair, etc., faith itself is unobservable. It functions as the locus of 
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'a dialectical process between the mundane and the transcendent'. The 
cumulative tradition will be different for each individual, since each will 
have experienced subtly or profoundly different exposures to previous 
expressions of faith. No two person's faith will be identical, indeed no 
individual's faith is static, but 'new every morning', and giving rise to 
fresh expressions, or 'deposits'. These deposits constitute the cumulative 
tradition of the next generation, through which their faith is germinated 
and nourished. The mundane results of faith are the cumulative traditions, 
and these are the mundane causes of the personal faith for those who 
. . . h d. . 97 I h S . h 1· part1c1pate m t e tra 1t10n. n a summary paragrap , mlt out mes how 
the dialectic would operate for an individual within a tradition. 
'Each person is presented with a cumulative tradition, and grows up 
among other persons to whom that tradition is meaningful. From it and 
them, and out of the capacities of his own inner life and the 
circumstances of his outer life, he comes to a faith of his own. The 
tradition, in its tangible actualities, and his fellows, in their 
comparable participation, nourish his faith and give it shape. His 
faith, in turn, endows the cmcrete tradition with more than intrinsic 
significance, and encourages his fellows to persist in their similar 
involvement'.98 
Smith believes it is possible (and necessary, if we are to properly 
apprehend human religious life) to become aware of, and to understand the 
faith of other persons. Such an understanding can never be 'with complete 
assurance but with reasonable confidence•, 99 and it is the new task of 
comparative religious studies to address this aspect of religious faith. 
Such study will be indirect; 'The proper study of mankind is by 
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inference', 100 treating the observable traditions as signposts to the 
personal faith of those involved. This is essentially an historical 
procedure for understanding what faith has been in actuality, rather than a 
philosophical analysis of what faith is. Indeed Smith asserts strongly that 
this is the only way to correctly understand faith, 'To see faith truly is 
to see it actually, not ideally•. 101 Only in abstraction can one see faith 
as identical from man to man, even within the same tradition. The evidence 
of the empirical data of religious study makes it plain that in historical 
reality men's faith has differed. This analysis applies not only to the 
observer, but also to the participant. For the man of faith recognizes that 
'We are all persons, clustered in mundane communities, no doubt, and 
labelled with mundane labels but, so far as transcendence is 
concerned, encountering it each dire:::tly, personally, if at all'.102 
It is not some theoretical abstraction (eg. The Christian Religion, or even 
the Christian Faith) which is fundamental to the man of faith, but the 
actual historical reality of personal faith. Thus Smith is able to assert 
that 'faith not only is, but ought to be, mundane•. 103 The point of unity 
for men is not therefore their cumulative traditions nor the faith by which 
they respond, but 'the transcendent' itself. 'The traditions evolve. Men's 
faith varies. God endures.• 104 
In the concluding chapter of The Meaning and End of Religion, Smith 
admits that he has deliberately eschewed a detailed examination of the 
'nature' of faith and cumulative tradition, and hopes that it might be 
possible to attempt such a study in the future. But he urges his readers to 
reassess the conceptual framework which we have inherited. In place of 
'religion' he urges us to recognize the 'amalgam of inner piety, outer 
, . , I 105 h' h h h d 'b d , f 1 f . h d mst1tut1on , w 1c e as escn e m terms o persona alt an 
cumulative tradition. He wants the word 'religion' to be dropped, in all 
but the sense of 'piety'; the plural 'religions' is therefore improper, and 
the names of the various 'religions' should likewise be dropped. He wants 
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to retain the adjecti'.'dJ fot·in 'religious', as this is consistent with his 
personalist understanding. He also notes three areas in which his thesis 
might be tested: the discipline of the 'history of religions', 
inter-religious dialogue, and personal affirmation of believers. In each 
case the proposed conceptualizations must enable observers and participants 
to better comprehend human religious life. 
Smith particularly commends his analysis to the Christian church, whose 
theology must be 'more closely attuned both to contemporary history and to 
the fullness and majesty of God', observing that 'the two important 
movements of Christian thought in the twentieth century so far, liberalism 
and neo-orthodoxy, have been orientated to one or the other of these, not 
to both•. 106 Innovation and novelty are demonstrable facts of theology in 
the past, and Smith wants to provide for the· emergence of 
'self-consciousness• 107 as a feature of religious history. For we are 
involved intimately In the formulation of the cumulative tradition, in the 
interpenetration of traditions, and in the theological expressions of 
faith. In this process Smith calls us to be 'conscious and responsible• 108 
participants. His vision of the 'new age' is clear, 
'Men of different religious communities are going to have to 
collaborate to construct jointly and deliberately the kind of world of 
which men of different religious communities can jointly approve, as 
well as one in which they can jointly participate'.109 
'On the threshold of that new age', Smith writes, 
'The end of religion, in the classical sense of its purpose and goal, 
that to which it points and may lead, is God. Contrariwise, God is the 
end of religion also in the sense that once he appears vividly before 
us, in His depth and love and unrelenting truth all else dissolves; or 
at least the religious paraphernalia drop back to their due and 
mundane place, and the concept "religion" is brought to an end.' 11 0 
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(iv; the --:oncept of Faith - Insights Gained 1n this Section. 
This section has traced the development of the concept of faith and 
cumulative tradition in some of Smith's early works, and particularly m 
his major work The Meaning and End of Religion. In order to clarify his 
notion of faith which is begining to emerge, the following points are 
summarised. 
(a) The concept of faith, together with cumulative tradition, provides a 
more satisfying way of understanding human religious life than does a 
concept of 'religion'. 
(b) The cumulative tradition is Smith's name for the whole range of 
external, observable phenomena of religious life. It is constantly 
changing; and since each person will have access to slightly different 
aspects of this historical deposit, each person may be said to have their 
own cumulative tradition. 
(c) Faith is the inner, personal dimension of religious life which 
cannot be observed as such by the outsider. 
(d) Faith is Smith's name for man's involvement with the transcendent, 
Yet faith is not itself transcendent, it is the participant's present 
awareness of that transcendence/eternity/God. 
(e) Faith and cumulative tradition are in a dialectical relationship 
with each other. The cumulative tradition enables, nurtures and generates 
faith, by which the participant gains insight, inspiration, etc. The 
cumulative tradition 'shapes' faith, and is the means through which the 
person of faith relates to the transecendent. His faith affects his 
observable behaviour, eg. his character, his art, his theological 
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statements, and thes·'· thus add to the constantly changing deposit of the 
cumulative tradition. 
(f) Faith itself is not static, but changes from person to person, and 
within the same person from day to day. 
(g) Although faith itself cannot be observed directly, its effects and 
expressions can be seen, in arts, creeds, character, etc. 
(h) It is possible to understand the faith of another person by 
inference through a sensitive study of its effects, and by establishing 
what these religious expressions mean to the person concerned. 
(i) Faith should be studied as it actually has been, rather than as it 
theoretically could be. 
(j) Since the cmcept of faith should be acceptable as a working tool to 
both observer and participant, it provides a sound basis for the 
establishment of a self-conscious world community in which people of all 
religious communities may participate with respect and approval. 
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Section 2.2. Faith and Belief 
This section outlines Smith's understanding of belief; how belief 
differs from his concept of faith; and how faith and belief are related. It 
has already been noted that Smith regards creeds and theological statements 
t f h 1 . d" . 111 h t • t f f . h as par s o t e cumu ative tra Itwn; t ese are expressiOns o ait , 
and not to be confused with faith itsel£. 112 Smith then developed this view 
m Belief and History and Faith and Belief, although he also tackles some 
f h . . . he 113 o t e Issues m varwus ot r works. 
(i) The History of Believing 
Belief and History was originally delivered as a series of lectures at 
the University of Virginia, 1974 - 1975. Its main purpose is to subject the 
word 'believe' to historical investigation, and to examine its Biblical 
occurtence. The book begins with a consideration of the contribution of the 
linguistic philosophers to our understanding of religious language and 
meaning. It may be fairly said that Smith has little time for linguistic 
h"l h" 1 . . 114 d h h d . '1 k f . p 11 osop Ica niceties, an ere e a mlts to a ac o senous 
acquaintance' with current philosophical views. 115 He nevertheless feels 
able to dismiss their literature as 'rather superficial, and 
. 1 I 116 • h • h f "1 d ck . h h 1" . d Irre evant , argumg t at It as ai e to re on Wit t e re Igwus an 
historical quality or the comparative contexts of religious statements. 117 
These particular criticisms might be to some extent valid, but his argument 
is not helped by his failure to understand the import of the linguistic 
philosophers' concerns. 118 
He then goes on to trace 'the modern history of "believing"'. In brief, 
he argues that 'I believe' originally meant I hold dear, I love (cf. 
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belove), give allegiance to, value highly; but it has come to mean in the 
twentieth century 'I hold an opinion', indeed it denotes a degree of 
. b h . . 119 H 1· h . h. h uncertamty a out t at opmwn. e out mes t ree stages m t 1s c ange 
of meaning. First there was a shift from a personal to an impersonal object 
of the verb, so that, for example, it changed from describing a trusting 
relationship between two people, to describing a person's word as 
trustworthy, and further, to describing a propositional 'belief that' some 
120 
statement is true. The second stage was a shift from the first person to 
the third person as the subject of the verb. 'I believe' gave way in large 
part to 'he, they be)ieve', such that the element of personal trust gave 
way to the assertion that he or they hold certain opinions. 121 The third 
stage was a shift in the relation between belief and truth. Whereas the 
verb initially implied a knowledge of what was true and a giving of the 
heart in commitment to that, Smith observes that the word came to imply a 
degree of uncertainty or hesitancy, and at last falsehood. 122 The modern 
meaning of believe, Smith asserts, is to hold an opinion, regardless of 
whether or not that opinion is true. 
In the final chapter of Belief and History Smith sets out to examine the 
Biblical use of the word 'believe'. He argues that the idea of holding an 
opinion about a proposition is not a notion which appears in the Bible. In 
other words, the concept of belief, holding various opinions about 
doctrinal statements, is not a Biblical concept. The key Biblical and 
religious category is faith. Furthermore, this key concept is normally used 
in an absolute sense - without any reference to an object. The Bible, he 
maintains, draws attention to faith itself, not to faith in this or that. 
Faith may indeed have an object, (eg. God, Christ, etc.) as may love; but 
as in the case of love, Smith sees faith as a personal. quality - and 
insists that this is the Biblical perspective. 123 
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(ii) Faith and Belief 
In Belief and History Smith had shown that believing, ie. holding an 
opinion about propositions, was not a major concern for the New Testament 
writers; in his next book, Faith and Belief, he shows that it has not been 
the major concern within any religious' tradition (including the Christian 
tradition) until modern times. He also examines the relationship between 
faith and belief, and outlines the intellectual dimension of faith. 
He examines the relationship between faith and belief from the 
standpoint of each of the religious traditions in turn; Buddhist, Islamic, 
Hindu and Christian. The Islamic and some of the Christian material is 
discussed in the relevant sections below, 124 whilst the Buddhist and Hindu 
material must be omitted as outside the limits of this study. These 
specific presentations are followed by an expanded and developed version of 
the material which Smith had already presented in Belief and History and 
which has already been outlined above. 125 The introduction and conclusion 
of Faith and Belief hold together and build upon the specific 
presentations, and make general observations about the nature of faith and 
belief in global, comparative context. The introduction and conclusion are 
therefore considered in this and the following sections. Unfortunately this 
rather piecemeal treatment does not capture the grandure of this remarkable 
book, in which Smith's comparative and historical abilities are amply 
demonstrated. It is probably his most significant book to date, although 
the thesis of The Meaning and End of Religion is more immediately 
startling, and has so far received more attention in studies of his work. 
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{a) Faith and Belief in Global Perspective. 
The introduction of Faith and Belief begins with a basic resume of 
Smith's notion of faith as a quality of human life; a quality 'that has 
been expressed in, has been elicited, nurtured and shaped by, the religious 
traditions of the wor1d•. 126 He is concerned with 'fides quaerens 
intellectum, faith in pursuit of self-understanding •... the search for 
127 
conceptual clarification of man's relation to transcendence'. In this 
context he lists three aims for his work: to call attention to the 
128 importance of this problem, to concentrate on the relation between faith 
and belief as 'an interim step towards elucidating the nature of man's 
faith•, 129 and beyond that there is the 'aspiration .•.• to make a 
contribution towards a new planetary self-consciousness about faith•. 130 
The rest of the introductory chapter attempts to set the faith/belief 
issue in global perspective with three general observations. First, 
religious beliefs have differed radically over history and between 
cultures, whereas religious faith has been considerably more constant. This 
is not to say 'that faith is everywhere the same •.•. faith is too personal 
for that'. But, 
'the variety of faith seems on the whole less than the variety of 
forms through which faith has been expressed', and ' •.•. such variety 
of faith as is found cuts across formal religious boundaries'.l31 
The historian of religion is able to report that faith as a personal 
quality of human living is to be found in other religious communities. 'At 
its best' such faith 
'has taken the form of serenity and courage and loyalty and service: a 
quiet confidence and joy which enable one to feel at home in the 
universe, and to find meaning in the world and in one's own life, a 
meaning that is profound and ultimate, and is stable no matter what 
may happen to oneself at the level of immediate event. Men and women 
of this kind of faith face catastrophe and confusion, affluence and 
sorrow, unperturbed; face opportunity with conviction and drive; and 
face others with a cheerful charity.' 132 
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At the opposite extreme from this pos1 tive quality of faith 'stands the 
mean, cramping faith of blind and fanatical particularism'. Again 'the 
opposite of faith is this (positive) sense is nihilism, a bleak inability 
to find either the world around one, or one's own life, significant•. 133 
A global perspective on faith and beliefs reveals, secondly, that the 
relationship between these has varied from place to place and from century 
to century. For example, belief has always played a more important tole in 
the Christian church than in other faith communities, in which theological 
precision has sometimes been regarded' with suspicion. 
Thirdly, Smith reaffirms his conviction that beliefs are expressions of 
faith, and thus part of the tradition which serves to arouse and nourish 
faith in other people. But 
'Beliefs have the very special quality, among faith's many 
expressions, of being subject to the imperious pressure to be true 
•.•• symbolically true and straightforwardly true .... By 
"symbolically true", we mean that life lived in terms of them should 
be true: true in relation to the mundane environment in which it is 
lived, and truly human, in the highest, final, cosmic sense'. 
'The faith which any symbol expresses or elicits ought to be true 
faith. A belief, in addition, insofar as it is prepositionally 
structured, is expected also to be cast in the form of true 
statements'. 134 
(b) Faith as Generically Human 
In the conclusion to Faith and Belief Smith refuses to attempt a 
definitive answer to the nature of faith itself, insisting that he has 
cleared the ground for further thinking rather than reached a final 
understanding of faith. He does argue, however, on the basis of his 
comparative and historical studies, that faith is to be seen as generically 
human. 
'Whatever idea of faith one may form, it must be an idea adequate to 
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faith as a global human quality'. 135 
'Standard man is man of faith; and negative secularity is a strange 
and sometimes fierce asceticism directed against the spirit, which it 
can suppress but cannot eliminate. Faith is not something extra to 
human life, but essential'. 136 
Smith observes that in each faith community, 'A person is not a human being 
and then also a Jew, or also a Christian, or a Muslim. One is a human being 
by being one or other of them'. These are 'various ways in which man has 
been man•. 137 
It is only a modern aberration of secularists to suggest that man is 
merely empirical and unrelated to transcendence. 'To think or feel that 
human behaviours may on occasion be inhuman, that people may be "less than 
human", that, unlike crocodiles, we persons may become or fail to become 
our true selves, is to recognize "man" as a transcendent and not merely an 
empirical concept'. 'Faith bespeaks· involvement in transcendence•. 138 Or, 
to speak theologically, 'Faith .... is .... Man's responsive involvement in 
the activity of God's dealing with humankind•. 139 
Having insisted that faith is a normal generically human quality, Smith 
then insists that it is not automatic. It is always unpredictable and 
I b" · 1 • h" 1 140 u 1qu1tous y astoms mg . 
(c) Beliefs: a Group's Intellectual Formulation of Truth 
The change in the meaning of the term 'believe' which Smith has outlined 
in Belief and History and Faith and Belief corresponds to a change in 
worldview. The major change is from a medieval Christian worldview to a 
modern, secular scientific rational worldview, or the replacement 'of a 
transcendence-orienta ted outlook by one increasingly impervious to anything 
loftier than the empirical•. 141 This 'new non-transcendence-orientated 
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culture', which Smith reckons to be the 'first such in human history', 142 
is accompanied by new concepts which serve and perpetuate the worldview. 
The present concept of believing 'is part and parcel of (this) particular 
hl.storl·cal l·deology•. 143 Th. d h 1 d f. d h 1s an at er new y re- e me concepts, sue as 
'knowledge' and 'truth', all tend towards a 'depersonalized and 
detranscendentalized' notion of reality, where knowledge of the truth is 
supposed to be 'objective' and 'amoral', indifferent to the life of the 
observer. The concept of 'belief' as holding an opinion, became a way of 
reducing the faith and perceptions of others to mundane terms. The church 
has contributed to this by its own increasingly secular stance whilst still 
holding on to the traditional words 'believe' and 'belief'. It also 
contributed by its negative attitude to the faith of other groups -
interpreting such faith as 'mere' beliefs. 
Smith notes, however, that certain concepts have escaped the 
dehumanizing and detranscendentalizing trends: symbol, myth, and especially 
understanding, insight, seeing the point, awareness, recognizing. 144 All 
these retain an essential element of personal engagement, meaning that one 
not only knows the facts but also appreciates the meaning. Indeed failure 
to understand is an intellectual shortcoming with these concepts. When 
trying to grasp what another group (whether in the past or present) has 
understood, Smith contends that we must 'go beyond what we think that they 
145 believed' in order to gain an understanding of what they meant. 
The attempt to understand our fellow men is not, in Smith's view, to 
sidestep the questions of truth. This matter is pursued further in section 
2.3. below. But his analysis does suggest that a revision is needed in our 
current notions of truth and knowledge and belief, in order to re-establish 
their personal locus. In this context a belief should be seen as 'an 
intellectual formulation in the mind of some person or group •... of the 
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truth, insofar as that person or group has apprehended it I 146 
In Smith's view it becomes more helpful to divide beliefs into two 
categories: not true and false, but those held by oneself and one's own 
group, and those held by other people and their groups. According to Smith 
we have an imperative obligation to ensure that our own beliefs and 
affirmations are true, and an imperative obligation to ensure that we 
understand the beliefs and affirmations of others. In this way we retain a 
responsible attitude to truth and commit ourselves to following it, without 
dismissing the views of others. 
The understanding of belief outlined in this section raises various 
questions relating to the nature of truth, and these are considered in 
section 2.3. below. 
(iii) The Concept of Faith - Summary of Insights Gained m this Section 
This section has compared the concept of faith with that of belief, and 
examined something of the interrelation between them. The following points 
may be noted. 
(a) Faith is quite different from the modern notion of believing, which 
denotes holding an opinion. 
(b) Faith is a key Biblical concept, but belief IS not. 
(c) Faith is a personal quality, a universal human characteristic. 
(d) The effects of this personal quality of faith are not limited to any 
one tradition, but are to be observed as living realities in all religious 
communities. 
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(e) The function of beliefs for people of faith is to give intellectual 
expression to the truth insofar as that person or group has apprehended it. 
Hence the beliefs of others are to be respected and understood. 
These insights raise several questions relating to the nature of truth, 
and these are discussed in the following section. 
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Section 2.3. Faith and Truth· 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith's insistence that religion should be understood 
in terms of faith and cumulative tradition at once raises various questions 
concerning the nature of truth. If beliefs and doctrinal statements are to 
be regarded as part of the changing cumulative tradition, is truth simply 
reduced to a mundane, historical, changeable idea? If personal faith is 
taken as central, does truth become a purely private matter of existential 
experience? How are we to explain the contradictory truth-claims found 
within the traditions? What is the importance of truth for persons of 
faith? These and other questions were tackled by Smith at various points, 
mostly before his thorough analysis of belief. 
The aim of this section is to consider the nature of truth in Smith's 
understanding of religious life, and how this affects his understanding of 
faith. 
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(i) The Locus of Truth is Persons. 
The first point to be noted about Smith's concept of truth is that truth 
is not primarily a quality of statements or propositions, but of persons. 
It has already been noted that for Smith, faith is not an item in a 
religion but a quality in some men's hearts; he now argues that the same is 
also the case with truth - its locus is persons, not religions or beliefs 
or theological formulations. 
This idea was argued or hinted at in several of Smith's works, 147 but 
perhaps the clearest is his paper 'A Human View of Truth'. 148 The paper was 
delivered in 1970 at a conference held in Birmingham under the chairmanship 
of John Hick. It is clear from the published proceedings that Smith's work 
received considerable attention at the conference. 149 The concluding 
article by Hick is a critique of Smith's contribution, and the book ends 
with a 'rejoinder' from Smith himsel£. 150 
In 'A Human View of Truth' Smith draws attention to the fact that 
although truth is normally understood in contemporary Western society in 
propositional terms, this has not always been the case, and some other 
cultures have continued to understand truth differently. He cites medieval 
Arabic notions of truth as an example. The Arabic root ~adaqa emphasises 
the personal integrity of the person involved. Thus the verbal noun derived 
from this root, ta~diq, is not primarily about generating logical or even 
accurate statements, but concerns recognizing the truth and subscribing to 
it for oneself. The observer must incorporate it into his 'own moral 
integrity as a person'. 151 It has to do with speaking or affirming the 
truth, and with verifying or confirming it, but even beyond this it carries 
the idea of taking steps to actualize the truth, to make it come true. 
Smith illustrates this with a passage from al - 'fabari, in which 'He refers 
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to a group of people who spoke the truth with their tongues, but did not go 
. h h h d . d d- . h . d d I 1 52 on to g1ve w at t ey a sa1 ta~ 1q m t e1r ee s. 
The Western propositional notion of truth, then, is not universal; the 
medieval Arabic notion may be called personalist, as it puts the emphasis 
on the persons involved rather than the propositions. Although Smith is not 
able to demonstrate his case conclusively, he goes on to use the moral 
argument that it is in fact better to view truth in personal terms, and the 
cultural argument that the devaluation of this aspect of truth constitutes 
a serious cultural loss. 
It should perhaps be mentioned here, also, that the medieval Muslim 
153 theologians more or less equated faith with ta~dTq, an equation which 
comes very close to Smith's own understanding, as will become clear in 
section 2.3.(viii), below. 
(ii) Religious Material can BECOME True for Persons 
In Questions of Religious Truth Wilfred Cantwell Smith examined several 
issues relating to the notion of truth. In the book's third chapter, he 
asks 'can religions be true or false?' The idea that a religion can be true 
or false is widespread, but of course in Smith's scheme such an idea could 
not be envisaged. He asserts that truth does not reside in religion or in 
religious teaching, but in persons. He then goes on to say that a religious 
teaching can become true for the person of faith as he participates in his 
religious tradition and makes it become true in his life. 
Smith can therefore go on to recogmse that his own Christianity is 'not 
very' true - in other words he does not live up to it at a constant level. 
He can also make a similar point about some Muslims, who 
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'have tended to affirm that Islam is the true religion; and .... 
(have) neglected to heed the warning that even so it requires to 
become true in their personal, concrete life, have lulled themselves 
into complacency by passively applauding its abstract truth while 
doing nothing about it, or by basking in the assurance that this true 
religion contains within itself the ideal solution to all man's 
problems, while those problems in fact go unsolved, partly because 
their personal Islam is not a living, dynamic, true faith.' 154 
From this analysis of religious truth it is clear that for Smith, faith 
is that active response of life by which a religious tradition and its 
theology becomes true for the person. Truth should not be seen as an 
abstract concept, but must be related to the lives and faith of persons. 155 
This understanding of truth may be illustrated by taking the question 
which Smith asks in Questions of Religious Truth, chapter two, 'Is the 
Qur'an the Word of God?' 156 This question is problematic, and cannot be 
answered by a straight yes or no, because intelHgent and sincere men are 
to be found on both sides. Smith contends that it is not enough to hold 
some abstract theological notion of the Word of God. The Qur'an may become 
the Word of God for people as they hear God speaking through it, and as 
they put it into effect in their lives. As such the initial question 
becomes an historical rather than an abstract theological one. In this way 
Smith feels that Muslims and Christians can begin to approach the question 
in the same way. 
'The historical facts that give sense to the proposition that the 
Qur'an is a mundane product, can no more be gainsaid by Muslims than 
can, by outside observers, the religious facts that give sense to the 
proposition that it is a divine word, a power of God unto salvation 
for those who believe'.l57 
This does not mean tha.t Muslims and Christians will cease to differ, but 
'intellectually their understandings must converge, even if morally they 
choose to respond differently•. 158 So the statement, 'the Qur'an is the 
word of God' is not simply true or false. It can become true in the lives 
of individuals. 'It becomes true through faith•. 159 
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(iii) Th~ ... I.~!·ecedence of_~~he __ eersonal or Moral Aspect of Truth over the 
Abstract Logical Aspect 
It was noted above that Smith employs the moral argument that his 
personalistic notion of truth is better than the propositional. This is 
because he regards moral integrity as more crucial than a conceptual 
clarity which lacks personal m orality. 160 
This sort of moral reasoning is used in another of Smith's papers, 
originally presented to a group of theologians in Montreal in 1 961, and 
reproduced in The Faith of Other Men. 161 The basic point m this lecture is 
that in our relations with people of other religious traditions, the matter 
of truth is not solely an issue of logical propositions - it is also a 
moral engagement. Where a logical theological statement leads to immoral 
behaviour, the moral considerations should lead to a rejection of the 
statement, however logical it may be within its own framework. He quotes as 
an example the statement 'without the particular knowledge of God in Jesus 
Christ, men do not really know God at all'. This, he maintains, encourages 
arrogance, and is therefore to be rejected, irrespective of its supposed 
truth within a body of Christian dogma. 162 
Commenting on the conflict between theology and ethics, Smith admits, 
'If I had to choose, I personally would choose the moral dimension of 
Christian faith; for I feel that of the two, it is the more truly 
Ch . . ,163 nst1an. 
(iv) The 'Objective' Side of Truth 
In view of what has been said about the primacy of personalistic truth 
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over propositional truth in Smith's understanding, it is perhaps necessary 
to redress the balance by recording that Smith does not regard the 
propositional element as being unimportant. He has often been accused of 
proposing a very individualistic idea of the 'truth for me', which might be 
different from the 'truth for you'. In fact he argues specifically against 
I h ll'b'l' ,164 d I . . 11 . . . I 165 s eer gu 1 1 1 ty an mere smcenty or we -meanmg mtentwn . 
He also asserts quite specifically that his 'argument is not at all that 
one should choose personal morality rather than objective truth •... When 
truth is seen as personal, a man's statements must not only cohere within 
his .... inner life, but must also relate to objective facts in (an) 
166 
exacting fashion'. 
This leads on to two further observations about Smith's understanding of 
truth in an interfaith context. The first is Smith's concern to ensure that 
students of religion allow their statments about other people's faith to be 
verified by the people involved. This point has already been noted in 
section 2.1. above, and in 'A Human View of Truth' Smith advances it as a 
principle 'that no statement about human affairs is true that cannot be 
, , 11 , d b h b h h , d I 167 ex1stent1a y appropnate y t ose a out w om t e statement IS ma e . 
This verification principle is further elaborated in Towards a World 
Theology, as 
'No statement involving persons is valid .... unless theoretically its 
validity can be verified both by the persons involved and by critical 
observers not involved' .168 
The second observation is that which was made in section 2.2. above; 
that beliefs should not simply be divided into those which are true and 
those which are false, but into those held by oneself and one's own group, 
and those held by others. There is an imperative obligation upon us, says 
Smith, to ensure that those beliefs which we ourselves hold and those which 
our group holds are objectively true. Our obligation towards those beliefs 
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held by others is that we should understand them, and we should resist the 
temptation to dismiss them as false simply because they hold no meaning for 
us and our group. He regards it as naive 'to theorize or to adjudicate 
about truth within an established conceptual framework without regard to 
169 its being one ideational system among others'. 
It is these considerations which render obsolete the simple true/false 
classifications, by which one worldview passes judgement upon another. 
Smith's comparativist position is to recognize, as we have seen, that all 
men have, or are capable of having, faith. As such the beliefs, concepts 
and statements, however alien, with which they give expression to that 
faith, must be assumed to have meaning and to convey some understanding of 
reality or truth. As an example, Smith cites the belief of Copernicus that 
the sun stood still at the centre of the universe whilst the earth revolved 
around it, superseding the belief that the earth was fixed whilst the sun 
revolved around it. Modern scientific knowledge sees 'the sun to be more 
vagrant than Copernicus thought the earth to be, and no nearer than the 
earth to the centre of the physical universe'. 
'Copernicus's belief was the conceptualization of an insight into 
reality. The insight was, and remains, valid; the conceptualization, 
like all ideational activity, (including our own modern scientific 
categories) was human, finite, and historical'. 170 
The same principles must apply in our understanding of more specifically 
religious beliefs. 
(v) The Problem of Conflicting Truth Claims - an Invitation to Synthesis 
In the conclusion to Truth and Dialogue, John Hick assesses the problem 
of 'Conflicting Truth Claims' between world religions. He accepts Wilfred 
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Cantwell Smith's insistence on the need for ·i:he moral truthfulness of a 
person's life', 171 as Hick prefers to call the idea of personalistic truth. 
He also accepts that it is not holding belief about God, even true beliefs, 
which constitutes faith or a relationship with God. But despite this the 
problem of propositional truth remains. A belief either does or does not 
point to a divine reality, a practice either is appropriate or is not 
appropriate. As Smith himself would wish to assert, Hick insists that 
sincerity in itself is not enough. Sincerity itself demands of the 
theologian a commitment to a more exact expression of propositional truth. 
Therefore Hick concludes that we should continue to search for a resolution 
of the conflicting truth claims made by the various religious groups. 
'We must live amidst unfinished business; but we must trust that 
continuing dialogue will prove to be dialogue into truth, and that m 
a fuller grasp of truth our present conflicting doctrines will 
ultimately be transcended' .172 
In a rejoinder, with which the book ends, Smith explains why he dislikes 
the expression 'conflicting truth claims•. 173 First he reminds us that the 
great religious traditions represent total Weltanschauungen which embrace 
and make sense of everything, and must therefore be taken as a whole, 
rather than broken down into various claims. Secondly, Smith dislikes the 
term 'claim', because great religious men have born witness to the truth, 
not claimed it. Hence he prefers to speak of a 'diversity of good news' 
proclamation. 174 Thirdly, he does not think it is necessary to see 
statements made by the various religious groups as 'conflicting'. 
Statements are certainly different, and may be divergent, but there is no 
need in Smith's view to speak of conflict. 'Tschaikovsky is radically 
different from Bach; whether they conflict or not is a judgement•. 175 For 
himself, Smith would rather see these differences in religious statements 
as 'an invitation to synthesis•. 176 Finally, he wants to preserve the 
insight that we are claimed by the truth rather than making truth claims. 
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On a number of grounds, then, Smith is reluctant to accept the idea of 
conflicting truth claims. Such differences as do exist are to be seen as a 
stimulus to working together with all men in order to gain a more true 
approximation to that Truth by which all people of faith have been claimed. 
(vi) Faith as Recognizing the Truth and Responding to it 
The conclusion to Faith and Belief ends with a section entitled 'The 
Intellectual Dimension of Faith', in which Smith spells out that faith 
involves insight and response. As a general illustration of all the points 
made in his conclusion he names five 'spokesmen' of faith. 177 Without 
giving any references to their work, he asserts that each held different 
beliefs, that none considered belief to be faith, and that despite their 
conviction as to the importance and truth of certain matters, they did not 
hold their own intellectual positions to be the final criteria of human 
destiny. 178 They are thus presented as supporting Smith's general thesis. 
For each 'spokesman', faith, intellectually 'includes two salient 
• • h d I 179 components: ms1g t an response. 
Insight is the 'difference between knowing that something is true, and 
knowing its truth, recognizing it.• 180 This is rather like the difference 
between knowing that a joke is funny (for example, by watching everybody 
else laughing) and seeing the joke for oneself. At the intellectual level, 
religious faith involves the ability to see the point of a tradition or a 
proposition, to move beyond the formulation to the truth which it seeks to 
show. In the case of the five spokesmen, they recognized a transcendent 
reality beyind the immediate mundane world, and they recognized that its 
reality far transcended their own insight or apprehension into it. 'They 
were unanimous in saying that anything that they might have to say about 
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that reality fell far short of the whole truth•. 181 Further, each of them 
affirmed that however partial his insight into the transcendent truth, here 
was something important to be shared with others in his writing. The modern 
student of faith must not only try to understand these men's beliefs 182 but 
also to recognize what they saw and knew to be important about reality. 
This means an understanding of their disparate 'beliefs' in order to see 
what it was that they tried to share. It does not mean an abandonment of 
the critical faculties but 'Insofar .... as they proclaimed a truth that 
they saw, I put forth my best endeavour to study their reports .... m 
order to see whether in the reality that surrounds and informs me and my 
fellows and my world I can see it too.• 183 Such a critical study will, of 
course, show up the errors and distortions of the image of truth both in 
the propositional formulations and in historical practice. But we must be 
quick to acknowledge that our own group has been just as guilty of limited 
visions of the truth and practical debasement of even the truth we have 
seen. 
Faith is insight, it is also response: 'a dedication to living in terms 
of the truth, and of the good•. 184 This, of course, involves the whole 
personality, private and social, but again the section concentrates on the 
intellectual dimension. In this sense 'faith is a saying "Yes!" to 
truth•, 185 "Yes!" to the truth as one has seen it, as one's group has seen 
it - be that through Christ, through the Qur'an, or whatever. Faith as 
response, intellectually, means a loyalty to the truth as one's group has 
so far seen it. At the same time the five spokesmen of faith recognized 
that the truth was in reality greater than they had seen. 'They held that 
faith means loyalty to the truth as such, to reality as such, primarily and 
overridingly - and to the particular truth/reality that they had seen•. 186 
Each of them wrote m terms of a distinct conceptual framework which 
'mediated' the truth to those who were able to 'see'. In no case was that 
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'mediating conceptual complex' to be confused with faith, yet neither could 
faith or the truth be understood without it. 187 
The intellectual response, which is a dimension of faith, must involve a 
loyalty or continuity with faith in the past, despite the diversity of past 
'beliefs'. 
'Persons of faith, the history of religion makes manifest, have not 
"believed" any one thing. Yet it does not at all follow that ideas can 
be set aside, to let faith wallow innovatingly in sentimental 
a-rationality'. 188 
At the same time, Smith insists that we do not have to accept their beliefs 
or old worldviews. Beliefs and 'Ideas are part of this world, of its 
transcient flux; they are human constructs •.•• Ideas do not capture 
knowledge; but if we are sensitive and fortunate, they may. be instrumental 
to it•. 189 Our loyalty must not therefore be to inherited patterns of 
belief, but to the truth - the truth whatever it be. In which case, Smith 
speculates, 
'there is no reason, in the modern world, why in principle an 
.intelligent and .informed Jew or Muslim and an intelligent and informed 
Christian ...• should have different beliefs. Yet there is also no 
reason why they should not continue to live in terms of differing 
symbols and differing coherences of symbols.'190 
Finally, to conclude this section, a paragraph from Faith and Belief in 
which the intellectual dimension of faith is explained, and the 
relationship between faith and truth in Smith's schema is shown. 
'In its intellectual dimension, faith is first of all recognition of 
truth, insight into reality; and its conceptualization (the "belief" 
that goes with it) must on the one hand be sincere, subjectively, a 
close approximation to what one personally apprehends (is apprehended 
by), and on the other hand be valid, not only in the objective sense 
of being a significantly close approximation to Reality, to final 
Truth, but .in the dynamic and demanding sense (thus linking the 
subjective and the objective) of the closest approximation possible.' 
' .•.. Faith, let us remind ourselves, involves loving not only truth 
but all goodness - God - and loving one's neighbour. Even in relation 
to truth it means living loyally .in terms of such truth as one knows, 
and of that truth towards which one's particular tradition and 
situation encourage and enable one to reach out'. 191 
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(vii) The Concept of Faith - Summary of Insights Gained m this Section 
This section has outlined Smith's understanding of truth, and examined 
how this affects his concept of faith. The following points may be noted in 
summary. 
(a) As with faith, the locus of truth is persons, not propositions or 
religion. 
(b) By faith the religious propositions (and other material) can become 
true for persons. 
(c) The personalistic, or moral, aspect of truth is of primary 
importance, but this is not to say that the person of faith should be 
indifferent to issues of propositioned truth. Quite the contrary, persons 
of faith have an obligation to ensure that their own beliefs and 
conceptualizations are true, and that they make only statements about the 
faith of others which can be accepted and verified by those to whom they 
refer. 
(d) Differing religious groups make different statements concerning the 
truth, and persons of faith should attempt to understand each other's 
statements and work towards some kind of synthesis. 
(e) Faith has an intellectual dimension which involves insight and 
response: the recognition of truth, and loyalty to it. 
(f) The truth itself always transcends our partial vision of it. Faith 
demands a commitment to truth itself, rather than to our limited vision of 
it, whilst at the same time time retaining a continuity with, or loyalty to 
that vision which has so far been grasped. 
57 
The need for people of faith to remain loyal to their own group's vision 
whilst at the same time pressing on to a fuller grasp of the truth leads on 
to the next section: How are people of differing beliefs and traditions to 
relate, and to live creatively in a world community? 
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Section 2.4-. Faith and World Community 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith's concept of faith originated as a tool for 
understanding religious life in a world of many different religious 
commitments and groupings. The aim of this brief section is to collect 
together some of Smith's suggestions as to how people of differing 
religious traditions might interrelate, and to capture something of Smith's 
desire for a world community. 
For Smith is essentially a visionary, who wants people of faith to make 
an historical impact upon the world by turning 'our nascent world society 
into a world community•. 192 But he is also a theologian, with a theological 
basis for his vision. Addressing people of all traditions, he is able to 
point to their unity in the transcendent reality: 'what they have in common 
lies not in the tradition that introduces them to transcendence, not in 
their faith by which they personally respond, but in that to which they 
respond, the transcendent itself'. 193 Addressing theologians from his own, 
Christian, tradition he is able to root his vision in the revelation of God 
1n Christ: 
'if we really mean what we say when we affirm that his life, and his 
death on the cross, and his final triumph out of the very midst of 
self-sacrifice, embody the ultimate truth and power and glory of the 
universe - then ...• there follows an imperative towards 
reconciliation, unity, harmony, and brotherhood. At this level, all 
men are included: we strive to break down barriers, to close up gulfs; 
we recognize all men as neighbours, as fellows, as sons of the 
universal father, seeking Him and finding Him, being sought by Him and 
being found by Him. At this level we do not become truly Christian 
until we have reached out towards a community that turns all mankind 
into one total "we".' 194-
(i) Respect and Understanding 
The need to respect those of other faith is soon evident to those who 
want to understand human religious life. It may have been possible from a 
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position of religious isolation to assume that members of other religious 
groups must be insincere or unintelligent, but it is impossible to go far 
in the study of other religious traditions without realizing that other 
religions have participants with equal and greater devotion, integrity and 
intelligence. This growing respect for other religious persons, not to 
mention the moral imperative to love, demands that the attempt be made to 
understand their beliefs and practices and faith. 
It was noted above that Smith advocated this need to understand the 
faith and the expressions of faith in others. It is not acceptable for the 
person of faith to write off the beliefs and practices and symbols of 
others as meaningless. These are, rather, the opportunity t? try to see the 
vision which they have seen, and to assess whether their vision is helpful 
for one's own group. 
Linked with this need for understanding is the need for verification by 
those whose faith and beliefs are being examined. His verification 
principle was noted above: 
'no statement about human affairs is true that cannot be existentially 
appropriated by those about whom the statement is made'. 195 
This principle demands a considerable degree of cooperation and dialogue 
between religious groups, and presupposes a mutual trust. 
(ii) Pluralism - Disparate Loyalties 
Mutual respect and desire for understanding imply a willingness to 
accept a world community which is religiously plural. The attempt to 
understand the religious beliefs and traditions of others would also be 
combined with the freedom to remain loyal to one's own religious community. 
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196 Ti->l·:; m::;y be illustrated in the case of the question discussed above, 
'Is the Qur'an the Word of God?' Smith holds that it should be possible for 
Muslims and Christians to accept the same historical and religious facts, 
whilst continuing to be Muslims or Christians: 'intellectually their 
understandings must converge, even if morally they choose to respond 
differently•. 197 
Smith's aim, then, is 'to be pluralist without losing an intelligent, 
steadfast loyalty to one's own vision•. 198 Or, m worldwide terms, Smith 
hopes that we will become a 'global community' in which a 'self-conscious 
intelligent pluralism or relativism (is) pledged, through our several 
199 disparate loyalties to truth and our mutual respect for each other'. As 
was noted above, Smith sees the point of unity between mankind not in our 
various traditions, nor yet in our faith, but in our relation to the 
transcendent itself, to truth, to God. 200 It is the willingness to accept 
that others have a genuine experience of that transcendence, however this 
might be expressed, which leads to a happy acceptance of religious 
pluralism. 
(iii) World Theology 
In Towards a World Theology Smith invites people of other religious and 
non-religious faith to join with him in an exercise of 'corporate critical 
lf - I 201 H" . . 1 - . se -conscwusness • 1s a1 m 1s to create, or at east to set m motwn 
the framework in which to create, a global theology (or indeed a 
202 
'transcendentology', if that word would help non-theists to join m the 
task). There may be some place for an intermediate task of Christian and 
other theologians generating their own interfaith theologies, but his 
ultimate aim is for all to engage together in this common task. 
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Smith urges modern intellectuals to 'attempt to give a valid v1s1on of 
th ld 1 form ' 203 so that ld · b e wor a conceptua our wor commun1ty may e 
established in the knowledge that human life is involved in both the 
historical and the transcendent. In other words this task is intended to 
undergird the process of forming a world community, so that faith is 
recognized as a universal quality , which draws people of faith to a common 
aim, whilst rejoicing in its diversity of expression and loyalty. 
In pursuit of a world theology, Smith believes that the Truth will 
increasingly emerge, since each group will be willing to listen to and 
learn from the visions of the others. 
(iv) Mission 
What place is left for mission In the religiously plural world which 
Smith envisages? Several of the religious traditions are involved with 
'missionary' activities, how should they, in Smith's analysis, regard this 
activity? For how can they respect and try to understand the faith of 
others, and work together for a world theology, whilst at the same time 
engage in proselytizing those of other traditions? 
Smith hints at an answer to this question m several. of his works. In a 
paper entitled 'The Mission of the Church and the Future of Missions• 204 he 
insists that only the insensitive could settle for either of two 'facile' 
solutions: 'on the one hand to call off the movement, abandoning all 
spiritual responsibility beyond one's own borders, or on the other hand to 
continue the unilateral proclamation of a uniquely saving faith, hoping to 
205 
convert'. These solutions are inadequate because the first fails to 
acknowledge the value of this central 'impulse' of Christian and other 
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traditions, and the second because it fails to acknowledge the value of 
disparate loyalties within the world community. Indeed it is the disparate 
loyalties which in part demand that the missionary effort be continued, and 
which contribute to the realization of the truth. 
But within the world community for which Smith is pleading, such 
missionary effort will be marked by a much greater humility and a rather 
different aim. In the Christian case, which is the only case he treats 
directly, this would involve seeing 
' .•.. God's mission in the church as one part of his mission to 
mankind; not as his whole mission to one part of mankind (the fallacy 
of indifference) nor as his sole mission to all mankind (the fallacy 
of arrogance).' 206 
For ' "The mission with which the church is entrusted •... is a missiOn 
from God to men, not a mission from Christian men to non-christian 
men".' 207 
Alongside this goes his plea to Christians to see 'God's mission in the 
Islamic venture; God's mission .... through the Hindu complex ••.. ' 
208 
In a pluralist society, mission is no less a part of the religious life 
of its members, and in Smith's view it is an essential part of spiritual 
growth, for: 
'Only as we learn to see God's actiVIty in other movements and in 
other communi ties shall we learn to serve Him well in and through our 
own'.209 
Finally, in Smith's view, men of faith have a specific mission to fulfil 
together. Together they must confront the world's problems and together 
they must forge the world community in which the historical and the 
transcendent dimensions of human life are valued. This demands an end to 
proselytizing missions, even something beyond dialogue. Smith suggests the 
term 'colloquy', representing the commitment of men and women of faith to 
face the world's problems together and to build a common wor1d. 210 
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(v) The Concept of Faith ·- lnsig;.:s Gained in this Section 
This section has considered the implications of Smith's religious 
understanding for the life of our world community, and the contribution of 
people of faith to that community. The following summary points may be made 
concerning the concept of faith. 
(a) People of faith will recognize that experiences of the transcendent 
are not limited to their own particular religious group. This recognition 
will engender a growmg mutual respect. 
(b) In a religiously plural society people of faith will attempt to 
understand the visions of others, whilst remaining loyal to their own 
tradition. 
(c) All people of faith can engage in the movement of critical 
self-consciousness in order to gain greater intellectual understanding of 
our divergent religious life. People of faith will contribute to the 
formation of a world community which is conscious of both historical and 
transcendent involvements. 
(d) Persons of faith will see their mission not as one of proselytizing 
members of other faith communities, but as together recalling mankind to 
acknowledge transcendence, and together facing the problems of the 
historical world. 
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Chapter 3 Studies m Islam and the Concept of Faith. 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate some of the specific studies 
related to Islam which Smith presents in the elucidation of his argument; 
to illustrate the way in which he uses his concept of faith in the 
treatment of Islamic material; and to examine critically his approach to 
Islam. 
The section shows how Smith regards Islam in terms of faith and 
cumulative tradition. He examines the external, historical phenomena of the 
Islamic tradition in order to elucidate the inner dimension of faith. He 
argues that the inner dimension of Islam, ie. personal faith, was 
fundamental to the original revelation to Mu~ammad, is central in the 
Qur'an, and has been central for most sensitive Muslims. Excessive emphasis 
on the structures and systematizations of Islam have been the result of 
external, Western influence. Smith tries to offer this inner quality of 
faith, and its associated notion of truth, as beneficial for Muslims and 
non-Muslims alike. 
Smith's approach is found to be a helpful re-emphasis of the inner 
dimension of Muslim religious life, but it gives a rather one-sided view. 
His approach is highly selective, and tends to impose a rigid personalist 
" 
interpretation on the material. 
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Section 3.1. The Meaning of Islam 
The first item concerns the meaning and usage of the term islam. Several 
of Wilfred Cantwell Smith's early works demonstrate his understanding of 
this term, but this section concentrates on his fullest treatments appear-
ing in The Meaning and End of Religion (chapter 4), and in the paper 'The 
historical development in Islam of the concept of Islam as an historical 
development'. I This is followed by an examination of a critical article by 
Isma<=rl R aJ FaruqT, 'The Essence of Religious Experience in Islam'. 2 
(i) The Reification of Islam 
Smith argued in The Meaning and End of Religion that the great religious 
traditions have undergone a process of reification, such that what used to 
refer to personal piety has come to be applied to ideal or empirical 
systems, or to religion as an aspect of human life. The case appears to be 
rather different in Islam, so he devotes chapter four to 'The Special Case 
of Islam'. 
First Smith notes that the Islamic tradition has its own built-in name. 
Islam is used in the Qur'an, so Muslims affirm this name has the sanction 
of God himself. 'This day I have perfected your religion for you, and 
completed my favour unto you; and have chosen for you as a religion 
Islam'. 3 'Verily, the religion in the eyes of God is Is1am'. 4 This quranic 
use of islam has been at the root of Muslims' recent attempts to get their 
own name into general Western usage, in place of the totally unacceptable 
names such as 'Muhammadanism'.5 
Furthermore, Muslims have from classical times been happy to use the 
Arabic word din (religion) to mean both 'piety' and a particular religious 
system. This second usage admits of a plural form adyan, so that Muslims 
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'can affirm that "the religion of Muhammad (is) the best of the religions 
of mankind'".6 Also ' •... the word in its systematic sense can be used both 
ideally and objectively, of own's own religion and of other people's, the 
true religion and false ones'· 7 The word cfin has been used to denote a 
generalized personal religiousness, as well as a religious system. Other 
religions may thus be seen as 'phenomena of essentially the same kind', of 
which 'one may be affirmed as the best .... but it is one a kind, not 
something sui generis'. 8 
The Islamic tradition seems therefore to have had since earliest times 
these two features which in Smith's analysis are absent from other 
traditions: a self-appointed (God-appointed) name and a willingness to see 
Islam as a system which may be compared to other religions. Yet he is able 
to trace a development of these self-consciously reified notions within the 
Islamic tradition. Smith finds himself able to discern three stages in the 
process: external, pre-islamic forces; internal forces; and western 
influence in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
(a) External, Pre-Islamic Forces of Reification. 
Pre-Islamic Forces - Zarathustra 
Smith turns his attention first to the religious history of Persia. In 
particular he seeks to show the role of the religious movements surrounding 
Zarathustra and Mani in the developing religious consciousness of the 
Middle East. Unfortunately his arguments are complicated somewhat by his 
introduction of much material which cannot be treated here.9 What follows 
here is only an outline of the salient points of Smith's presentation. 
Zarathustra (to g1ve him his Persian name, or Zoroaster, in Greek) is 
generally given a prominent place in the history of religious ideas. This 
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is not because there are vast numbers of followers tracing their religious 
history back to him 10 but because of the considerable Zoroastrian 
inf1uence 11 on other living religious traditions. Persian ideas are 
reckoned to have influenced the Jewish tradition during the period of the 
exile in Babylon. The traditional dating of Zarathustra's death (c. 541 BC) 
is just before the conquest of Babylon by the Persian king Cyrus. Ling 
notes that 'by this time Zarathustra's religious teaching had exerted a 
wide enough influence in Persia for the Jewish exiles to have become 
"thoroughly impregnated with Zoroastrian ideas'". 12 
Smith lists the following ideas of Zoroastrian thought which have 
contributed to our religious development: 'cosmic conflict-dualism 
(rehabilitated by Marx), heaven and hell,· the Devil, ange1o1ogy, and in 
part messianism'. 13 He also adds some ideas which became current in the 
Jewish community after its contact with the wider Middle Eastern world: 
14 
'personal immortality and salvation, a Day of Judgement, and much else'. 
These ideas have been widely discussed by historians of religion and Old 
Testament scholars, 15 but Smith goes on to add 'it may be that the very 
phenomenon of an organized religious community and the concept of 
systematic religion should be added, as contributions related to this 
d . · I 16 tra 1t10n . 
So Smith claims Zarathustra as the initiator of the reification of 
religion. The suggestion is an unexpected one, for Zarathustra himself is 
known to have opposed institutional religion. John Hinnells writes, 
'Perhaps the characteristic feature of Zoroaster's teaching is his emphasis 
on personal religion'. 17 A more obvious proposal might have been to think 
of Zarathustra opposing the reifying tendencies that were already at work 
in the religious life of the Persians. Smith admits that 'the development 
. 1 • . d' . I 18 h h 11 was certam y neither 1mme 1ate nor precise; e now ere spe s out 
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exactly what he means by his proposal, nor offers any direct evidence; but 
our purpose here is not to assess his treatment of Zarathustra. 
Next Smith switches to the rise of the Christian church in the 
Mediterranean world. The church demonstrated an 'either/or emphasis' and 
embodied a 'new conception of a religious community'. 19 These phenomena are 
traced historically to 
'ideas current in the Jewish community and its environment after its 
members had become participants in the wider flux of the then Middle 
Eastern world. These included ...• a way of looking at the world that 
sees mankind as divided (metaphorically) into two great opposing 
groups. The sheep and the goats, the saved and the damned, a voluntary 
membership organization (to which one either does or does not belong) 
- these are fundamental ideas. In their historical emergence Persian 
conflict-dualism as a cosmic postulate had played a part'. 20 
Smith's claim is this that our reified notion of religion as denoting 
religious communities and systematic entities arose in the Zoroastrian 
religious life of Persia, became part of Hebrew religious thought at the 
time of the exile, and so entered the Christian church. In the West, the 
church finally triumphed over indigenous religious traditions and 'over 
other comparable new systematized intrusions from Persia such as the cult 
of Mithra•. 21 In the Middle East, and further East, the church did not 
triumph over existing religious communities and there emerged 'a pluralism 
of "religions"'. 22 
Pre-Islamic Forces - Mani. 
The next stage in Smith's argument on the pre-Islamic process of 
reification concerns Mani. Mani set about specifically to create a 
religion, self-consciously to generate a systematized religious community 
and body of beliefs. Smith argues that Mani had found well established 
concepts of scripture, prophethood, religious community, etc., in the 
traditions of the Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians and Buddhists with whom he 
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had contact in the cosmopolitan world of the Sassanian emp1re. With these 
forms in mind, Mani gave new content to these established forms. Mani 
claimed to supersede Zarathustra, the Buddha and Jesus, but unlike these 
leaders whose message preceded and gave rise to forms of organization and 
doctrine, Mani reversed this process. He sought to provide a better 
religion. 
Smith admits that the precise role played by Mani is not known, but: 
'It is in the conceptualization of the generic entity of religious 
system - that there exists a series of these, each one of which is of 
an abstractly comparable kind - that I see the role of Mani as 
significant, as either an original or an illustrative thinker and 
actor'. 23 
Further, although the exact historical location of this development is not 
known, 'there is some evidence that Mani's systematizations contributed to 
the crystallizing of other traditions'. 24 Again, 
'The emergence of a Manichee community .... may be seen as a 
stimulating factor in, or just a symptom of, a wider tendency. In any 
case, the fact is that the centuries from the second to the sixth. or 
seventh in the Aramaic- and Persian-speaking world are a time of 
increasing systematization, crystallization, and definition of what 
previously had been a more chaotic welter of unorganized movements and 
what gradually became a situation of self-conscious religious 
plurality'. 25 
Before relating this development to the emergence of Islam, Smith 
focuses upon the linguistic 'vehicle' by which this reified concept of 
religion was expressed throughout the Middle East. 
Pre-Islamic Forces - Linguistic Developments. 
The term by which this conceptualization was expressed throughout the 
Middle East was den, and its equivalents in the other languages. Smith 
notes that this term has never been the subject of sustained research. 26 He 
discusses the etymologies and usages of various terms current at that 
time.27 In each case Smith holds that a word was already in existence, and 
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that the new, reified usage, brought about by Mani, began to permeate the 
region. In Arabic, for example, there were two early uses of din: the 
verbal noun from an ancient semitic root, meaning 'judgement, verdict', as 
found in the expression ya wm al-din, day of judgement; and the indigenous 
Arabic meaning 'conformity, propriety, obedience, and also usages, customs, 
standard behavour'. 28 To these existing usages, the new concept of 
systematized religion was added. 
This part of Smith's argument may be summarized thus: there arose in 
Persia, associated with the views and character of Zarathustra, a new 
element in the religious thought of the world, namely that of a dualism in 
which people could be divided into groups as the saved and the unsaved. 
This 'either/or' notion was incorporated into the Hebrew tradition at the 
time of the exile, and so taken into the Christian tradition. In the 
movement surrounding Mani, this was taken a stage further - religion was 
seen not so much as a personal quality of human life but rather as a system 
which an individual could either have or not have. Religion became for M ani 
a reified system and a reified religious community. This new notion entered 
the thought-forms of the Middle Eastern world through the new usage of the 
already common word din and its equivalents. This linguistic development 
may be seen as a parallel to the western usage of the term religio. 29 
Influence of Pre-Islamic Forces on the Emergence of Islam. 
Having established these developments in man's religious understanding, 
Smith returns to his treatment of Islam, which emerged soon after these 
developments had taken place. He outlines the ways in which these 
developments affected the proclamation and reception of Islam in its 
earliest days. 
Smith carefully writes that there is no need to assert that Muhammad was 
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influenced consciously or unconsciously by these notions of religion when 
he gave his teaching. This view would be energetically denied by Muslims. 
Yet he proffers a more subtle suggestion that 
'some Middle Easterners in the early days of the Muslim community, 
when they heard the Qur'an or thought about Islam, were influenced 
••.. by such pre-Islamic pressures.' 30 
This would seem to suggest that the quranic message was received and 
understood by some Muslims in a way which was not in accord with the 
original message. 'The true meaning of a given passage may be 
transcendentally given, but the actual meaning to particular persons has 
been historically conditioned, and may be historically elucidated. The 
historian may help the theologian, perhaps •..• to understand why men have 
misunderstood'. 31 
In this part of his argument Smith seems to be saying that whilst a 
systematized understanding of religion in general and Islam in particular 
is a possible interpretation of the quranic message, this understanding 
might be a mistaken one, and at the time of the original revelation 
historical circumstances were ripe for such an interpretation to be placed 
upon it. 
If this is right, it is a far-reaching claim. For as _he notes, 'it is 
sound Islamic doctrine that the Jewish, Christian and Islamic as historical 
systems are variations on a single theme'. 32 The suggestion that this sound 
Islamic doctrine might be based upon a misunderstanding of the quranic 
material ill befits a scholar commited to a view that 'no statement about a 
religion is valid unless it can be acknowledged by that religion's 
believers'. 33 This is made worse when Smith goes on, 'Muhammad to some 
seems self-consciously and deliberately to have set about establishing a 
religious system .•••• Jesus .... could not have conceptualized 
"Christianity". Muhammad, on the other hand, seems to some observers and to 
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some Muslims to have known what he was about when he talked of Islam'. 34 
Is Smith suggesting that Mu~ammad was responsible for perpetrating a 
mistaken interpretation of Islam and the Qur'an? Would it not be more in 
line with his stance to accept that the reified notion of Islam is part of 
authentic Muhammadan and contemporary Islam? 
Smith is on firmer ground when he notes that self-conscious Christian 
and Jewish communities in seventh century Arabia had reified notions of 
religion. These communi ties and their ideas were 'facts ..•. in the light 
of which the Islamic message was preached and was received•. 35 He now 
argues that the reificationist conceptualizing of Islam was given added 
momentum by the fact that Mu~ammad saw himself as a reformer of these 
outside traditions. Smith had already shown that the practice of naming a 
religion and conceptualizing it as an entity was primarily the work of 
outsiders to the religious traditions involved. 36 Now he observes 
'that the Islamic seems to be the only religious movement in the 
(present day) world that arose historically not primarily out of a 
reform of the indigenous religious tradition of the people to whom it 
was presented. It arose rather among, and was preached to .... a 
people for whom it was the reform of outsiders' religious traditions'. 
37 
'the Prophet's message was delivered to the Arabs as a reformulation 
not primarily of their own, idolatrous, religious tradition but of the 
tradition of Christians and Jews, which in Muslim eyes needed 
reforming.' 38 
In view of this, those non-Christian and non-Jewish Arabs who received the 
message saw as outsiders all that needed to be changed in the religious 
systems of the Jews and the Christians, and saw their own new faith as a 
rival, perfected version of the same kind of conceptual form. 
The question in hand, it will be remembered, is 'why does Islam appear 
to have this reified notion of itself as a "religion", where this process 
of reification can be seen to be a late development in the other great 
religious traditions?' So far Smith's consideration of the external factors 
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have been described. Before moving on to the internal and modern forces, it 
may be helpful to quote Smith's own summary of this part of his argument: 
' .... of all the major religious communities of the world today the 
Islamic is the only one that has come into historical existence this 
side chronologically of that period in human history when schematized 
religious systems had evolved, and in that part of the world where the 
process of systematizing them was developing. Secondly, we have seen 
that the practice of naming a religion and conceptualizing it 
systematically is appropriate primarily for outsiders, for those for 
whom it is not a medium of faith; and the Islamic is the only 
religious movement in the world that was launched by a reformer and 
accepted by a people standing outside the tradition (in this case the 
two traditions) being reformed'. 39 
(b) The Internal Forces Towards Reification. 
Smith turns next to consider those internal forces which have been at 
work within the Islamic tradition 'by which Muslims themselves have tended 
over the centuries to reify their own concept of their faith'. 40 
Although the reified images of islam and religion are possible 
interpretations of the quranic and Muhammadan teaching, Smith maintains 
that there are and have been other interpretations, which the historian of 
religion must report. He holds that the non-reified image/understanding of 
islam has several advantages. First it is more in keeping with 'traditional 
usage in the Arabic language• 41 and especially peninsular Arabic. Further 
it was held by 'persons more sensitively religious', those 'less 
superficial in their response', and 'less liable to an outsider's mundane 
view'; those 'more perceptive of transcendent overtones', and those who 
42 
were 'leaders' in those early days. 
In my opinion Smith is here seeking primarily to suggest his thesis and 
persuade his readers, rather than to convince with conclusive evidence. 
This is one of the few sections in The Meaning and End of Religion where 
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one would have liked more detailed substantiating notes. For whilst he 
discusses the meaning of islam, he gives no comparison between the work of 
'more sensitively religious' persons and that of the less sensitive. 
(Although presumably the reference to Tafti:d~m! is intended as an example 
of one more sensitively religious writer) Indeed it is difficult to know 
how one would be able to classify early members of the Muslim community 
without begging the question. 
Looking to the Qur'an, Smith notes that it 'is concerned, and presents 
God as being concerned, with something that people do, and with the persons 
who do it, rather than with an abstract entity'. 43 This statement is backed 
up to start with by some basic data on the frequency of various words in 
the Qur'an. 
The word islam is the verbal noun (or gerund, masdar) of the verb 
aslama, which is itself the IVth derived form of the verb salima. The word 
Tman is the verbal noun from the verb amana, IVth form of the verb amuna. 
Aslama occurs in the Qur'an in all its forms 72 times, of which the 'direct 
active personal' verbal use accounts for 22 times; the 'personalist 
adjective or noun' (muslim) occurs 42 times; and the 'gerundial, generic' 
usage (islam) occurs 8 times. Amana occurs in all forms 812 times, of which 
the verbal use accounts for 537, the personalist adjective or noun (mu'min) 
230, and the gerundial, generic form (Tman) 45.44 From this statistical 
material, Smith notes that the active, operational uses of these words 
greatly predominate; and that the word islam itself is infrequent. 
Smith further contends the personalist interests of the Qur'an by 
examining the meaning of the word Tman. He maintains that the word 1s most 
acccurately to be translated by 'faith' rather than 'belief', as iman has 
to do with 'the richness and warmth and the engagement of "faith"'. 45 The 
engagement and commitment of faith is to be contrasted in the Qur'an with 
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the rejection by the kafir of all that he really knows is true. Kafara, the 
root from which kafir is. derived, 'means not to disbelieve, but rather to 
reject: it too is active, engage'. 46 The Qur'an is interested in the 
dynamic relationship of man with his creator, and its terms stress the 
actions and decisions of men's response, not the 'institution' or 'social 
system' in which that relation is lived. 47 Smith insists that this 
understanding of 1man is that of the classical theologians, and refers to 
the fourteenth century Taftazan! in support. 
The position is similar with the quranic use of the word islam. In some 
cases the personal quality 1s 'inescapable• 48 as in Surah 9.74, wa-kafaru 
bacda islamihim, which Smith translates 'they refused, after they had 
accepted'; also in SOr ah 4 9.17, isfamaku m 'your islam, your personal 
commitment to heed God's voice•.49 Even those 'classical verses which in 
modern times have been used as proof texts for reification' need not be 
interpreted as defining islam in systematic or impersonal terms. Surah 
3.19, Inna-1-dfna cinda-llahi-1-islamu in modern times translated 'Verily 
the religion in the eyes of God is Islam', was in Smith's view originally 
taken to mean 'the proper way to worship Him is to obey Him - or, simply, 
true religion .... is obeisance'. This interpretation is supported by a 
reference to al TabarT's commentary.50 'Vivid and dynamic - and personal: 
these are the qualities of the term islam in the Qur'an. What was 
proclaimed was a challenge, not a religion'. 51 
It is Smith's contention that this personalist use and meaning of islam, 
which he sees as characteristic of the Qur'an, is typical of 'the 
preponderating majority, at least among leaders• 52 in the early Muslim 
community, and has been the interpretation held 'by many, if not most, of 
the leaders of Muslim religious thought in the early centuries•. 53 But, as 
he has already argued happened in the West, he maintained that 'over the 
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centuries' there has been 'a very gradual closing in of the reificationist 
view'. 54 Unfortunately Smith does not document this gradual change here, 
but does refer to the study to be examined below55 in which the relative 
frequencies of the Arabic words for 'faith' and 'islam' are compared in the 
titles of Arabic books over the centuries. He claims that this gives an 
'index' for the process he describes, in which the change is to be 
observed first in the case of secular writers, and increasingly in 'more 
religious writers•. 56 Despite the tendency over the centuries, it is not 
until the end of the nineteenth century that this process is visible in 
most religious writers. 
This concludes the account of the second, internal process by which 
Smith holds that the Islamic tradition hfs undergone the same 
reificationist development which also characterizes the other great 
religous traditions. 
(c) Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Western Pressures Towards Reification. 
The third process by which Islam has come to be seen as the most reified 
of the religous traditions, is the response to massive western pressures 
since the latter part of the nineteenth century. In Smith's view 
apologetics is the major contributing factor to the reificationist trend 
since the nineteenth century. When this apologetic use was added to 'the 
internal secular tendencies towards institutionalizing' it seems to have 
become an 'irresistable' combination.57 Again Smith does not document this 
process, but refers again to the paper to be discussed in section (H) 
below. Nor does he consider the question as to why precisely modern 
apologists have changed their usage while earlier apologists presumably 
found it unnecessary to do so. 
The ·extent of the reificationist understanding of islam is demonstrated 
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by the mooern use of the term ni;.:am, meaning ::;ystern. This word is now used 
commonly to describe Islam as a religious system. But Smith has found no 
example of its use in this sense before the modern period. It now denotes a 
total, idealistic, systematized Islamic entity. 
(d) The Meaning of Islam. 
From the historical treatment of the use of the term islam, Smith 
highlights three distinct uses. First there is the personalist, 
exisentialist use, denoting a man's personal submission and commitment to 
God. This correlates closely to Smith's own term 'faith', and in his 
opinion represents the earliest and central core. Secondly, there is the 
empirical actuality of islam, as the Islamic community has in history 
actually been. This is a use taken over from the other religious 
communities of the Middle East and the Arabian peninsular at the time of 
the revelation and preaching of Islam. It has gained currency, according to 
Smith, especially amongst the more secular elements of the community. 
Thirdly, islam has been used to denote an entity, a religious system which 
may be compared on the same level with other 'religions'. This use has 
gained in frequency by influence from the West, and in pyrsuit of 
apologetic aims. 
'The Special Case of Islam', which is the fourth chapter of The Meaning 
and End of Religion, does not represent a fully conclusive argument. 
Despite the considerable notes and references, there are several points at 
which documentation, or substantiation, is lacking. The following section 
examines some of the material which Smith offers as evidence for his thesis 
that a reified notion of Islam is a late development. 
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(ii) The Concept of Islam as an Historical Development. 
In 1958 Wilfred Cantwell Smith delivered a paper at the School of 
Oriental and African Studies, London, entitled 'The Historical Development 
in Islam of the Concept of Islam as an Historical Development'. In it he 
compared the frequency of the occurrence of the words Tman and islam in 
Arabic booktitles over the centuries. The paper was originally published 
without the list of titles concerned.58 It has since been reproduced with 
the list of titles in On Understanding Islam. 59 
In his introduction to the reprint, Smith writes that this paper proved 
very significant for the development of his own thinking, and that some of 
its points helped him to come to the thesis he finally presented in The 
Meaning and End of Religion. Already in 1 958 Smith had seen that there were 
three levels on which people spoke of religion: the personal, existential 
level; the objectified systematic level; and the objectified institutional 
level. In this paper he tried to examine what various people at various 
times have thought Islam to mean and how they have used it. He therefore 
undertook a study of the uses of. the terms Tman and islam in Arabic book 
titles, attempting to find some pattern. Since this is the only work quoted 
in The Meaning and End of Religion to show the historical progression 
towards reified notions of Islam, it is worth examining this paper and his 
methodology in some detail. 
The substance of Smith's data is three lists of Arabic booktitles in 
which the term islam occurs. The first list (List A) comprises all such 
books published before 1300 AH, as cited in Brockelmann's Geschichte der 
Arabischen Litteratur. The second list (List B) comprises books more recent 
than 1300 AH. This list contains all items found in Brockelmann, plus extra 
works contained in the two libraries in which Smith did most of his 
research, and in his own collection. The third list (List C) is a further 
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four books which were brought to his attention after the study was 
completed, and these are offered as illustrative of his thesis. The first 
two lists are then analysed according to the meaning of the term islam m 
the title. 
List A consists of 84 entries, out of a total of fifteen to twenty 
thousand entries listed by Brockelmann for the period up to 1300 AH. Smith 
analyses these entries according to the sense in which the term islam seems 
to have been used in the title: 
(a) There are nine titles where Smith is certain from the context that 
the personalist sense of islam is implied. 
(b) There are 14 in which the expression al-iman wa-al-isfam (or vice 
versa) occurs; these begin to appear from about the 8th/14th century. 
Here Smith admits that either the personalist or the systematized 
meaning could be implied, but ultimately feels that these belong to 
the group which correlates islam with personal faith. 
(c) A further group of 37 titles include the expressions: shara'ic 
al-islam, qawacid al-islam, ark~m al-islam, qawatic al-islam, etc. 
This group occurs from the 3rd/9th century. Although Smith admits that 
he has not been able to check the use each author made of the term 
islam, and that the evidence is ambiguous, he himself finds it most 
persuasive to regard these as indicative of the personalist 
interpretation in many instances. This suggests to him that a 
transition is apparent, that islam might have been used 
personalistically by their authors, and that the ambiguity of these 
titles might in itself have contributed to the systematizing trend. 
(d) In the remaining titles, Smith considers that islam is used in 
non-personalistic senses. Two were written by non-muslims (including 
the earliest book on the list). One (or possibly three) represents an 
idealized system of Islam. In ten cases, begining in the 6th/ 12th 
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. century, islam implies the community, the mundane historical 
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actuality. The 'secularizing tendency' reaches its climax m a group 
of six works dating from the 8th/ 14th century. Four titles receive no 
comment. 
List B comprises 81 titles of books dating from after 1300 AH. Only 51 are 
taken from Brockelmann, who lists some five to ten thousand titles for the 
period. In his analysis of this list, Smith does not give a full account of 
many of the titles, but the picture is in fact much clearer. The following 
points are worthy of note: 
(a) Only eight titles continue the personalist or 'Medieval' use of 
islam. One of these is in a subtitle, not the title itself. This 
personalist use persists in a few cases right up into the 14th/20th 
century. 
(b) All the remaining titles seem to use islam in its mundane sense. 
They refer occas .. :)onally to the principles of systematized islam; and 
there is a rise in the use of islam referring to Islamic civilization. 
Smith notes a large proportion of translations of Western authors, 
works by non-muslim Arabs, and apologetic-type replies to the West. 
This western influence is clearly visible. 
Smith concludes his study: 
'To sum up, then, one may say that to an outsider it would seem that 
there has .been a tendency over the centuries and especially in modern 
times for the connotation of the word 'Islam' gradually to lose its 
relationship with God, first by shifting from a personal piety to an 
ideal religious system, a transcendent pattern, then to an external, 
mundane religious system, and finally by shifting still further from 
that religious system to the civilization that was its historical 
expression.' 61 
There are several comments and criticisms which may be made concerning 
the meth odol cg y and conclusions of this paper. First, there are the several 
problems which Smith himself mentions: i) the entries were unchecked to the 
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original titles, and the interpretations of the titles unchecked to the 
content of the books. ii) There are certain omissions from Brockelmann. 
iii) Titles are subject to a certain amount of stylization. iv) There is 
uncertainty about the origin of the titles in some cases, the possibility 
being that they were later additions in response to fashion or style. 
Secondly, anyone who has tried to predict the content of a book from its 
title will be aware of the problems involved. Smith's designation of the 
group containing al-Tman wa-al-islam (and vice versa) as personalistic is 
purely speculative. Furthermore, the juxtaposition of the two terms may as 
easily serve to highlight the divergence of the two words rather than their 
convergence. 
Thirdly, if this group is included with those uses of islam which Smith 
designates as ambiguous, we find in List A that: 
9 are definitely personalistic, 
51 are ambiguous, 
3 are idealistic/possibly idealistic, 
2 are by non-muslims, 
10 refer to the mundane community. 
These results can hardly be dubbed conclusive, and when it is remembered 
that they represent only a tiny proportion of Brockelmann's entries, (9 
occurences of a personalistic use of islam in 15 - 20,000 titles! ) it is 
difficult to ascribe them any statistical validity at all. 
Fourthly, to designate ambiguous entries as illustrative of a 
I . . ,62 . . h d trans1t10n 1s purely to read the theory mto t e ata. 
Although Smith admits elsewhere63 that the process of reification in the 
use of islam was by no means a neat development, I submit fifthly that, 
given the enormous overlap of the dates for all the groups idEntified by 
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Smith in List A, the personalistic, the systematized and the mundane usages 
have all been in currency throughout the period in question. To claim more 
than this is to go further than the evidence permits. 
Sixthly, Smith is on much firmer ground in his conclusions to the data 
of List B. Despite his rather less thorough treatment of this list, it is 
clear that there is a considerable shift in use in the modern period, with 
evidence of Western influence upon that shift. 
Finally Smith uses this study in The Meaning and End of Religion to 
support his argument for a development in the reified use of islam. In 
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addition to the restatement of his conclusion, he also produces a graph 
comparing the frequencies of islam and Tman in the Qur'an, in the titles of 
List A (ie. pre-1300 AH), and in List B (ie. post-1300 AH). The results 
were: 
1man islam 
In Qur'an: 45 8 
List A (pre-1300): 56 84 
List B (post-1300): 4 52 
Smith offered this graph as an 'index' to the process of rei fica tion; 
arguing that Islam as a system and as a mundane phenomenon has been 
increasingly more prevalent than the personalistic term Tman. Al FaruqT 
rightly describes this statistical method 'frivolous and misleading'. 65 It 
takes no account of the infrequency with which the classical writers used 
these terms in their titles. It is also questionable to compare the content 
of the Qur'an with the titles of other works, whereas a comparison of the 
content of these books with the quranic material might prove instructive. 
To conclude, I agree with Smith that this data 1s 'unquestionably 
imperfect' and 'highly restricted'; that his method 1s incomplete, for he 
has still 'to read the book(s) with imaginative care' in order 'to 
determine the meaning that the word had for the author in each instance'; 
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that his conclusions are most definitely 'unpersuasive' such that we 
certainly await 'more meticulous and thorough research' in this field if we 
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are to make any reliable progress. There may be a certain interest m 
discovering the way in which a scholar reaches his conclusions, but it is 
strange that Smith should republish such an unpolished piece, especially as 
he found it necessary to write just a few years previously: 
' .... that only those things should appear in print that their authors 
regard as thought through and polished, and with which they are fully 
satisfied as a final position that will probably stand up well and 
long to criticism.' 67 
(iii) Al Faruq1's critique of Smith's interpretation of Islam 
Al FaruqT's article 'The Essence of Religious Experience in Islam' 
begins with the assumption that Islam has an essence. To his knowledge, no 
Muslim or Orientalist has ever denied or questioned this before Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith. He therefore launches into a stinging attack on Smith's 
argument from The Meaning and End of Religion, chapter four. Al Faruq! is 
not entirely fair in all of his criticisms,68 and has at one point 
. d S . h' 69 H . 1 . k 1 . h h m1srepresente m1t s argument. e 1s a so qu1c to comp am t at t e 
treatment of Islam in The Meaning and End of Religion does not accord with 
Smith's own condemnation of 'all interpretation of Islam made under alien 
categories'. 70 In short he holds that Smith questions fourteen centuries of 
Muslim quranic scholarship in order to reach his conclusion that Islam as a 
system with an essence is only a modern phenomenon. 
Al FaruqT questions each of the three processes of reification in turn. 
To the first: that Persian, Christian and Jewish religion was already 
reified, al Faruq"i claims that this proves nothing - had God not done his 
homework? Was it not obvious that the increase in conceptual precision 
implied by reification would be taken advantage of by any subsequent 
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religious movement? Smith nowhere proves the negative implications of this 
process, but negative he always assumes them to be. He nowhere establishes 
'the necessary incompatibility of reification with religiousity•. 71 As for 
the Greek influences on Islam, al Fari:iq1 dismisses these as too late to be 
relevant. The third process of rei fica tion as a result of apologetics with 
the Western world in modern times is similary dismissed on the basis that 
the results so obtained are quranic. 
Al FaruqT reserves some of his strongest remarks for Smith's treatment 
of the Qur'an. 'Not only does he tell Muslims what Qur'anic meanings are 
but he takes the fanciest issues with their linguistic and exegetical 
h 1 d k . 1 . 72 Al F- - -sc oars an ma es some qulte unusua pretenswns'. aruq1 comments 
first on Smith's translations of some key passages • Whilst Smith 
translates Surah 3.85 (Wa man yabtaghi ghayr al-islami dTnan falan yuqbala 
minhu) 'If anyone opts for anything other than self-surrender as a norm, it 
shall not be accepted from him', 73 al Faruqi insists that this is only one 
side of the meaning of this verse which he himself translates 'Whoever 
seeks a religion other than Islam, it will not be accepted of him•.74 Smith 
does not actually claim that his is the only possible interpretation, but 
he does claim to represent 'many, if not most, of the leaders of Muslim 
religious thought in the early centuries'. 75 Al FaruqT insists that no 
Muslim would dispute Smith's interpretation, but would wish to add that 
this is not all the verse means: 'That "Islam" means submission and 
personal piety does not preclude it from meaning a religious system of 
ideas and imperatives•. 76 Both reified and the personalistic meanings have 
been common to Muslims across the centuries. Al FaruqT also criticises 
Smith's citation ·of al "fabarT in support of his one-sided interpretation, 
for although al "fabarT does indeed define islam as al-inqiyad 
bi-al-tadhallul wa-al-khushlf=77 (submission to My command and 
self-determination to obedience to Me) he adds immediately the words 'in 
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accordance wJth its obligations, prohibitions and notable recommendations 
prescribed by Me for your benefit•,78 thus combining the reified and 
personalist interpretations into a single definition. 
Further Smith sees the translation 'This day I have perfected your 
religion for you, and completed my favour unto you; and have chosen for you 
as a religion Islam,7 9 as a 'modern' interpretation, meaning that this 
Surah was revealed to Muhammad at the end of his life and closed the 
'exposition of Islam as a now completed system•.80 Smith claims that al 
TabarT is silent on this particular interpretation, but al FaruqT quotes al 
~abarT's knowledge of the position in the life of the Prophet at which this 
Surah was revealed. He also cites the works of several other early writers 
which confirm this dating of the Surah as the concluding revelation to 
Muhammad. 
The final example given by al FaruqT is that of Ibn Ishaq (d. 151 AH/768 
AC) author of the 'earliest biography of the Prophet'. This biographer uses 
the term islam in both the personalist and the reified senses. 'In one 
passage he calls the Ansar of Mac!Tnah "the battalion of Islam"• 81 
Having dismissed Smith's objections, al FaruqT goes on in the second 
part of his article to examine what exactly is at the heart of religious 
experience in Islam: the character of God, and submission to his revealed 
will. This understanding is also that of Jane I. Smith, who sees from the 
earliest commentators an emphasis on the content implicit in islam as well 
as the personal response to it. 82 As A. Yusuf Ali comments on Surah 3.85 
'In essence it amounts to a consciousness of the Will and Plan of God and a 
joyful submission to that Will and Plan•. 83 
Al Faruqi, in my opinion, occasionally exaggerates his case a little, 
but he nevertheless poses some important objections to Smith's treatment of 
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the Islamic religious material: i:he central contention being that 
personalist and reified understandings of islam are both quranic, and both 
have been present throughout the Muslim centuries. Al Faruq1 admits a 
certain increase in the reified or systematized uses of the term islam, but 
denies any significance to the development, since the results are equally 
quramc. 
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Section 3.2. The Shahadah 
In this section we examine the fourth chapter of Smith's book The Faith 
of Other Men, entitled 'Muslims'. The first part of this book (chapters 1 -
7) was originally presented as a series of radio broadcasts in Canada m 
1962. Smith adopts a delightful style, addressing his material to a 
non-specialist audience. In this more popular form Smith illustrates the 
theoretical principles argued in more detail in The Meaning and End of 
Religion. It contains a clear and simple example of his understanding of 
faith in its Muslim occurence, and therefore demands attention here. 
The book's introduction makes it clear that Smith does not intend to 
mass together a huge volume of information about 'the various religious 
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systems', but rather to assist his readers and listeners to come to 
understand the faith of other men themselves. His method in each case is to 
focus attention in a single item which will serve to represent in a small 
way the faith of each community, so that we begin to understand the meaning 
which these items have for participants themselves. This understanding is 
important because it helps us to see and feel the world as it appears and 
feels to those of other faith. This level of treatment in 'comparative 
religion', the level 'of men's faith• 85 is to be distinguished from the 
'sheer presentation of facts', 86 to which Smith does not intend to add. 
There is also a third level in comparative religious studies, according to 
Smith, that of generalizatons about religious life in the light of the 
specific studies of each religious tradition. This third level is 
considered in the concluding chapter of The Faith of Other Men, but 
throughout the book his 'attempt to understand the fact of faith itself• 87 
is evident. 
Chapter four exammes the Muslim confession of faith, the shah'adah, as a 
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symbol of the faith of Muslims. Srni..h uses this confession to try to 
understand the meaning of its words to the man who utters them, and also to 
try to capture the compelling call to commitment which the Muslim feels. 
'There is no god but God, and Muhammad is God's apostle', La ilaha 
illa-llah wa Mu~ammadun rasulu-llah. This is the compact affirmation, which 
to recite intentionally is to become a Muslim. There are certain features 
of this formula which Smith notes as 'intrinsically interesting in 
itself• 88 before he focuses on the meaning of the formula. It is very short 
and tidy, in the Arabic language it bears an insistent force. It is also 
the subject of many great calligraphic efforts. The formula is in constant 
use within the life of the Muslim: at birth, at death, in the five-times 
daily call to prayer, the adhan, in the rhythmic repetitions or 
incantations of the Sufi orders, and even, Smith reports, in the workaday 
life of a Himalayan road-making gang. Next he observes some basic 
differences between Muslim faith and symbolism and those of Hindus, 
Christians and Jews. The Hindu temple is ornate and complex like the truth 
it testifies, whilst both architecture and philosophy in the Islamic 
tradition maintain a simplicity and order in which incongruity or basic 
conflict of doctrine can have no place. Unlike the symbolism of the cross 
for Christians, the shahadah is a verbal symbol. This difference is also 
seen in revelation - Christians pointing first to a person, Muslims to the 
verbal revelation of God to the Prophet. The Christian creed tends to be 
d d ff . . f b 1" f . . 11 1 89 regar e more as an a 1rmat10n o e 1e , as 1n 1nte ectua assent, 
whereas this Muslim 'creed' (not so called by Muslims themselves) 
constitutes more a bearing witness to those truths which are taken for 
granted as self-evident. Furthermore, as in the Jewish case, where the word 
of God is seen primarily as an imperative, the shahadah itself becomes a 
command to worship the one true God. 
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Smith now turns in the remaining s1x pages of the chapter to the 
question which he sees as primary - what does the shahadah mean to the 
Muslim? The first affirmation, there is no god but God, means in its most 
obvious sense 'a rejection of polytheism and idolatry', 90 originally 
expressed in the smashing of the idols in Muslim conquests, and embodied in 
its doctrines of monotheism and the transcendence of the one true God. At a 
more subtle level the affirmation has also implied 'a rejection of human 
tyranny'. For 'to impose a purely human yoke on man's neck is an 
infringement not only of human dignity but of cosmic order, and to submit 
to it would be sin•.91 This has sometimes, especially m times of decline, 
led to a kind of 'fatalism'; but in Smith's opinion 'it is legitimate and 
proper, in interpreting other men's faith as in one's own, to try to see it 
at its best and highest•. 92 There is a 'third level of meaning', found 
especially amongst the mystics, where to turn from idolatry is to turn not 
just from the physical statue, but also from 'false values - the false gods 
of the heart. To pursue merely earthly goals, to value them, to give them 
one's allegiance and in a sense to worship them •... says the sensitive 
Muslim conscience, like the sensitive Christian or Jewish one, is to 
infringe the principle of monotheism.' 93 Nothing is to stand in the place 
of God in the hearts of men, and we are to rely on none but Him. Finally 
there is an interpretation of this phrase which, although not particularly 
common, Smith includes because it speaks particularly to him. This is the 
view of the mystics that a 'process, a movement in faith• 94 is implied by 
the first part of the shahadah. One cannot arrive at true faith in 'God' 
without first knowing the depths of 'no god' in the darkness of unbelief. 
The second proposition of the shahadah, Mu~ammad is the apostle of God, 
1s also to affirm something about the character and activity of God. It 
presupposes, first, 'that God has something to say to mankind• 95 and 
chooses to communicate through a man of his choice. It further affirms that 
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God has communicated his own moral law to mankind, of his own initiative. 
'Man's business in the religious life is not a quest but a response•. 96 
Thus God has revealed through the Prophet how his people are to live, and 
from this the 'theoreticians and systematizers have extracted and 
constructed a law, finally elaborated in all detail and ultimately turned 
into a static system'. 97 Finally the statement concerns Mu~ammad's 
function, not his status. He fulfils a place comparable to that of the 
Christian apostles rather than to that of Christ or the New Testament. 
The chapter we have been considering from The Faith of Other Men is 
typical of Wilfred Cantwell Smith's approach to Islam, and of his treatment 
of the Islamic material. He is concerned not just to state the data but 
especially to identify the meaning which is attached to it. That meaning 
concerns not only the place of the item in the Islamic schema, but also, 
and especially, the meaning of the shahadah to individual Muslims. He 
emphasises not only the theoretical function of the item in the textbook, 
but also the imperative or the challenge which it presents to the 
individual. He aims to eschew a purely detatched or even agnostic approach 
in preference for an understanding of the commitment or engage' faith which 
it calls forth and affirms in the men who recite the shahadah. Indeed he 1s 
most satisfied when he can treat Muslim faith as it speaks to him. His 
preoccupation with the personal and living faith of the individual Muslims 
is shown not so much by a full statement of the exact character of that. 
faith, which in fact Smith has never attempted, but rather by continued 
references within the chapter to the devotion or surrender implied by the 
religious symbol in question. For example, in describing the neat rows of 
people bowing together at prayer, he comments on their purpose, 'as a token 
of their personal and corporate submission to the will of God•.98 In his 
travelogue report of the road-menders in the Himalayas, he draws attention 
to 'a kind of living in which a split into religious and secular has not 
91 
.•.. yet come •... to segment life', whereas in the towns the mu'adhdhin 
has to 'summons the faithful to turn for a moment from their routine 
affairs to the life of the spirit•. 99 
In trying to understand Islam he wants to distinguish between Western 
and Islamic uses, such as of the term 'creed' to describe the shahadah, in 
order to lead his readers to a more accurate insight into the Muslim's own 
self-understanding. He also wants to keep his readers from a superficial 
expectation that the religious faith of all men will be expressed in forms 
or patterns similar to our own. Throughout his presentation Smith takes 
many such opportunities to remind his readers that the object of studying 
this material is to give greater insight into the faith of Muslims. 
There are two comments which may be made at this stage concerning 
S . hI h I 1- . 11 d b h. b k 1 0° F. 1 h h mit s approac to sam as 1 ustrate y t 1s oo . 1rst, a t oug 
this little book addresses a non-specialist audience, and must therefore 
make a very basic presentation, in many respects it differs only slightly. 
from the treatment which might be expected from some phenomenologists of 
religiqn. Considerable space is, despite the comments in his introduction, 
devoted to the 'sheer presentation of facts', 101 suitably handled to retain 
the interest of the radio audience. He is concerned with the functions of 
the shah3dah, comparisons with other religious traditions, and general 
religious observations. Even Smith cannot help but become involved with 
what is 'intrinsically interesting in (the symbol( itself• 102 quite 
irrespective of its religious meaning. Such a distraction, it seems to me, 
is both inevitable and desirable if we are to come to a sound understanding 
of the Islamic tradition, and Smith is wrong to criticise those whose 
interest in these intrinsic characteristics keeps them from a treatment of 
symbolic meaning. 1 03 Such studies have a valid place in the study of 
religion. 
92 
Secondly, despite his desire to present an introduction to aid our 
understanding of what Muslims themselves have found important and 
challenging for personal faith, Smith nevertheless has included at least 
one interpretation simply because he finds it 'personally .•.. 
attractive•. 104 This process of selection is also evident in other 
105 
chapters. It is inherent in this approach to Islam, and all religious 
traditions, for the study is aided, and perhaps even made possible, by a 
h t . · h h f · h of another. 106 But 1"ts great danger 1·s sympat e 1c rapport Wlt t e a1t 
this sort of subjective selection of the data to be considered, based on 
the faith and idiosyncracies of each observer. 
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Section 3.3. Truth - a study of three Arabic roots. 
In chapter two, above, section three, it was noted that in Smith's v1ew, 
truth does not reside in 'religions' or in propositions, but in persons. 
Religions are not entities which can either possess or lack the quality of 
truth, but the traditions can become true in the personal lives of men and 
women of faith. This section considers the paper 'A Human View of 
Truth', 107 in which Smith argues for this view on the basis of material 
from the Islamic tradition. The material discussed in this section is 
closely related to that in the next two sections. 
The aim of 'A Human View of Truth' is to suggest that truth is best 
understood not as a property of statements, but as a quality of persons; 
that truth is primarily personalistic rather than propositional. His 
argument is based on an examination of the meaning and use of three Arabic 
roots which in differing ways convey the notion of truth. As is often the 
case, Smith does not claim to offer a rigorous proof of his thesis, but 
rather to suggest and propose. In addition he claims the moral argument 
that it is better to see truth in personal terms, and the cultural argument 
that the devaluation of this aspect of truth constitutes a serious cultural 
loss. 
The three roots discussed by Smith are Qaqqa, ~adaqa, and ~abi:Ja. The 
verb !?af:li:Ja and its adjective ~ahTh denote being sound, healthy, 
appropriate, etc. These words are used to express the accuracy of 
statements or information. Smith observes that this root has the least 
moral connotation of the three: an outdated railway timetable may be ghayr 
108 ?a~T~, but this fact is of no cosmic consequence. Furthermore this word 
and its derivatives do not appear in the Qur'an. By contrast the other two 
roots are strongly moralistic, and 'reverberate in (the Qur'an) 
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. h "1 ' 109 m1g t1 y. 
The word ~aqq, from the root l)aqqa, is like the Latin verus and the 
Sanskrit satyam in that it can be translated either by 'true' or 'real'. 
The dichotomy between truth and reality which is com_mon in the West today 
is not found in the Arabic. Jjaqq 'refers to what is real, genuine, 
authentic, what is true in and of itself by dint of metaphysical or cosm1c 
status'. 110 As such the term applies supremely to God, al-ljaqq, who is the 
ultimate Reality. Here, then, we have truth.in the sense of the real; which 
can be contrasted to the ba~il, the false or 'the phoney'. 'Behind the one 
IS 
is metaphysical power, while the other in strident dichotomy from it is 
A 
ludicrously vain and vacuous'. The task of distinguishing and choosing 
between these 'is one of man's most decisive tasks or prerogatives'. Ill 
Smith devotes most of his discussion to the root ~adaqa. Whereas ~aqqa 
has to do with the truth of things, and ~al)l)a has to do with the truth of 
statements, ~adaqa has to do with the truth of persons. ~adaqa is concerned 
with 'honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness: •... It involves being true 
to oneself and to other persons, and to the situation with which one is 
dealing'. 112 There is complete coincidence between outward expression and 
actual fact, there is a genuineness of intention on the part of the speaker 
which is in complete contrast to kadhaba, lying. Smith observes that in 
modern English we still have a personalist dimension in such negative 
concepts as lying or cheating, for these depend not only on the statements 
or actions of the participants, but also on their attitudes and intentions. 
~adaqa refers not just to speech, but also to other actions: giving true 
advice, suggesting both the sincerity of the counsellor and the practical 
appropriateness of the counsel; fighting a true battle, suggesting both 
genuine zeal and good effect. The abstract, or verbal, noun from the root 
is the word ~idq meaning 'that quality by which a man speaks or acts with a 
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combination of mner integrity and objective overt appropriateness. It 
involves saying or doing the objectively right thing out of a genuine 
personal recognition of its rightness, an inner alignment with it•. 113 
These points are all stressed in the medieval Arabic dictionaries used by 
Smith. 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith turns next to the word tasdTq, the verbal noun 
from ~addaqa (the lind derived form of the verb ~adaqa). Smith grves 
saddaqa the causative meaning 'to make come true', 'to render true'. As for 
the meaning of ta~dTq, Smith gives four from his medieval dictionaries: 
(i) to 'recognize the truth of something', which is better than saying 
merely to 'believe', since it is possible to believe what is false. 114 
Ta~diq goes beyond recognition of an external fact, but includes the act of 
subscribing to it, incorporating it 'into my own moral integrity as a 
person•. 115 (ii) The word means the realization that someone is a speaker 
of the truth. (iii) The word is used of verification, as in the case of a 
scientific experiment. 116 (iv) Beyond these, the word ta~diq has a more 
active sense of taking steps to cause something to become true. 'To 
summarize. Ta~diq is to recognize a truth, to appropriate it, to affirm it, 
to confirm it, to actualize it it is the inner appropriation and 
outward implementation of truth.• 117 
Having discussed these linguistic matters, Smith notes that when 'the 
clasical Muslim thinkers' were asked to explain what faith is, they 
'affirmed almost to a man' that faith is ta~d1q. 118 On this understanding 
of faith, it involves recognizing what is true as authentically applicable 
to oneself, plus commiting oneself to acting in the light of that truth, a 
notion which comes very near to Smith's understanding of faith. On a 
mystical level, faith has to do with 'the discovery of the truth .... of 
the Islamic injunctions: the process of pers<;mal verification of them, 
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whereby living them out one proves them and finds that they do indeed 
become true, both for oneself and for the society and world in which one 
1. •119 Th .. ff"h .h d- "llb .d d. 1ves. IS equatiOn o ait Wit ta~ 1q WI e cons1 ere m more 
detail in section 3.5. below, but an important remark of Smith's may be 
noted. Having commented that these are good definitions of faith, he adds: 
'They are not, and are not meant to be, definitions of Islamic faith; 
rather, they are Islamic definitions of human faith.• 120 So Smith tries to 
argue here from the Islamic material his point that faith is a universal 
human quality, which men experience through varying traditions. 
In the remaning part of 'A Human View of Truth', Smith considers these 
notions of truth in the context of modern Western society, where, Smith 
believes, the human dimension of truth has been lost in the general concern 
for objective propositional truth. Human integrity in his view is at stake, 
and the very truth we seek to preserve is in question. Smith therefore 
advocates a return in our society to an understanding of truth which 
corresponds to the meaning of ~idq. On the one hand we should reject a 
pursuit of a purely objective external truth which condones the hypocrisy 
of personal insincerity ('the way to Hiroshima or to bacteriological 
warfare (is paved) with good objective science'. 121 ). On the other hand 
;;idq is more than 'well-meaning intention'. 
'There is no room here for that kind of truth that leaves unaffected 
the moral character and private behaviour of those who know it. 
Equally, there is none of that modern nonsense whereby one has simply 
to unbottle one's emotions, whatever they be, so that feelings are to 
be expressed regardless of consequences or propriety, or so that we 
come close to hearing that it is honest to tell a lie provided that 
one really wants to tell it.' 122 
'A price that we have paid for divorcing objective truth from 
sincerity, is to divorce subjective emotionalism from all discipline -
and from community cohesion. We have made truth amoral, the next 
generation has made self-expression amoralistic also'. 123 
So Smith makes a plea for a personalistic understanding of truth, in which 
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the external objective exactitude of our knowledge is matched by the inward 
orientation of our hearts and lives. 
Much of the material which we have discussed here is re-used by Smith in 
a paper presented at a conference in honour of Harry A. Wolfson, reproduced 
in On Understanding Islam. 124 In that paper Smith returns to some of the 
kalam texts to see if his concept of faith can be shown to make sense. It 
is a pity that he there limits himself to such a select group of writers 
which demonstrate his case. Most of his examples are from TaftazanT, with 
some references also from al Baghdadi, al ~abarT and al Kastal.i. In that 
paper Smith accepts Wolfson's analysis of ta~dTq in the falsafah 
tradition 125 as meaning the mind reaching a decision, but asserts that in 
the kalam texts its use is shadowed by the interpretation which has been 
discussed above. 
An understanding of Smith's use of truth is essential for an 
understanding of his concept of faith. It is easy to fall into the trap of 
caricaturing Smith's position as 'anything goes, as long as you have 
faith'. Smith in many ways invites this kind of misunderstanding, for 
example by refusing to address himself to the question of whether my 
religious affirmation has any link with an objective reality, and by 
failing to perceive the seriousness of the task undertaken by the 
linguistic philosophers to that end. But in 'A Human View of Truth' he 
spells out more clearly than in most places the importance of what a man 
says corresponding to what is in fact the case. 'When truth is seen as 
personal, a man's statement must not only cohere with his •••. inner life, 
b 1 1 b. . f ,126 ut must a so reate to o JeCtlve acts. 
In his approach to Islam, Smith is looking not just for information 
about Islam, nor even for Islamic notions of truth and faith, but for 
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Islamic insights into the n2.ture of hurnan faith and its relation to truth. 
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Section 3.4. Is the Qur'aP_ the Word of God? 
In 1963 Wilfred Cantwell Smith gave his first public lectures as a 
theologian in a series at Yale Divinity School. The first of his lectures 
was entitled 'Is the Qur'an the Word of God?', and it was published in 1967 
along with three other chapters to form the book Questions of Religious 
Truth. 127 Whilst this lecture was not concerned with matters of technical 
Islamic study, it deals with a topic of consider able importance to his 
understanding of Islam, and highlights Smith's understanding of faith and 
its relation to truth. The main thrust of Questions of Religious Truth is 
to argue for and illustrate his notion of truth which does not reside in 
statements or systematic formulations of 'religion', but a truth which can 
become true for persons of faith as they live their lives in the light of 
that which they know of the Ultimate Reality. 
The fact that God has spoken is a glad assumption of religious faith, at 
least it is certainly so in Islamic and Christian faith. But when it comes 
to examining the particular claim that the Qur'an is the word of God there 
has, of course, been disagreement between these two great faith 
communities. Smith's aim is not primarily to try to solve this 
fourteen-century-old dispute, but rather to use the fact of the 
disagreement as a way of thinking about how we hold to our religious truth. 
Traditionally the 'yes' and 'no' answers to this question have been held by 
isolated and distinct communities, each possessing a vigorous assurance 
that their answer is the right one. Each camp has been occupied by persons 
of intelligence and sincerity, as well as those who inevitably follow the 
lead of more able proponents. Furthermore, this question has never been 
seen as peripheral or minor, despite the fact that it has not been 
articulated as such. Those who have held that the Qur'an is indeed the word 
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of God have taken it very seriously through times of attack or through 
indifference, and have lived their lives in the light of that which is 
revealed to them through it. For those who have held that the Qur'an is not 
the word of God, it has still not been a minor issue, for their very 
indifference to the question shows the profundity of their assurance that 
their answer 1s right. In both cases, however, the conviction that the 
Qur'an is or is not the word of God is not the result of reading the Qur'an 
and reaching a conclusion; instead those who affirm this word of God read 
it in order to hear what God would say to them, and those who do not 
recognize here the word of God either do not read it or they read it for 
some quite different purpose. In both cases, then, the answer is prejudged; 
both sides are actually prejudiced. 
Smith states that it is a function of religious Weltanschauungen to give 
their members sets of presuppositions, and that it is a task of the 
academic comparative religionist to draw into the open such presuppositions 
as are inherent in the man of faith's position. In this case, the answer to 
our question is already determined by the religious presuppositions of the 
parties concerned. Not only are the answers prejudged, both the positive 
and negative answers are self-authenticating to those who give them. The 
self-authentication gives a certain 'pragmatic justification' for those 
entrenched positions held. 
'Those who have held the Qur'an to be the word of God have, by holding 
this, found that God does in fact speak to them through it. They have 
ordered their lives in accord with it, and have found that that 
pattern rewards them by bringing them into the divine presence.'l28 
At the same time, 
'Western scholars .... and many others, approach the Qur'an quite 
heedless of a possibility that it might be God's word; persuaded that 
its source was mundane, they look for that source in the psychology of 
Mul)ammad, in the environment in which he lived, in the historical 
tradition that he inherited, in the socio-economic-cultural milieu of 
his hearers. They look for it, and they find it. They find it, because 
quite evidently it is there. 129 
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Both those who answer 'yes' and those who answr_:r 'no' find that their views 
are confirmed by reading the Qur'an. 
In the past these two groups have been almost completely isolated, 
whereas today there is considerable intercourse between the two groups. We 
are moving towards Smith's vision of the 'one world', with its 'global 
society'. In such a world the continuing divergence on this important issue 
poses an intellectual and moral challenge. No longer, Smith insists, can we 
evade the empirical evidence that both camps contain men of intellegence 
and sincerity, psychologically satisfying as such a fallacy may remain. 
Neither, in Smith's opinion, can we hope to remove the problem by 
missionary efforts to conversion on either side. 
Already it is clear to Smith that there is evidence of a growing 
awareness that the old isolationists' answers are failing to serve. In the 
new climate it is essential for both sides to take stock of the other's 
insights. The Western scholar can make sense of the facts about the Qur'an, 
but he cannot thereby account for the vitality of the life of faith which 
he can now see for himself in the Muslim community. In the style of 
scientific enquiry, there is additional data here which calls for the 
formation of new hypotheses. Smith draws attention to a Western Islamicist 
and a Christian missionary/theologian who have begun such a reformulation: 
Hamilton Gibb, who admitted the term "'Revelation" .... as the description 
of Mu~ammad's personal experiences'; 130 and Kenneth Cragg, who 'no longer' 
rejects the Qur'an theologica11y. 131 Similarly Smith believes that 'the 
best minds and most honest spirits m (the Muslim) community are themselves 
sincerely searching for a new answer to our question, one that wi11 do 
equal justice to the transcendent element in their tradition, and yet will 
at the same time be meaningful and persuasive to those whose horizon is 
1 b 1 d h h . • 1 d d" . 1" . I 132 g o a an w ose 1stonca un erstan mg 1s rea 1st1c. 
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Smith's vision of the unity of knowledge and the unity of mankind leads 
him to 'imagine that the only answer to our question that will satisfy the 
non-Muslim and the only answer that will satisfy the Muslim will in coming 
years be identical•. 133 Despite this hope, Smith does not expect Christians 
and Muslims to cease to be different. He suggests that 'intellectually 
their understandings must converge, even if morally they choose to respond 
differently•. 134 But it is not until chapter three of Questions of 
Religious Truth that Smith gives any further clues as to the shape of that 
intellectual convergence. In that chapter he expounds his view that truth 
does not reside in religions or in religious statements, but that these can 
become true in the life of faith of individual men and women. On this view 
of truth, the question about the Qur'an is seen not as a question about the 
essential truth of the book, or whether it is in itself the word of God. 
The question becomes 'does God actually speak to people through it? Can it 
become true for people of faith?' Finally, in another later article Smith 
insists on an empirical historian's view of the question, for, 'the true 
meaning of scripture is the solid historical reality of the continuum of 
actual meanings over the centuries of actual people•. 135 
There are several comments which can be made about this question and 
Smith's treatment of it. First, I find it difficult to reconcile Smith's 
acceptance of an intellectual convergence and moral divergence between the 
two camps, with his insistence upon moral and intellectual integrity in 'A 
Human View of Truth'. If we can both accept the intellectual formula that 
in the life of faith that X has lived today, X found that his reading in 
the Qur'an presented him with a word from the living God, this intellectual 
admission permits no moral divergence between us. 
Secondly the discussion illustrates Smith's approach to Islam as both 
objective data for consideration, and also personal response. A related 
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parallel is to be found in Mawdudi's 'Introduction' to A. Yusuf Ali's 
translation and commentary of the Holy Qur'an. 136 Mawdudi" acknowledges that 
people come to a reading of the Qur'an with differing presuppositions. 
These may be positive or negative as to whether the book is divinely 
inspired. His advice to both groups is to leave their presuppositions 
behind. Instead he gives them some basic information about the Qur'an and 
its reception by Mu~ammad, and invites them to read expectantly, to see if 
God does not speak to them through it. It seems that here we have a 
synthesis of the two sides in Smith's debate for the purposes of Islamic 
apologetics - the reader is invited to be both objective and expectant. 
Thirdly it is in keeping with Smith's approach to be dissatisfied with 
any solution to the question which is not acceptable to both Muslims and 
non-muslims. But it is far from clear that this is the case here. It may be 
acceptable for a Christian to expect God to address him in all of life, so 
that if in reading the Qur'an we find that God is speaking to us, we may 
wish to express this fact in the terms which Smith suggests. But the 
traditional devout Muslim wants to affirm that God has spoken today because 
he has spoken eternally, the Qur'an has become for him the word of God 
today because that is what eternally it is. It seems impossible to 
reconcile Smith's understanding of the problem with 'the transcendent 
elements in the (Muslim) tradition•. 137 
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Section 3.5. Studies in Faith - Tman, Tasd!q and Arkan. 
This section examines three chapters of On Understanding Islam in which 
Smith discusses Islamic material relating to faith. The aim of the section 
is once again to see the way in which Smith understands faith and 
approaches Islam. 
(i) Faith In the Qur'an - Tman 
This section examines the use of Tman .and related terms in the Qur'an. 
Smith treated the subject in a pair of lectures delivered in 1974 as the 
Iqbal Memorial Lectures at the University of the Punjab in Lahore. 138 
These argued from the Islamic tradition the case which was later developed 
in broader perspective in Faith and Belief. 
The central thrust of Faith and Belief, we saw in section 2.2. above, is 
that faith is not the same as belief; that believing is not a primary 
religious category; and that it is faith which is of ultimate significance. 
If this is true, it is a serious mistake to translate certain biblical and 
quranic words by the modern English word 'believe', which denotes holding 
opinions of uncertain foundation. The Qur'an is interested in knowledge of 
the truth and commitment to it, engagement with it; there is no significant 
place for the holding of opinions. 
The words carafa and calima are very frequent m the Qur'an (especially 
the latter); knowledge holds a central place in the Qur'an. The word which 
in later Islamic theology became standard for 'believing' is ictaqada, but 
this word does not appear in the Qur'an. The root from which {taqada 
derives (caqada) does occur seven times in various forms, meaning 
'originally "to tie a knot", either literally or in the figurative sense of 
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binding a person by a legal or moral commitment, to make a binding 
engagement'. 139 Smith has found that {taqada appears in medieval kalam 
texts at first with the meaning 'to bind oneself, to commit or pledge 
oneself to, to take on the engagement of living in accord with a given 
position; and that only gradually across the centuries does it take on the 
more neutral meaning of "to believe" something intellectually•. 140 
Unfortunately, as in other places where Smith sees a change in meaning 
occuring 'gradually over the centuries', he provides no further data to 
substantiate the claim. 
The Qur'an is concerned fundamentally with 'God, presented as Creator, 
Sovereign, and Judge, powerful, demanding, succouring, majestic, laying on 
humankind inescapable imperatives and offering us inexhaustable rewards. 
The fundamental category on the manward side is that of faith.• 141 Tman is 
thus the manward side of this central concern of the Qur'an. It means 
'almost precisely, s'engager•. 142 The word !man seems to stress the 
existential engagement of living faith. This is further illustrated by the 
English word 'amen', which comes from the same semitic root through Hebrew, 
as the Arabic root amana. The mu'min, the man of faith, is he who is able 
to say 'amen', to include himself in the worship of the whole. 'By it, he 
identifies himself with the communal and cosmic activity•. 143 
The positive word for faith, !man, presupposes the divine summons, and 
describes the human response. The same is true of the words for rejection. 
The main word here is kafir, from the root kafara, to reject, to cover or 
hide. This word is often translated 'infidel', or 'unbeliever', but these 
do not do justice to the force of the word. The word could not possibly be 
used of someone who happens to hold different opinions about the nature of 
things. The word implies, rather, that although the man knows what is true, 
yet he fails to accept it or obey it. Similarly kufr means not so much 
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144 d . h f 11 
'.infidelity' but 'almost a spitting m God's face' esp1te t e u 
force of his authority and mercy. Another similar verb, meaning to deny or 
repudiate, ja~ada, is used in surah 27.14; jahadu bi-ha wa-stayqanat-ha 
anfusuhum. Smith translates it 'They rejected (the signs of God) although 
145 they knew very well in their hearts that they were true'. 
Another interesting surah includes a word derived from kafara and also 
Tman. Arberry renders surah 2.109 I Many of the People of the Book wish they 
might restore you as unbelievers, after you have believed, in the jealousy 
of their souls, after the truth has become clear to them•. 146 It is clear 
that the verse refers to a situation in which the People of the Book would 
like the Muslims to repudiate that to which they are now committed, and 
that which the People of the Book themselves know to be true. 
The same presupposition of the truth about God is made in the word 
mushrik. This word is sometimes translated 'polytheist', 'pagan', 
'idolater'; but it is derived from the root which means to associate. The 
mushrikTn are those who associate other beings with God. But Smith's point 
is that such people cannot be seen as those who believe in many gods. The 
assumption of the Qur'an is that these people foolishly and perversely 
continue to associate more/other beings with the one and only true God. The 
very word in fact presupposes monotheism - it does not point to an 
alternative system of beliefs. 
In the Qur'an, then, Smith asserts, the concept of belief is absent. The 
Qur'an does not concern itself with the opinions of others, it simply 
assumes its own set of presuppositions. Faith, rejection and association 
are all responses to the one reality which is never questioned but always 
presupposed. Faith, in the Qur'an, is about commitment to that which is 
known, not about holding one set of opinions in contrast to some other. It 
is to this commitment that the mu'min bears witness in the shahadah, not to 
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the precise formulation of his 'beliefs'. 
The remaining parts of Smith's Iqbal Memorial Lectures are not analysed 
here. They go on to examine in more detail the differences between faith 
and belief in the Qur'an and then in the Christian tradition. 
(ii) Faith in later Islamic history: ta~dfq and arkan. 
This section examines Smith's treatment of three ways in which Muslims 
have understood faith. These three ways are performing some external acts, 
making confession with the lips, and possessing some inner quality. These 
three elements of faith were combined into a rhyming formula: al-Tinan huwa 
t d- b. 1 . - . - b. 1 1" - c 1 b. 1 k- 147 a~ 1qun 1-a -Janan, wa-1qrarun 1-a - 1san, wa- ama un 1-a -ar an. 
All three of these aspects have been important for Muslims through the 
centuries. Faith as an inner matter of the heart tended to become the 
dominant theme of the major theological schools; faith as confession with 
the lips or recitation of the shahadah has been the dominant theme for 
mundane and social functions; faith as performance of good works became the 
d d f h Kh- . ·- 148 stan ar o t e anJl movement. 
In several places Smith argues that the personalist theme is dominant m 
all three of these elements. We saw in section 3.2. above, his conviction 
that the note of personal commitment is central to the confession of the 
lips in the recitation of the shanadah. We saw in section 3.3. above, that 
he demonstrates the personalist orientation of the term ta~dTq, and this 
---
theme is continued in one of the papers we are about to consider. 149 In the 
other paper to be considered here, we find Smith's treatment of the third 
element of the rhyming formula, where he demonstrates that even al-arkan is 
b d d . 1" 150 est un erstoo m persona 1st terms. 
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a. Ta~dTq 
S . h W lf I 151 h . h . . f h m1t accepts o son s argument t at m t e wntmgs o t e 
falasifah, ta~dTq is used to indicate the mind's making a judgement. This 
philosophical and logical usage is in direct continuity with late Greek 
thought. But Smith contends that the word is used differently in the kalam 
or theological writings. At this point Smith repeats several pages from his 
paper 'A Human View of Truth', namely the discussion of the three roots 
relating to truth in Arabic: ~aqqa, ~adaqa and ~al)~a, and the discussion of 
the meaning of ta~dTq. These have already been examined in section 3.3. 
152 
above, so need not be repeated here. 
Armed with his definition of ta~d!q as active commitment to that which 
1s know11. as the truth, Smith now addresses the question of how this term is 
used in the kalam texts. He examines some selected passages from Tah3.zanT, 
al-Kasta11, al-TabarT, a1-Baghdad1 and a few others, and shows that the 
philosophical usage is inappropriate to the intention of these writers. 
They spoke not of opinions or 'beliefs', nor even of knowing the truth. To 
quote from al-KastalT (ninth-century AH commentator): 
'Al-ta~cfiq does not mean knowing the truth .... ; no, it is rather a 
yielding to what is known and a letting oneself be led by it, and the 
soul's being quiet and at peace with it and its accepting it, setting 
aside recalcitrance and stubbornness, and constructing one's actions 
in accordance with it'.l53 
Smith focuses especially upon the moral nature of faith in the Islamic 
tradition. God's revelation to man in the Qur'an is mub!n, clear, and leads 
to knowledge. But man must come to the point of realizing that that truth 
applies not to man in general, but to me as an individual. Ta~dfq here is 
that inner response in the heart by which I know that I must do as 
commanded, and actually doing it. 'Faith is the appropriation of truth by 
h . f d . . d 1" •154 the heart that comes to t e pomt o ec1s1on an comp 1ance. 
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Al-Tman huwa ta~dTqun bi-a1-janan describes faith not as belief in the 
heart, nor yet as knowing with the heart, 155 but as personal appropriation 
by the heart. In this way Smith once again draws our attention away from 
the conceptual content of faith towards its personal focus and form. 
The same is true for the second clause of the formulation: wa-iqrarun 
bi-al-lisan. Confessing with the tongue, or reciting the shahadah, is 
primarily an expression of commitment rather than a declaration of belief. 
(See Section 3.2., above.) 
b. Arkan 
It is to the final word of the three-fold rhyming definition of al-Tman 
that Smith turns in chapter 8 of On Understanding Islam. A1-arkan may refer 
to the so-called 'pillars' of Islam (ie performance of the prayers, 
almsgiving, fasting, pilgrimmage, and recitation of the shahadah; although 
presumably the recitation of the shahadah is implicitly excluded in this 
case because it has already been treated in the second part of the rhyming 
formula: iqrarun bi-a1-1isan) or alternatively, al-arkan may refer to the 
limbs of the body. 
The radicals r-k-n which form the root of arkan convey the notion 'to 
· 1' d 1 b d by•. 156 The me me towar s, to ean upon, to rest upon, to e supporte 
noun rukn, of which arkan is the plural, 'signifies that upon which 
something rests, by which it is supported; according to the classical 
dictionaries it denotes the strongest side of a thing and, generally, 
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strength, resource'. Hence the possibility of arkan referm1ct to the 
pillars of Islam. Other meanings include the philosophic essential 
condition, and although not common, human limbs or members. It 1s this last 
meaning which Smith argues in this paper, and on this understanding the 
phrase camalun bi-al-arkan which occurs in the three-part formulation of 
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faith, is equivalent to carnalun bi-al-jawari~. 
The main reason to suppose that arkan denotes the pillars of Islam is 
that this is the major religious use for the term. This interpretation is 
given by many but not all Muslims and Western scholars. But Smith presents 
a considerable amount of evidence to support the contrary view that arkan 
in this context is equivalent to jawari~, and bears the meaning members or 
limbs of the body. 
First, if the pillars were intended, we might have expected a definite 
al-camal rather than the indefinite camalun. Some translators insert the 
definite article: 'the practice of Islam's chief duties', rather than 
allowing 'a matter of external, physical behaviour•. 158 
The second point is the tentative suggestion that the use of the 
preposition bi- is 'just a whit awkward•. 159 Smith feels that li-, or an 
accusative or an objective genitive might be a smoother choice if the 
pillars are intended. 
Thirdly, Smith notes that the first two phrases refer to parts of the . 
body, and that the progression heart, tongue, limbs, is more obvious than 
the alternative: heart, tongue, pillars. Further, as we noted above, one of 
the five pillars is already advocated in the expression iqrarun 
bi-al-lisan, and although there is one commentator who explains the third 
phrase as 'the remaining four pillars', 160 there is another who refers to 
c 1 b. -,. 1 . - .h ( . . h h . . b d.l b ) 161 ama 1-sa 1r a -Jawan. act1on w1t t e remammg o 1 y mem ers. 
Next Smith moves on to more substantial matters which in his view prove 
decisive. Our question is set in the wider context of the debate between 
faith and works, whether or not faith involves doing anything. This debate 
takes place in the k alam, and especially surrounds the Muctazilah and the 
whole Kharij! movement. In this debate the two expressions al-jawari~ and 
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al-arkan are used interchangeably, although the former is more frequent 
h h 1 . 1 162 d h . . h h' t an t e atter m ear y texts, an t ere 1s no suggestwn t at t 1s 
change in phrasing implies any change in meaning. 
Smith's fifth reason for asserting that arkan does not refer primarily 
to the five (or four) pillars, is that works of faith are not to be limited 
to the pillars alone. Al-BaghdadT, for example, quotes the i)adith which 
refers to over seventy parts of faith 'the meanest of which is, not one of 
163 the pillars, but merely removing an obstruction from a path'. The 
citation of this l")adfth immediately follows the three-fold definition, 
ending .... bi-al-arkan. In addition works of supererogation are also 
discussed in these terms. So, too, is the possiblity of commiting sin 
bi-al-arkan; which does not mean that, say, not commiting adultery is one 
of the pillars, rather that the behaviour of the body is central to faith. 
Smith turns lastly to the question of historical development; as there 
are various versions of this formula available. He sees a process by which 
first the expression carnal bi-al-jawari~ was replaced by carnal bi-al-arkan; 
and secondly al-arkan came to be seen to refer not to al-jawaril"), but to 
the pillars. The reason for the use of al-arkan in preference to al-jawarib 
is that this produces the neat rhyme: .... bi-al-janan .... bi-al-lisan 
.... bi-al-arkan. As evidence for this tendency to generate a rhyming 
triplet, Smith notes a similar process in the first phrase of our formula: 
164 the common word qalb has been replaced of late by the 'rare synonym' 
janan, which one commentator felt he had to explain to his readers. 165 Of 
--· 
the various versions of this formula available, the earliest historically 
has no rhyme, in the middle there are some which have two rhyming elements, 
and the final form is that in which all three phrases rhyme. The earliest 
version is qalb/lisan/jawari~; in between we find qalb/lisan/arkan; and the 
final form is janan/lisan/arkan. Unfortunately, as in so many of Smith's 
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'progressions over the centuries', the process 1s by no means 
straightforward, and the data is subjected to considerable interpretation. 
In the notes, Smith refers to the first example of the triple rhyme in the 
work of the fourth/tenth century Hanbali writer, Ibn Battah (d. 
387 /997). 166 The middle position is to be found in the l)adith collected by 
Ibn Majah (d. 273/886). 167 Smith gives no early reference to the unrhyming 
version. 
Other evidence for this point is that several writers use the qalb and 
jawaril) in their major discussions and expositions, but consistently use 
the rhyming versions, janan and arkan, when the whole formula is cited. 
Examples of such writers are BaqillanT and al Ghazalf. 
The final stage in the development, which Smith is careful to cover, is 
the way in which the word arkan has been understood by those who read the 
triplet. In Islamic trtadition the 'pillars' have not always been refered to 
as al-arkan, as early l)ad'lth show, but it is clear that this term came to 
be applied to them. Since in religious use the term al-arkan usually refers 
to the pillars, it is not surprising that as people read the three-fold 
formula of faith they have assumed that the pillars were being referred to. 
Whilst a considerable number of Muslim and Western scholars normally accept 
this later interpretation, Smith reports that there are also those who have 
assumed that the earlier jawari~ interpretation is implied. 
This concludes the discussion of the primarily Islamic material. In this 
last section we have seen how Smith finds the personalist focus of faith to 
be more in keeping with the Qur'an, and is to be I=>refetred to a structured, 
systematized form or to an emphasis upon the content of faith. 
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Chapter 4 Studies m Christianity and the Concept of Faith. 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate some of the specific studies 
related to the Christian tradition which Smith presents in the elucidation 
of his argument; to illustrate the way in which he uses his concept 0~ 
faith in the treatment of Christian material; and to examine critically his 
approach to Christianity. 
Smith argues that questions of belief are not central to the Christian 
tradition; faith is the key concept in the New Testament, and in early 
baptismal rites and creeds. He also argues that the central moral and 
theological tenets of the Christian tradition demand that Christians find 
new responses to people of other faith, both practically and theoretically. 
In his view, Christians must see people of other faith as sharing this 
basic human quality of faith with them. 
Smith's approach to Christianity is found to highlight this important 
aspect of the biblical and early Christian tradition: that men and women 
must respond in faith to the God who has made himself known to them. But 
Smith's approach involves selective interpretation of the material. There 
is considerable evidence to suggest that right beliefs about the truth of 
God's dealings with mankind are necessary preconditions to the sort of 
faith which Smith emphasises, and that other external factors are part of 
the total response which man must make to the divine. Personal faith must 
be seen as a key factor in understanding Christianity, but this must not be 
allowed to dominate. 
114 
Section 4.1. Faith in the New Testament 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith specifically deals with the Biblical material m 
the third chapter of Belief and History, a book which traces the 
development in meaning of the word 'believe' through the ages and shows how 
the modern term differs from faith. 1 Having shown that the modern word 
'believe' means to 'hold an opinion, regardless of whether or not that 
opinion is correct', Smith goes on to argue in chapter three that this 
modern notion is quite absent in the New Testment. The central biblical 
category is faith, as commitment and trust, so he concludes that it is 
wrong to translate any word in the New Testament by the modern word 
'believe'. The following paragraphs give a summary and critique of his 
reasoning. 
In the King James Version, the noun 'faith' appears 233 times, whilst 
the word 'belief' appears only once. 2 There is no verb in English which 
corresponds to the noun 'faith', so the verb 'believe' is used instead, and 
it occurs 285 times. Words in the 'believe' family (believer, unbelief, 
believing, etc.) occur 355 times in the KJV. Smith states that the 
translators of the KJV generally used words of the 'faith' family wherever 
they could. In the Old Testament the root aman appears 320 times, of which 
45 are translated by 'believe' words, and only 5 are of the type 'believe 
that'. In the New Testament words like -rr•crT•S, T"T"I<TT"£.(.)£tV ~TTI~-ro>, etc., 
I 
occur some 603 times. Of these only four percent are followed by a 'that' 
clause (ie en, , or accusative and infinitive.). The verb appears in the 
New Testament as follows: with no object 34%, with a personal object 41%, 
with a non-personal object (including word, promise, etc.) 12%, and with a 
propositional object ("that .... " clause) 12%.3 
After this introductory data, Smith quotes several New Testament 
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scholars to show that it is 'a common-place among New Testament scholars 
that the scriptural notion of faith is fiduciary, a trusting, entrusting of 
oneself, and also obedience, fidelity; and in other ways is more than 
intellectual•. 4 He then shows by examining New Testament references, that 
faith is not more than intellectual, faith is not intellectual at all, it 
is something quite other. In order to prove this he examines a selection of 
the passages in which .,.,.-,<ri<t:..U£.. IV and its related words occur; first those 
few which are followed by a subordinate clause or independent statement 
beginning ' .... that', secondly those which take a non-personal object, 
thirdly those which take a personal object directly or indirectly, and 
finally those which take no object at all. 
(i) n I <TI£V (IV with a 'that' clause 
The first group of references to be examined are those in which the 
Greek verb rr rcr--r£.UE 1 v takes a propositional statement as a direct object, 
ie., b-n or an accusative plus infinitive. This group makes up four 
percent of the total occurrences of words from Tfi(J"ftc;/TIJCJT1i-t.>£rv In the 
New Testament, and Smith chooses just three examples for consideration. 
Even in these cases where perhaps the translation 'believe that' is most 
obvious, Smith feels that it has become a mistranslation so to render the 
scriptural notion. 
The first verse to be considered is James 2.19, 'Thou believest that 
there is one God; thou doest well: the devils also believe, and tremble'. 5 
The problem with the belief described in this verse is that there is no 
follow through, no sincerity on the part of the devils who 'believe'; it 
does not affect them positively, it does not affect their lives in worship 
and obedience. It is, however, not an impartial or detached speculation on 
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their parts: the devils are involved existentially, for cp f I crooua- 1 I/ , 
they tremble. Smith suggests that here is the o~ly place in the New 
Testament where TTI<ST<e:.U£ 1 V does not mean having faith, .at the same time 
he insists that it most certainly does not mean believe in the modern sense 
of holding an opinion. The devils know and have seen God's oneness, yet 
they. reject, they repudiate that which they know for themselves - they do 
not hold optnions about existence or unity of the divine. Smith offers the 
translation 'You recognize God's oneness? Good! But the devils also 
recognize, and tremble'. 6 The idea is very similar to Smith's treatment of 
the word kafir in Islamic thought, that wretched ingrate who rejects that 
which he knows. 7 
In John 13.19, Jesus says to his disciples at the Last Supper, 'From 
henceforth I tell you before it come to pass, that, when it is come to 
pass, ye may believe that I am he'. 8 Smith wants to translate this as, 
' .... in order that you may recognize that I am He'. Smith holds that it 
would be quite wrong to suppose that John is portraying Jesus as wanting 
his disciples to hold certain opinions about him. Instead Jesus is 
portrayed as wanting his disciples to recognize the truth about him. 
The last verse considered by Smith in this group is Hebrews 11.6, 'But 
without faith it is impossible to please him: for he that cometh to God 
must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently 
seek him'. 9 Here Smith again would translate 1T1cr·n:.ucrc:o~-' by recognize, for 
the original does not allow the modern notion of holding an opinion that 
God exists, irrespective of whether or not he does. The emphasis here, 
according to Smith, is that faith must precede belief, just as in this 
verse it does. In other words, we should only believe in as much as we know 
- first we should catch a glimpse of God, and only then believe in him. 
'Belief follows after faith, and theology is simply an honest human attempt 
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to conceptualize, in the terms of one's day, the faith that one has priorly 
had, the vision that one has seen•. 10 Belief, various opinions about God, 
are not the entrance fee to the vision of God, rather belief is the result 
of the mind's attempt to grapple with what one has come to know for 
oneself. 
(ii) n I <JI£\..JE-1 V with a non-personal object 
The second group of passages consists of those in which the concept of 
faith is followed by a single object which is a thing rather than a person. 
These are slightly more common in the New Testament than the first group 
where the object of faith seemed to be a proposition; even so together 
these constiute only a small proportion of the total. To represent this 
group Smith cites two passages, 2 Thessalonians 2. 10 - 13, and 1 John 4. 
16. 
In 2 Thessalonians 2. 10- 13, TTI<JIC.t..>£-IV appears twice, and the noun 
once, in each case having direct objects which are non-personal. Smith 
paraphrases the passage using parts of the text from the Revised Standard 
Version (indicated by "···· ") and the New English Bible (indicated by 
' .... ') thus: 
The writer •... 'sets up a sharp contrast "between those who are to 
perish" on the one hand and "you, brethren beloved by the Lord" whom 
"God chose .•. from the beginning to be saved". The former will perish 
"because they refused to love the truth and so be saved". 'Therefore 
God puts them under a delusion, which works upon them to' have faith 
in the Lie, 'so that they may all be brought to judgement, all who do 
not' have faith in, opt for, give their allegiance to 'the Truth but 
make sinfulness their deliberate choice'. It is over against these 
that the Christians to whom the letter is addressed are said in the 
next verse to be loved by God and saved "through sanctification by the 
Spirit and" faith "in the Truth".' 11 
The conflict between the Truth and the Lie reminds Smith of Persian 
dualism, and thus he places them in capital letters. There is a direct 
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parallelism between 'love of the truth' and 'faith in the truth', and 
between 'faith in the lie' and 'pleasure in unrighteousness'. 12 There 1s no 
doubt that here the primary issue is not the holding of opinions, a fault 
of 'mere intellectual error'. 13 Here the issue is recognition of the truth, 
a recognition which may give rise either to acceptance of it, alignment 
with it, or to rejection of the truth and rebellion against it with one's 
whole being. 
In 1 John 4.16, the direct object of the verb rr,c:r-r~£-fv' 1s T->jV 
~0o<-rr1v' love. 14 Smith interprets_ the opening part of the verse to affirm: 
"'We have come to know the love that God has in us" and adds 
·rn::nt(}"T£Uj:::...o(_;<J£-V .... meaning that in response we have dedicated 
ourselves to live in terms of that love. Not only do we know it; more, 
we accept it, and give ourselves over to it; we orient our lives hence 
forth in alignment with it'. 15 
Smith concludes this second group of passages with the pronouncement, 'Once 
again, there is expressed here no element of believing (in to-day's sense) 
at all. Not a whiff of it. There is no trace of it; not the merest hint of 
16 
a suggestion of it'. 
(iii) n,<:r"l£-v£..1vwith a personal object 
The third group of references identified by Smith are those where 
Tllcr""T£.U&t II and related words take a personal object, notably God or 
Christ, but also other persons. In the case of the verb, this is the 
standard occurrence in the New Testament. In the case of the adjective 
,.-,cr-.,-o_s (meaning trusting, trustworthy, loyal, faithful) the reference is, 
17 
of course, primarily to persons. In the case of the noun, this group 
constitutes only a very small proportion. 
In this part of his discussion Smith does not comment upon any specific 
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Bible verses, but offers a reflection on this usage. He holds that the 
participants in the Christian movement 'did not think that they believed 
anything) 8 and therefore it is unimportant to ask what it was that they 
believed. The student of religion should instead see the significance of 
the new faith to which their belief-system gave a pattern; indeed it was 
the faith which gave rise to the belief-system. The primary focus of their 
faith was Christ, but: 
'The Christian movement arose not as a body of persons who believed 
that Jesus was the Christ, but as an upsurge of a new recognition in 
human history: a sudden new awareness of what humanity can be, is, all 
about; the dawning of a new insight into what what had previously been 
called divine could, and should, be understood as meaning .... a new 
recognition of human potentialities'. 19 
Faith is not primarily to do with the propositional level at all, but if we 
must look at this aspect of faith, Smith admits that there has been a 
change - the change, however, is not in what people believed, but in what 
they recognized. 
Although Smith gives no examples, it may be helpful to see his point in 
a concrete setting. John 14.1 is rendered in the King James Version, 'ye 
believe in God, believe also in me'. 20 In Smith's terms this has come to 
mean 'You hold the opinion that God exists, have this opinion of me too'. 
This makes nonsense of the intention. Modern translators have rightly 
rendered ,- '<J""'Tf.t.J ~ -o£.. as trust, so The New English Bible gives 'Trust m 
God always; trust also in me', and the Jerusalem Bible has 'Trust in God 
still, trust also in me'. Here there is recognition of Christ, together 
with a call to commitment. Certainly the focus of faith in the early church 
was persona~ l t was Christ. 
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(iv) n, <llt_U£_1 V With no Stated object 
The final group of verses in which n 1 c:r•Lo.£.-1 v, rr 1 o-r 1', etc., appear 
are those in which there is no stated object, the absolute use. This is the 
most frequent occurrence of these words in the New Testament: in the noun 
88% are absolute, and in the verb, 34% are without an obje::t. All the words 
like 'lack of faith', 'little faith', ( d--rr,a-•oc, ~}._, 0 o-rrtcr-To~) appear 
without an object.21 This majority usage Smith claims as evidence for his 
thesis that the New Testament is concerned with faith as a quality of 
persons, an activity 'in and of itself, not as explicitly directed to an 
b. I 22 o Ject . 
A few examples are given to illustrate this point: 
"When the son of man comes, will he find faith on earth?" (Luke 18.8) 
"0 ye of little faith" (Matthew 6.30, etc.) 
"Thy faith hath made thee whole" (Matthew 9.22, etc.) 
"And now abide faith, hope, charity, these three .•.. " (1 Corinthians 
13.13) 
"By faith Abraham .•.• obeyed ••.• through faith ..•. Sara .... By 
faith Moses •••. " (Hebrews 11. 8, 11, 23.) 
Rather than immediately assuming that 'of course they ~ faith in 
Christ •••• or God•/3 Smith advises caution and further consideration, for 
in his opinion this is to read the New Testament in the light of 
'present-day orientations and conceptual presuppositions'. 24 Leaving aside 
for a moment, then, the possibility of an unexpressed content of faith, 
Smith prefers to focus on faith itself. Just as we accept that there is a 
quality of love, which may be described, praised, etc., (as in 1 
Corinthians 13, for example) without denying that there is someone who is 
loved, so Smith wants to focus on the faith of the religious man - and 
this, he asserts, is the New Testament stance. 
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a 
In the gospels Smith feels there is no reson to suppose that any object 
1\ 
ls intended for faith. Only once is the phrase 'faith in God' found in the 
sayings of Jesus. 25 In the sayings of Jesus iTI\r"'l 1 ~ occurs twenty one 
times, the compounds ~A, 0 orrHrTo~, ~~~0 orrr<rTroo.occur six times, 
' f' . d h d' . . . 26 I M h 8 oc.iTI<:T"'o;- IVe times, an t e a JeCtive rrr~ICX nme times. n att ew . 
10, 'I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel', Jesus seems to 
imply that faith is a quality which may characterize a person to a greater 
or lesser extent. He also quotes Mark 9.24, translating it, 'Lord, I have 
faith: help my lack of faith• 27 as an example of faith as a personal 
quality in Christ's hearers. A further illustration of this emphasis is St. 
Paul's expression 'in Christ•. 28 This is not 'the subject/object distancing 
involved in many modern conceptions of human faith vis-~-vis an external 
"object" •••• (but) .... a union, •... a relationship between the human 
29 person and God'. For Smith, faith is the name of that relationship, or at 
least of the human side of that relationship. 
(v) The 'content' of faith 
Smith admits that in some cases it is plausible to understand the 
absolute verb as applying to some unstated object. He suggests Acts 14.1 as 
an example here; 'a great multitude both of Jews and also of the Greeks 
1T•<r-r"£.UCT".,..I'. Although he prefers to render this 'found faith•, 30 he accepts 
that it might relate to an unstated object, such as the kerygma or the 
Lord. He also admits a certain, very limited, plausibility in the case of 
the Epistle to the Romans, where both verb and noun are frequent, and 76% 
are absolute. But in the case of the gospels, as we saw in the last 
paragraph, he insists that there is no need to suppose that any object is 
intended for faith. 
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Smith comments on a book by Oscar Cullmann which aims 'to argue that, m 
the early church, faith means faith in Christ'. 31 Smith is surprised that 
such a book needed to be written, for so far as their faith was 'faith in 
anything, he may well be largely right'. 32 But to the question of what 
faith itself is, Cullmann does not address himself. It is Smith's 
contention that since the content of faith is not a major issue in the New 
Testament, we err if we concentrate primarily on that as opposed to the 
nature of faith as a quality of persons. By concentrating on the early 
Christians as 'believers', our minds are directed automatically 'to 
something outside themselves, and divert(ed) from thinking that, whatever 
may elicit or focus it, faith may essentially be, and certainly 
historically was, a transforming personal experience'. 33 
In the closing sections of Belief and History, Smith finally focuses on 
'the unexpressed context, ideationally; the presuppositions within which 
the articulated conceptual expression of faith is cast; the uncriticized 
intellectual framework'. 34 It is these which approximate to the modern 
notion of 'beliefs'. In one of Smith's many aphorisms, he suggests that 
35 
'one's faith is given by God, one's beliefs by one's century'. At the 
same time 'it matters enormously that we find a proper belief to elucidate 
our faith'. 36 Whilst the modern concept of believing, of holding an 
opinion, does not occur in the New testament, obviously the New Testament 
writers did believe many things. The important things to remember are that 
such beliefs were not described by words like 1TI<f"T£:.U£tll, 7/t<JTI$, etc.; 
and that their opinions and presuppositions were almost incidental to the 
life-enriching faith which they professed. 
Smith makes two further points which are worth stating. The student of 
comparative religion must learn to take seriously the presuppositions of 
he 1 d h dl h ' 1 f · 1 3 7 · h ot r peop e, an to an e t e1r patterns o preconceptions Wlt out 
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difficulty. Smith is amongst those who do not want to demythologise the New 
Testament, but to recognize its myths, and gladly accept them as myths. His 
second point is to remind us that our 'labels', our concepts, are less than 
the reality they describe; God is greater than our conceptions of him. In 
the New Testament, then, such beliefs (in the modern sense) or 
presuppositions as may be seen, are not to be taken as objects of faith. 
Instead they must be seen as secondary to that quality of life and that 
relation to God and the world, which is faith. 
(vi) Assessment 
The following comments may be noted on Smith's treatment of faith m the 
New Testament. 
(a) It is clear that the words 'belief' and 'believe' have changed their 
meanings over the centuries, and Smith is right to draw attention to the 
confusion which is caused by the standard English translations of the 
Bible. 
(b) It is a pity that Smith makes so little use of the vast literature on 
the subject of faith available in the writings of New Testament scholars. 
The commentaries contain countless discussions of the meaning and usage of 
il"l<r"T£UE-il/1 Tlt<r,..-ts, etc., in the New Testament, and the problem appears 
to be more complex than Smith allows.38 As we have seen, Smith acknowledges 
that it is 'a commonplace among New Testament scholars that the scriptural 
notion of faith is fiduciary, a trusting, entrusting of oneself, and also 
obedience, fidelity'. 39 At the same time, however, he claims that New 
Testament scholars have not addressed themselves to the nature of faith. 40 
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(c) Smith's decision to treat all words deriving from Tll<fT(. LJ~ 1 v', 
1f1<T"IIS together is both confusing and misleading. The 'standard' use of the 
verb is with a direct personal object; the most frequent use of the noun is 
in an absolute sense. In addition to the purely grammatical reasons for 
this difference, it could easily be taken as support for Oscar Cu11mann's 
view noted above. 41 Faith (what Smith calls the absolute use of the noun) 
could be seen as the state of having faith in Christ (the verb with direct 
personal object). 
(d) Smith says that the case for no object of faith is very clear in the 
sayings of Jesus.42 But for the verb T'\~<::r~uc..t v this is far from obvious. 
Of the twenty one occurrences of the verb in the sayings of Jesus recorded 
in the synoptic gospels, eight have an expressed object, 43 at least four 
refer to an object by clear implication, 44 and only a maximum of nine are 
b .1 45 a so ute. 
(e) Smith asserts in his final paragraph that 'It matters enormously 
that we find a proper belief to elucidate our faith'. 46 Yet at the same 
time he finds it is unimportant to investigate the beliefs of the New 
Testament writers.47 If we are enriched in faith by the New Testament, 
might we not also find the 'beliefs' expressed in the New Testament 
enriching? 
·Further, whilst the New Testament may not focus upon its ideational 
presuppositions, it has much to say about holding right conceptions about 
God, opinions, practices and doctrine.48 It is quite wrong to say that 
'Participants in this movement did not think that they believed 
anything•.49 The confession of Peter, recorded in Mark 8.29, Matthew 16.16, 
and Luke 9.20, is set in the context of the opinions of others. Jesus asked 
his disciples "Who do men say that I am?" and the disciples report some of 
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the opinions they have heard expressed; John the Baptist, Elijah, Jeremiah, 
etc. "But who do you say that I am?", Jesus asked. Peter's reply was "You 
are the Christ".50 Peter was a participant in the 'movement' who 
self-consciously held an opinion, a belief, about Jesus. Peter's confession 
was a statement of opinion or belief about Jesus of Nazareth which could be 
compared with the opinions or beliefs which others held of him. The gospel 
writers obviously held it to be the right opinion, and Jesus is portrayed 
as applauding it.51 It also seems to have carried with it a commitment of 
faith. 52 The participants in this new movement knew that they believed 
certain things, and put great emphasis upon them. 
(f) In my opinion, Smith's preference for the word 'recognize' instead 
of 'believe' does not help. He describes the Christian movement as 'an 
upsurge of a new recognition in human history .... the dawning of a new 
insight into what had previously been called divine could, and should, be 
understood as meaning (God is not simply high and lifted up, in the 
H . . 11 ) 53 B . dd" . sanctuary, e IS a carpenter m a sma town ••.. '. ut In a 1t10n to 
those who recognized this, there were those who recognized God on the 
contrary to be one whose essential nature makes it impossible for him ever 
be a carpenter in a small town. Thus the use of 'recognition' in prefNence 
to 'belief' is still to beg the question of what it is that they recognize, 
and how this compares with the recognitions of other religious groups.54 
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Section 4.2. Baptism and Creed 
(i) Belief was not central to Baptism or Creed 
In chapter five of Faith and Belief Wilfred Cantwell Smith considers a 
selection of Christian material relating to the distinction between faith 
and belief. This section examines his treatment of the lectures of St. 
Cyril of Jerusalem on baptism and the place of the creed in baptism. Smith 
argues that the baptismal confession 1T1<rT£..Uw (Latin credo) relates to 
commitment of the heart, ie faith, not belief. From this he goes on to 
argue that the creeds which began as baptismal vows, are now wrongly 
understood as propositional declarations of belief in the modern sense. 
St. Cyril's lectures consist of the Procatechesis, an introductory 
lecture to the newly enrolled baptismal candidates, in which the 
seriousness of their undertaking and the need for persistence are stressed; 
eighteen catechetical lectures, in which various matters relating to 
conduct and the articles of the 'creed' are explained; and five 
mystagogical lectures, delivered to the newly baptized, in which the 
meaning of the sacraments is explained. In the matter of faith, the 
Procatechesis makes it plain that a momentous commitment of life is 
intended, and the first three mystagogical catecheses in particular further 
emphasise this central aspect of the baptismal act. 
Smith concentrates most of his attention on the mystagogical lectures, 
giving a graphic description of the ceremony and relating it to the life 
and death issues which were symbolically reenacted. 
'The crux was authenticity of purpose: a man's genuine intent to move 
from the old life to the new, his determination to turn from "the 
world" to Christ'. 
'Accordingly, the central moment of the ceremony, the plunging into 
the water, involved each participant's expressing verbally and 
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publically his personal dedication to the purpose of the act', his 
commitment of himself 'to God the Father .... to Jesus Christ .... and 
.... the Holy Spirit'.55 
After their baptism it was said of them, 'that they "became christs".' On 
the life-changing significance of baptism in the early church, Smith writes 
'the act by which they (joined the church) .... was seen as an act of 
momentous right-about-face, the discarding of one life and adopting of 
another. It marked a transition of decisive consequence, by which was 
transformed the inner and outer life of the person concerned, both 
historically and cosmically'.56 
Smith makes three points arising from his presentation of St. Cyril's 
exposition of baptism. The first is that the candidate commited himself in 
'taking an existentially decisive step'. It was an act of self-engagement 
m which 'the words were performative'. 57 Secondly, this act was also seen 
as the work of God to be received. The candidate not only decided actively 
to renounce evil and choose the life of Christ, he had also to receive, 
passively, the grace of God to save. This coincidence of active choice and 
58 passive reception is likened by Smith to the marriage vows. 
The third point is rather more substantial, and takes us to the heart of 
Smith's contention. The central 'saving confession' 59 was the candidate's 
affirmative response to being asked 'whether he believed m the Name of the 
60 Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost'. In Greek 'the 
performatory utterance of commitment' 61 was Tli<fT£.ut.J; in the Latin of 
Western Church rites, the candidate affirmed credo. Credo seems to be a 
compound of ~' cordis, heart, and -do, put, place, set; its root meaning 
is thus 'I set my heart on', or 'I give my heart to'.62 Although the 
primary meaning of credere in classical Latin was 'to entrust, to commit, 
to trust something to someone', Smith feels that at this 'crucial moment 
•... of personal engagement .... credo came close to its root meaning .... 
"I hereby give my heart to Christ".' 63 n l<r-r£.ua.J as used in the Greek of St. 
Cyril's rite is not directly synonymous with credo, but it does have these 
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classical meanings, and plays precisely the same decisive role in the 
baptism. 
Having established this dramatic, existential meaning for credo and 
TTI<f"·n:uw, Smith procedes to make several further points.64 Two in 
particular are pertinent to this study. First, he holds that baptism was 
not about 'moving from non-belief to belief'.65 The ceremony was not 
envisaged in that way, and the words n l<fT£.. ut.J or credo did not designate 
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such a movement. 'In the course of the ceremony there was no enquiry of 
the baptizands as to whether they believed anything'. 67 
Secondly", Smith reminds his readers that the liturgical use of creeds 
predates their doctrinal use. 68 The word credo 'was used by the Church 
first in the ceremony of self-dedication that is baptism, and only a good 
deal later in the realm of theoretical issues'. 69 The creeds were 
originally not about believing, but about commitment; indeed they contained 
no propositional statements, the principle verbs were performative.70 Smith 
states that there was a gradual shift of attention from the original issue 
of commitment to the precise definitions of theology so that credo could be 
spoken 'casually as if it were no more than a preamble to a theoretical 
delineation, designating a relationship to one or another of various 
possible intellectualizations'. 71 The question "Do you commit yourself to 
this, or do you not?" was transformed into "Is it this, or is it that, to 
which we all commit ourse1ves?"72 
Neither baptism nor creeds were originally about believing anything. Of 
course those who were baptised and those who recited creeds believed 
things, and their beliefs were not unimportant, but the affirmations 
n I<T"-r£-v<J or credo were not used to denote their beliefs. Their affirmations 
certainly implied and presupposed beliefs,73 but 1"1"1<3"-f"£:-UtJ or credo did not 
prefix the listing of those beliefs. 
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(ii) Assessment 
In assessing Smith's approach to this Christian material, and his 
understanding of the faith implicit in the act of baptism, the following 
points may be made. 
(a) It must certainly be accepted that baptism is concerned primarily 
with commitment rather than with beliefs. 
(b) It is far from clear that Smith has demonstrated a 'transition' by 
74 
which 'gradually' attention was diverted from the performative, 
self-commiting meaning of credo to a mere statement of formulae of belief. 
Smith's study has certainly shown that credo and TTI<1"-r£.vi.J have both been 
used with different meanings at different times, but it is far from clear 
that one use predates the other. Indeed the Nicene creed (325 AD) predates 
the account of baptism given by St.· Cyril (c 315 - 386 AD), and there were 
certainly antecedent creeds emphasising the formulae of TTI<rli.s-, and 
baptismal rites emphaisising the commitment of m<r-r£.vLJ •75 
(c) There is evidence to suggest that from very early times baptism was 
seen to include both belief and faith. Smith himself quotes from Dom 
Gregory Di/6 in support of his view about the origin of the creeds, but he 
specifically omits the following passage from The Shape of the Liturgy, 
'From the earliest days repentance and the acceptance of the belief of 
the Church was the condition sine qua non of baptism into the Body of 
Christ, (Acts ii.38; viii.37; etc.) and formal interrogation as to 
both was made of converts before they recieved the sacraments'. 77 
Repentance (;v~-r,..vo•"" ) is literally that 'right-about-face' of which Smith 
speak/8 and Acts 2.38 describes this as integral for baptism. Acts 8.37 is 
omitted from the best manuscripts, but was probably inserted under the 
influence of later practice. At the same time, 'acceptance of the belief of 
the church' is implied by St. Cyril's insistence upon the 'rebaptism' of 
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those baptised by heretical groups. In such groups a commitment had been 
made, but it lacked the basis of right beliefs, and so 'their former 
b . b . 79 apt1sm was not aptism'. 
St. Cyril's view of the rebaptism of heretics was not universally held, 
but there is considerable other evidence to support the view that in the 
early church the faith affirmed in baptism had a doctrinal content and an 
act of commitment. E. H. Gifford notes the occun~nce of this view in 
Clement of Alexandria, the Apostolic Constitutions and St. John 
80 Chrysostom. The cogitive element of faith is also present in the 
Cl.S 
prebaptismal preparation described by Justin Martyr, 'As many A are persuaded 
and believe that which we teach and say is true, and undertake to live 
accordingly, are instructed to pray and entreat God .... ' 81 
(d) Belief and Faith in St. Cyril 
In my view Smith has treated St. Cyril's lectures on baptism rather 
superficially, and at several points Smith's view is refuted by Cyril 
himself. Here I present just a few items from the lectures to which Smith 
pays little or no attention. 
Most of the pre-baptismal, catechetical lectures consist of an 
exposition of the Jerusalem creed. In Lecture IV St. Cyril explains 'the 
reason for the teaching of the Creed and for expositions upon it•. 82 He 
says that godliness consists of both 'pious doctrines' and 'virtuous 
practice•,83 and that God accepts neither one without the other. He gives 
them 'a short summary of necessary doctrines'. 84 The first is to be a 
foundation laid in the soul, 'the doctrine concerning God•. 85 To hold wrong 
doctrine, though one be 'nobly temperate', amounts to being an 'impious 
86 blasphemer'. In several places the candidates are instructed to believe a 
proposition, for example 'Believe then that this only-begotten Son of God 
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for our· sins came down from heaven upon earth'. 87 
At the end of Lecture X, after giving evidence for the doctrines about 
Christ, first from scripture, then from the witness of the holy places in 
Jerusalem, St. Cyril called 'any one who formerly believed not, let him now 
believe: and if any one was before a believer, let him receive a greater 
increase of faith, by believing in our Lord Jesus Christ, and let him 
understand whose name he bears'. 88 Here the candidates are called not to 
place their trust in Christ, but to consider the evidence of scripture and 
the events of his life (marked by the holy places which surrounded them in 
Jerusalem) and to move from unbelief to belief; from other opinions about 
Jesus Christ to the orthodox dogmas to which the evidence points. 
The eleventh lecture begins with the charge: 'But we must not simply 
believe in Christ Jesus nor receive Him as one of the many who are 
improperly called Christs•. 89 It seems to me that here St. Cyril calls the 
candidates to hold right opinions about Christ, so that their commitment to 
him might be undivided. If their commitment is to be sound, they must have 
a right understanding of the one to whom they commit themselves. Towards 
the end of the lecture, St. Cyril repeats the article of faith 'We believe 
in one Lord Jesus Christ .... •90 and follows it with a list of contrary 
opinions which are to be 'silenced•.91 
We could multiply many times these examples which clearly show that 
those being baptised were to hold right beliefs. Admitedly the ceremony of 
baptism itself was not primarily concerned with those beliefs, and no 
enquiry was made in it to the orthodoxy of the candidates' opinions. But it 
is not enough to say that these beliefs were merely 'implied' or 
'presupposed' by the act of self-commitment, n •cr-rl.-uw. Right beliefs were 
already engendered in the candidates through the catechesis, and the act of 
commitment was only possible in the context of those beliefs. Furthermore, 
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it 1s plain from our examples that the verb .,-, c::ri(...U~I v was in fact used to 
denote both the act of commitment and the holding of right beliefs. 
This is conclusively demonstrated by a final passage from St. Cyril's 
fifth catechetical lecture. 
'For the name of faith is in the form of speech one, but it has two 
distinct senses. For there is one kind of faith, the dogmatic, ( !o 
So 'lsfJ v- 1 llc_ov ) involving an assent of the soul on some particular 
·point: and it is profitable to the soul •.•. For if thou shalt believe 
that ( 'T't""l<f'ILUE.--~ 6-r' ) Jesus Christ is Lord, and that God raised 
Him from the dead, thou shalt be saved .... 
'But there is a second kind of faith, which is bestowed by Christ as a 
gift of g,race •.•. this faith ..•• is not merely doctrinal, ( o;,; ~oofi"'"T' "-£ 
)Jovov f..IJTII! ) but worketh things above men's power •... Have thou 
therefore that faith in Him which cometh from thine own self, that 
thou mayest also receive from Him that faith which worketh things 
above man.' 92 
St. Cyril seems to anticipate Smith's debate. The candidates are taught to 
use their minds to reach a right opinion93 and give assent to it. Cyril 
asserts that this belief is enough for salvation, and involves the 'assent 
of the soul' to which Christ himself adds his own gift of faith, that faith 
which is 'not merely doctrinal, but .•.• worketh things above men's power'. 
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Section 4-.3. The Challenge of Religious Pluralism to Christian Faith 
The close proximity of people of other faiths has brought the Christian 
Church in the West face to face with a great challenge. In the opinion of 
Max Warren it is a challenge which may make that of the impact of agnostic 
science seem like child's play by comparison.9 '+ Several of Smith's works 
make a contribution towards meeting this challenge. This section centres 
upon one of Smith's early attempts to treat these issues, a lecture given 
in May 1961 to a group of theologians, Church historians and Biblicists, 
entitled 'The Christian in a Religiously Plural World', and reproduced as 
the second part of The Faith of Other Men. 
(i} General Problems Affecting all Men of Faith 
The fact of religious diversity poses problems which are intellectual, 
moral and theological, and which affect all men of faith and goodwill. 
Smith feels that we need a revolution in thinking similar to that of 
Newton. It was once thought that objects like apples, being on earth, fall 
to the ground, whereas the moon and the planets were thought to be subject 
to other forces such that they go round in circles above. It is now known 
that they are all subject to similar forces influencing their movements. In 
a similar fashion many Christians still feel that whereas 'the Christian's 
faith has come down from God, the Buddhist's goes round in the circles of 
purely human aspiration •95 There is an intellectual problem to be 
grappled with here.96 
The major moral problem which Smith sees as posed by religious diversity 
is that it disrupts community; and this too, is a problem to be tackled by 
all men of faith. From his early espousal of Marxist ideals to his latest 
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quest for a World Theology, Smith has insisted that 'Perhaps the single 
most important challenge that faces mankind in our day is the need to turn 
our nascent world society into a world community'. 97 This life-long 
preoccupation and constant quest for world community reveals what is 
perhaps the greatest motivating force behind Smith's work. He is driven by 
a moral imperative which finds its roots in his own Christian faith and m 
all his contacts with people of other faiths. 98 It is an imperative to 
overcome the conflict, suspicion, ignorance and indifference in order to 
value, to understand and to share. Smith believes 'that the task of 
constructing even that minimum of world fellowship that will be necessary 
for man to survive at all is far too great to be accomplished on any other 
than a religious basis•. 99 If there must be rivalry between religious 
groups, let us 'rival each other in our determination and capacity to 
promote reconciliation•. 100 But his 'own prayer would be that we should not 
compete in this but learn, somehow, out of loyalty each to our own vision, 
11 b . . I 101 to co a orate m 1t. 
Furthermore, religious diversity gives rise to theological problems 
which face all men of faith. Whilst each community of faith must wrestle 
with its own theological problems, there is ultimately a level at which 
these must be shared in a common quest for theological (or 
'transcendentologica1' 1 02) conceptualizations of the ultimate. It is this 
problem which Smith treats in Towards a World Theology, and in the 
conclusion of Faith and Belief, although both of these go beyond the . 
Christian interests of the present chapter. 
These are some of the general moral and intellectual problems which face 
all men of good will as they look out on our religiously divided world. 
What are the problems which Smith sees as confronting specifically the 
Christian man of faith? 
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(ii) Moral Problems for Christian Fa:th 
The Christian in a religiously plural world faces several moral 
challenges. First, by virtue of their faith they have an obligation to love 
their neighbour. In a sermon preached on the 9th August 19 59, 103 Smith 
reminds his congregation that in the parable of the· Good Samaritan Jesus 
'deliberately .... cuts across religious frontiers' in showing who is the 
neighbour to be loved. 
Secondly, that love impels Christians to try to understand and 
appreciate the faith of other men. 104 
'Let us not fool ourselves into thinking that we can love a Hindu •... 
if we refuse to take seriously what is his most precious possession, 
his faith, and if we are supercilious about the tradition through 
which he finds and nourishes it ••.• Other men might disdain an. 
outsider's religious faith, but a Christian has no business doing 
so'.l 05 
Such an understanding is not to be obtained easily, and there are many 
pressures to divert the Christian from this task. One practice which Smith 
believes is particularly unhelpful is that of labelling men as 
'non-Christians'. In The Christian Century Smith writes, 'there is perhaps 
no more effective way of misunderstanding the faith of' Muslims, Hindus, 
Buddhists and so on 'than by thinking of .them negatively, stressing what 
106 
they are not, instead of acknowledging what they are'. 
Thirdly, there are moral problems relating to Christian doctrines. On 
the one hand Smith accuses the Church of not putting into practice in its 
relations with people of other faith the practical or moral implications of 
its theology; whilst on the other hand he holds that some of its doctrinal 
formulations are not compatible with the moral imperative of the Christian 
faith. Smith refers to 'a lack of integration .... between the moral and 
intellectual facets of our relations with our fellowmen•. 107 
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It is Smith's contention that Christian affirmations about God's 
revelation of himself in Christ, about 'the ultimate power and truth and 
glory of the universe' embodied in Christ's 'life, and his death on the 
cross, and his final triumph out of the very midst of self-sacrifice• 108 
should lead Christians to certain kinds of action. They should be actively 
engaged in pursuit of 
'reconciliation, unity, harmony, and brotherhood. At this level, all 
men are included: we strive to break down barriers, to close up gulfs; 
we recognize all men as neighbours, as fellows, as sons of the 
universal father, seeking Him and finding Him, being sought by Him, 
and being found by Him'.109 
Whilst it does not immediately follow, from the affirmation under 
discussion, that Christians 'should recognize all men as •... seeking Him 
and finding Him, being sought by Him, and being found by Him', it is clear 
that Christians do not 1 i;ve up to the implications of this lofty 
theological assertion in their relationships with people of other faith. 
At the same time, Smith sees that there are other theological 
affirmations made by Christians which give rise to morally unacceptable 
behaviour and attitudes. As an example, he discusses the phrase 'Without 
the particular knowledge of God in Jesus Christ, men do not really know God 
at a11•. 11 0 Quite irrespective of the truth or otherwise of this statement, 
Smith contends that it is arrogant. It may have a limited value in the 
quiet confines of the study, 
'But except at the cost of insensitivity and delinquence, it is 
morally not possible actually to go out into the world and say to 
devout, intelligent, fellow human beings: "We are saved and you are 
damned"; or "We believe that we know God, are we are right; you 
believe that you know God, and you are totally wrong".' 111 
'Here my submission is that on this front the traditional doctrinal 
position of the Church has in fact militated against its traditional 
moral position, and has in fact encouraged Christians to approach 
other men immorally. Christ has taught us humility, but we have 
approached them with arrogance'. 112 
'Any position that antagonizes and alienates rather than reconciles, 
that is arrogant rather than humble, that promotes segregation rather 
than brotherhood, that is unlovely, is ipso facto un-Christian'. 113 
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Again Smith gives another example; of those who argue that if Christianity 
. h . f ll h ll h l" . f l 114 s . h IS true, t en 1t must o ow t at a ot er re Igwns are a se. mit 
argues, in a passage which is in my view one of his most powerful (and 
therefore I have quoted it in full) that this 'gets tied up in un-Christian 
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'it is possible to go on to the converse position: that if anyone 
else's faith turns out to be valid or adequate, then it would follow 
that Christianity must be false - a form of logic that has, in fact, 
driven many from their own faith, and indeed from any faith at all. If 
one's chances of getting to heaven .... are dependent upon otrer 
people's not getting there, tren one becomes walled up within the 
quite intolerable position that the Christian has a vested interest in 
other men's damnation .••. When an observer comes back from Asia, or 
from a study of Asian religious traditions, and reports that, contrary 
to accepted theory, some Hindus and Buddhists and some Muslims lead a 
pious and moral life and seem very near to God by any possible 
standard, so that, so far as one can see, in these particular cases at 
least faith is as "adequate" as Christian faith, then presumably a 
Christian should be overjoyed, enthusiastically hopeful that this be 
true, even though he might be permitted a fear lest it not be so. 
Instead, I have sometimes witnessed just the opposite: an emotional 
resistence to the news, men hoping firmly that it is not so, though 
perhaps with a covert fear that it might be. Whatever the rights and 
wrongs of the situation theoretically, I submit that practically this 
is just not Christian •.•. It will not do, to have a faith that can be 
undermined by God's saving one's neighbour .... ' 116 
Before turning to the theological problems which confront the Christian 
as he grapples with the fact of religious diversity, the following 
observations and comments may be made. 
(a) In this 'lack of integrity' which Smith has rightly discerned, he 
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shows an admitted preference for the moral over the theological, so that 
Christian theology must change if it falls short of ethical ideals. But 
d. s • h b h I h 1 • 1 d 1 d .I 18 accor mg to mlt , ot t eo og!Ca systems •.•• an •... mora co es 
fall into the category of cumulative tradition and are thus subject to 
continual change. How is one aspect of the tradition to be rated as more 
fixed than another? 
(b) It may be possible to hold an exclusive theology whilst resisting 
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the arrogance which Smith deplores. Indeed the humility of Christ before 
the religious leaders after his arrest was all the more praiseworthy in 
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view of his known convictions about them. At the deepest level there 
were profound theological and religious differences between them, which 
120 Jesus sometimes expressed in quite 'arrogant' terms, but still he knew 
how to be humble before them. 
Whilst it is certainly true that the teachings and example of Christ 
encourage humility rather than arrogance, it is difficult to see how this 
applies to propositional statements of doctrine. Is not the locus of 
arrogance, like that of faith and truth, persons not propositions? Perhaps 
. . b 121 "f 1 h . . . propositiOns can ecome arrogant 1 peop e c oose or acquiesce m usmg 
them arrogantly. 
Some doctrinal statements may have encouraged some Christians to 
approach other men immorally or arrogantly. At the same time it is not 
necessary for a man who accepts the statement 'Without the particular 
122 knowledge of God in Jesus Christ, men do not really know God at all' to 
accost any 'devout, intelligent, fellow human being' with an assertion that 
'We believe that we know God and we are right; you believe that you know 
123 God, and you are totally wrong'. 
(c) In view of the example of Jesus to which we have referred, it is 
very difficult to accept Smith's assertion that 'any position that 
antagonizes and alienates .... promotes segregation .... is ipso facto 
un-Christian•. 124 The message as well as the activity of Jesus antagonized 
and alienated many, it segregated people into those who heard, received and 
obeyed, and those who rejected. This is part of the hard evidence which the 
observer must also report. A theology or theory of religion which fails to 
account for rejection as well as acceptance of the gospel may be just as 
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morally reprehensible. 
(iii) Theological Problems for Christian Faith 
The Christian in the face of religious diversity faces not only moral 
problems, but also theological ones. He is confronted with the need to 
express conceptually his faith, in the light of the data of comparative 
religious studies. Wilfred Cantwell Smith touches on these theological 
issues in all his major books, and several important articles. This section 
continues to focus on his presentation in The Faith of Other Men, part II, 
despite the fact that he makes further refinements in his later works. The 
later developments result from his personalist notion of truth, outlined in 
Questions of Religious Truth, and his recognition of the distinction 
between faith, belief and theological formulations, as found in the 
concluding chapter of Faith and Belief. 
Smith's aim in analysising some of the theological problems is not so 
much to propose a watertight alternative to traditional Christian doctrine, 
but to indicate some of the factors to be taken into consideration in the 
formulation of such an alternative. He presents his major problem in two 
ways: 'how to account, theologically for the fact of man's religious 
diversity?'; and the question 'as to whether or how far or how 
non-Christians are saved, or know God•. 125 These two questions are 
obviously very closely related, but before concentrating on the second, 
Smith remarks that, so far as he knows the first 'has got .... almost no 
. f k" d' 126 senous answers o any m . 
The second question has received considerable attention, and Smith limits 
himself to a discussion of the answer we have already seen: 'Without the 
14-0 
particular knowledge of God in Jesus Christ, men do not really know God at 
a11•. 127 Smith emphasises that there is of course, a very positive 
affirmation here of basic and ultimate Christian faith, for 'in Christ God 
died for us men and for our salvation, •..• through faith in him we are 
saved.' This central, positive affirmation 'must be preserved' m any 'new 
f 1 · •128 h. h b d d B he . 1 ormu atwns w 1c may e pro uce . ut t re 1s a so a negative aspect 
which gives rise to several diffirulties: epistemological, empirical and 
internal. 
On the level of epistemology, Smith contends that whilst it may be 
possible to assert reasons for knowing that one's own faith is true and 
valid, it is difficult to present cogent grounds for knowing that the faith 
of people in other traditions is false. He suggests that most people make 
this judgement on the basis of logical implications from theoretical 
premises. Smith is not prepared to give that much place to the force of 
logic: 'The damnation of my neighbour is too weighty a matter to rest on a 
11 • 1 129 sy og1sm. 
Smith's empirical observations suggest to him that, in contrast to the 
negative pronouncement of the doctrinal statement, there are many 
individuals in other religious traditions who appear to ·know God. Amongst 
his personal friends there are those whom he feels it would be 
I h" k b . h I 130 Th" h preposterous to t m a out m any ot er way • 1s argument as 
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already been seen above, and elsewhere Smith calls for 'theological 
pronouncements about the religious life of men outside the Christian Church 
(to) be inductive, based on some actual knowledge of those men and their 
religious life•. 132 He is highly critical of those who write negatively 
about the faith of other men on the basis of their own Christian premises, 
and claim the authority of revelation against any rational argurnent or 
empirical data. In an impassioned review of a book by Emmanuel Ke1lerhals, 
14-1 
Smith writes that their 
'position seems thoroughly logical, and once one has walled oneself up 
within it, impregnable. Those of us who, after our study of Islam •••. 
have come to know that these religious traditwns are ..•. channels 
through which God Himself comes into touch with these His children -
what answer can we give?' 133 
Smith likens this refusal to take note of the empirical evidence to the 
nineteenth century refusal to accept that the world was more than six 
thousand years old. A theological response to religious pluralism must 
involve accepting the empirical evidence that there are people of faith m 
all religious traditions. This does not involve rejecting divine 
revelation, although it does mean recognizing that revelation is always 
subject to human, and therefore fallible, interpretation. To change our 
interpretation of the revealed word, as a result of empirical observation, 
is not the same as to dispense with revelation altogether. The notion of 
divine revelation survived the nineteenth century crisis. 
Finally, Smith questions whether the doctrinal statement about men not 
really knowing God who do not know him in Jesus Christ is consistent with 
the rest of Christian theology. Quoting again from Smith's review of 
Kellerhals' Der Islam: 
'If God is what Jesus Christ has revealed Him to be, a loving, 
personal Father, searching out sinners to forgive them, yearning to 
bring them into fellowship with Himself and all His children .... -
then God is not remote from Muslims ..•. If He is willing to. suffer on 
the Cross for my sake, then He will not let Himself be frustrated by a 
theological proposition from reaching out to a sincere, devout, humble 
and pious member of the Muslim world who seeks Him'. 134 
Smith's ultimate criticism, then, of this and other orthodox doctrinal 
statements, is that they fail to treat God seriously as Jesus has revealed 
him to be. It is the Christian's faith itself which demands a change in his 
theology. 
These considerations lead Smith to make two very cautious suggestions 
about the shape of an alternative theological position. First, it 'may 
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perhaps run along the lines of affirming that a Buddhist who IS saved, or a 
Hindu, or a Muslim or whatever, is saved, and is saved only, because God is 
the kind of God whom Jesus Christ has revealed Him to be•. 135 Then he poses 
a question in the form 'Does God let Himself be known only to those whom He 
has let Himself be known through Christ? Does God love only those who 
d H . . h" d" . ?,136 respon to Im m t IS tra I twn. 
The aim of this study is not to solve the theological questions which 
Smith has raised, still less to attempt to create a satisfying Christian 
theology of other religions, but to state and assess his treatment of this 
Christian material. The following brief points may be made. 
(a) Smith has pin-pointed a very real theological problem for 
Christians. The Christian Church still has to find answers to these 
questions. It may be said that these questions are being tackled in some 
quarters of the church, and that some shift from the traditional position 
has seems to be the trend, but it is far from clear where this process of 
theological reflection will end. 137 
(b) In relation to Smith's question about the origins of religious 
diversity, which he feels has received 'almost no serious answers•. 138 In 
fact a considerable amount of energy has been given to this question by 
historians of religion, and by conservative missionary theologians. 139 
(c) Smith's treatment of the epistemological problems involved in the 
area of interreligious theology is rather limited. He is right to draw 
attention to the problem of asserting that another person does not know 
God. It is equally hard to see how 'an observer' can establish empirically 
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tha.t a man of another faith does know God. 140 This 'empirical', or even 
'historical', method begs more epistemological questions than it solves 
moral problems. 
This concludes the chapter on Smith's approach to various items from the 
Christian tradition. He tries to show that personal faith, rather than 
belief, is the central concern of the New Testament and of early baptismal 
rites and creda1 affirmations. In approaching Christianity, then, Smith 
wants to focus attention upon the personal commitment and trust which 
charactizes the individual participants. He sees Christians as sharing this 
basic human quality of faith with all persons of faith, irrespective of the 
religious tradition in which their faith was formed. This insight, Smith 
insists, must influence the way in which Christians relate to people of 
other faith. 
Smith's approach is thus to centre on the faith of the persons involved. 
Whilst this is a most helpful emphasis, Smith fails to do full justice to 
those elements of the tradition which speak of the necessity for right 
beliefs to accompany and facilitate the act of commitment and the life of 
trust. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith's concept of faith has received considerable 
attention from numerous scholars in various disciplines. His basic emphasis 
on the personal dimension of religious life has been widely applauded as a 
necessary antidote to an excessively detached study of religion. But his 
concept of faith and his approach to religious life have also been widely 
criticised for a variety of reasons. 
The foregoing chapters have outlined Smith's concept of faith, and 
illustrated and assessed it in the context of Islamic and Christian 
material. This final chapter analyses various critical responses, and 
attempts to evaluate the concept of faith as a tool with which to approach 
and understand Islam and Christianity. 
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(i) In Defence of Religion 
Smith contends that the term 'religion' is too ambiguous and misleading 
a concept to focus on as the object of Religious Studies. He holds that the 
word 'religion' should no longer be used, except perhaps in an adjectival 
form to denote inner piety or religiousness. In the same way he advocates 
the abandonment of the names of the 'religions' - Hinduism, Christianity, 
etc. - as these are reifications which wrongly suggest that religion and 
the religions have an essence, and detract from the inner heart of faith. 
It was against this dissatisfaction with a concept of 'religion' that Smith 
presented his alternative concepts of faith and cumulative tradition. 
Most scholars, even those who accept the basic principles of Smith's 
work, wish to retain the word 'religion' and the names of at least some of 
the religions. Some of the arguments in defence of religion are presented 
below. 
a. Religion has an essence. 
In contrast to Wilfred Cantwell Smith there are many who would argue 
that in fact religion does have an essence, although not necessarily a 
fixed and static essence. Two studies which relate this question 
specifically to a discussion of Smith's work argue that Christianity and 
Islam each have an essence. 
In an article entitled 'The Essence of Christianity', S.W.Sykes is 
critical of 'Smith's attempt to connect the quest for the essence of 
Christianity solely with the Enlightenment'.! Sykes has traced the phrase 
'essence of Christianity' back to a controversy between John Edwards and 
John Locke in the years following Locke's Reasonableness of Christianity as 
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"/ 
delivered in the Scriptures.- That debate makes specific reference to 
accounts by Tertullian of the regula fidei. Far from originating in the 
Enlightenment, 
'the question of the "essence of Christianity" is continuous with the 
very long-standing debate about which of the articles of Christian 
faith were binding on all believers and what the status was of 
theological enquiry outside these articles'.3 
In the case of Islam a similar criticism is made by Is rna cil Raj i al 
FaruqT.4 He observes that to his knowledge no Muslim or Orientalist has 
ever before denied or questioned that Islam has an essence. He insists that 
Islamic scholars have always seen Islam as 'a coherent, autonomous system 
of truths· about reality, of imperatives for action and of desiderata for 
all kinds and levels of human activity .... at the center of this system 
stood God .... •5 This position is expanded in al FaruqT's later book 
TawbTd: Its Implications for Thought and Life,6 in which Tawt)Td, the 
principle of the unity of God, is expounded as 'The Essence of Religious 
Experience', and 'The Quintessence of Islam'. Tawt)Td is also presented as 
the central principle of history, knowledge, metaphysics, ethics, social 
order, the ummah, the family, political order, economic order, world order, 
and esthetics. 7 
b. Reification is Inevitable in Religious Life. 
Smith rejects the word 'religion' bec.ause in his view this tends to 
encourage the reification of piety. It makes 'religion into a thing, 
gradually coming to conceive it as an objective systematic entity'. 8 
Religion thus becomes an ideal, existing somewhere in heaven and given as a 
complete system to be followed by adherents; it becomes a non-human thing, 
rather than a personalistic involvement. 
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The notion of reification is one derived from the social sciences 
referring to the process by which social systems come to be regarded as 
objective reality. Reified systems become constructs having a life of their 
own, independent of the persons who generated them and imposing a structure 
of reality upon people. Studies in the sociology of knowledge suggest that 
reification has an essential part to play both in social cohesion and in 
personal individuation: 
'it would .... be a mistake to look at reification as a perversion of 
an originally non-reified apprehension of the social world, a sort of 
cognitive fall from grace. On the contrary, the available ethnological 
and psychological evidence seems to indicate the opposite, namely, 
that the original apprehension of the social world is highly reified 
both phylogenetically and ontogenetically.' 9 
A reified conception of reality seems to be an inevitable and essential 
part of socialization, even if a dialectic is recognized between the 
'given' order and the individual's actions such that they modify each 
other. 
It may be argued that the problem of reification runs deep and is 
central to our understanding of religion. Rei fica tion implies that the 
human object under consideration has been converted into or apprehended as 
a thing established as an eternal construct. It is not possible to speak of 
reification in the case of, say, the traditional Muslim view of the 
revelation of the Qur'an to Muhammad. In the Muslim view to speak of an 
eternal construct would not be to reify that which was a human product, but 
to recognize it for what it is. Reification can only be said to have 
occurred where a human product has been wrongly elevated to the status of CVL 
eternal contruct. In other words, Smith's very use of the notion of 
reification makes his analysis unacceptable to those who like al FaruqT 
regard their religion as a given from God. 
If one is ready to go along with Smith in this respect, however, his 
solution does not exclude its own form of reification. In my opinion 
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cumulative tradition and, to a lesser extent, faith are i.hemselves in 
danger of reification. 10 Smith's designation of cumulative tradition as a 
'human construct• 11 which is passed from one generation to a~other; 
personalised and transmitted; 'the mundane cause of the faith of men in the 
12 present' is already suggestive of reification. As soon as Smith uses 
expressions like 'The Faith of Other Men' or 'the faith of Buddhists• 13 the 
danger of a reification of faith is as real as it is in 'the religion of 
other men'. 
c. Barth's rejection of 'religion' is not compatible with Smith's. 
It was noted at page 26, above, that Wilfred Cantwell Smith refers to 
various Christian and other scholars who call for the rejection of 
'religion'. He claims these as supporting his own thesis. But many of these 
writers (especially Barth, Brunner, Bonhoeffer and Tillich) criticise 
'religion' in a way fundamentally different from that of Smith. 
C. Douglas Jay14 insists that Barth, Brunner and Bonhoeffer reject 
religion 'not on the ground that man's cumulative traditions are not 
adequately comprehended in a blanket concept, but because human tradition 
tends to become an idolatrous substitute for the divine word.• 15 In fact 
the position is more subtle than Jay allows. For Smith also deplores the 
reification of human tradition as if it were the eternal word. Smith could 
well argue that these German theologians were rejecting a concept of 
religion which lacked precisely the concept of faith to which he draws 
attention. 
Certainly for Barth, this meant rejecting all religions other than 
Christianity - which stood beyond 'religion' because it was 'the sole 
vehicle of salvation•. 16 This is a view which Smith explicitly rejects, 17 
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so it 1s hard to see how he can claim Barth's support for his thesis. 
d. The Ambiguities of 'religion' are Inherent. 
Smith argues that the diversities of meanings which have been applied to 
religion make it an ambiguous and confusing term. 
In my view Smith has not demonstrated that this ambiguity is 
inappropriate. It could be argued, as it is for example by Ninian Smart, 18 
that religion is essentially multi-dimensional and that an aspect of human 
life so diverse must of necessity be subjected to a wide range of 
interpretations. 
In the cases of Islam and Christianity Smith devotes considerable space 
to arguing that the 'reified' notions of religion as systematic entities 
and institutionalized structures are late developments. His argument in the 
case of Islam is discussed in section 3.1., above, where his treatment is 
shown to be far from conclusive. As al FaruqT comments, Smith has failed to 
demonstrate the 'necessary incompatibility of reification with 
1. . . I 19 re 1gws1ty . 
(ii) The Cumulative Tradition 
The concept of cumulative tradition has been recognized as a valuable 
one by several writers. Eric Sharpe20 finds it a helpful reminder that each 
individual in a group does not share precisely the same tradition - it is 
specific to each participant. David Miller21 finds cumulative tradition a 
useful tool in discerning the sources of Hindu ethics because it focuses 
attention away from the classical Sanskrit texts and onto the persons of 
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faith who wrote them and use them. In Miller's view 'the dynamic, sacred 
centre of Hinduism is •... the enlightened guru, whose charismatic 
leadership creates the institution for philosophical, religious and social 
22 
change'. This corresponds closely to Smith's notion of cumulative 
tradition, and illustrates the dialectic between faith and cumulative 
tradition. A further benefit of the concept of cumulative tradition is as a 
reminder of the interrelatedness of the religious traditions.23 
But the notion of cumulative tradition has also been criticised on a 
number of counts. It was noted above24 that Eric Sharpe applauded the 
reminder t~a t each individual in a group should not be assumed to share 
precisely the same tradition. At the same time, and rather paradoxically, 
Sharpe makes the point that 
'Perhaps it needs to be stressed more strongly than Smith is prepared 
to that there is a corporate, as well as individual cumulative 
tradition.' 25 
Pyl/6 finds an implicit dualism in Smith's notion of cumulative 
tradition for it suggests that the mundane religious paraphernalia are of 
limited importance, and separable from the question of any relationship 
with the transcendent. In Pyle's view, the religious paraphernalia are 
valued 'in themselves as elements of a relationship of absolute worth.' 27 
This point is taken up and clarified in an excellent summary and 
critique of The Meaning and End of Religion by the Swedish Theologian 
C.F.Hallencreutz in a Research Pamphlet of the World Council of Churches.28 
Hallencreutz examines the dialectic which Smith sees operating between 
faith and cumulative tradition29 but finds Smith's emphasis on the creative 
and decisive r6'1e of personal faith in the history of religion to involve 
an undervaluation of the equally decisive symbolic function of the 
religious phenomena. Christian theology emphasises 'the impact of the 
"sacred" on the history of religion' and makes it necessary 'to extend 
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Smith's view of the dialectic between the transcendent and the mundane and 
consider ...• how far the divine mediates through the material provided by 
"cumulative tradition" when creating the nurturing "personal faith". 30 
This is essentially the objection of many phenomenologists of religion, 
who on the whole get a rather bad hearing from Smith. 31 They wish to insist 
that the phenomena of the tradition matter in themselves since it is these 
that are valued by participants as occasioning the encounter with the 
transcendent. 
In my opinion it 1s possible to make too much of the divide between 
Smith and the phenomenologists of religion. Ninian Smart has written 
32 
critically of Smith in several places, yet he is willing to concede the 
importance of Smith's emphasis on the 'human dimension of religion'. 33 At 
the same time Smith produced a series of radio talks, later reproduced in 
The Faith of Other Men34 containing a good deal of material which would not 
be out of place in a similar work by a phenomenologist. 
(iii) Faith 
a. Faith must be defined in re1a tion to its object. 
In 1973 Eric Sharpe took up Smith's suggestion that the 
conceptualization of religion in terms of faith and cumulative tradition 
should be tested in the area of inter-religious dialogue. 35 After 
summarizing his own view of dialogue Sharpe asks how Smith's analysis might 
be of use. He is happy with cumulative tradition, as was noted above.36 But 
with the concept of faith Sharpe is less persuaded for he insists that 
'faith exists only in relation to a highly specific understanding of the 
object of faith•. 37 In Sharpe's view it is not possible to abstract faith 
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from the transcendent 'object' whom the partner in dialogue trusts, nor 
38 from the imagery and symbolism with which it is attended. 
Sharpe's article is followed by a rejoinder from Smith, 39in which he 
struggles to show that their views do not differ as much as Sharpe 
supposes. 'I have been at great pains to try to insist that I am not 
"defining" faith and especially not specifying its content, nor even its 
4-0 
shape'. But this is precisely Sharpe's criticism, faith must be defined, 
and it must be defined in terms of its specific content and object. As an 
abstract concept, separated from these concerns which are central for 
religious persons, the notion is of no value. Smith is right to point out 
that one's faith is in God, not in one's conception of God; but to this 
extent he concedes Sharpe's point.ltl In his later works Smith tries to 
justify a treatment of faith as a human quality in its own right, 
independent of its 'object' .4-2 
b. The Corporate Nature of Faith. 
Smith has been criticised by several, notably British, writers for 
failing to give sufficient weight to 'the corporate nature of faith'.lt 3 In 
the words of the Doctrine Commision of the Church of England, 
'We do not just take from the tradition what is meaningful to us, but 
we feel with our indebtedness a sense of obligation. The tradition is 
not there for us to do just what we like with it. We choose to stand 
within it, to associate ourselves with it and to become, humanly 
speaking, responsible for it.' ltlt 
In this way we gain a sense of 'belonging•lt5 and hold to a shared faith in 
which even those who lack mental abilities (the young or handicapped) may 
be a part - even if they appear incapable of faith in Smith's sense. 
This is a point also made by Kenneth Cragg, who 1s concerned that 
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Smith's personalist interpretation of religion 'is liable to atomize 
shared, and indeed corporate, realities'. 46 Cragg's book The Christian and 
Other Religion deliberately takes note of The Meaning and End of Religion 
in its title: using the singular 'religion' to designate 'living commitment 
47 
•... beyond the formal category, the heart rather than the system'. But 
Cragg contends that Smith overstates his case 'when he claims that each 
"personal submittingness - if we may use such a term - is, of course, quite 
distinct from any other person's".' Cragg responds, 'I, speaking English, 
am unique: but the English I speak is not unique to me. Is it not more 
48 deeply so with faith than with language?' 
In response to this sort of criticism, Smith gave considerable space to 
the issue in his later books. In Belief and History he replies: 
'I would say ..•. that by "religious" I mean personal, so long as one 
is not so individualistic still as to imagine that personal is over 
against social. On the contrary: the counterpart of soc1al is 
individual, the counterpart of personal is impersonal. An individual 
becomes a person in society; and a society becomes a community by 
being personal, just as it becomes dehumanized, a juxtaposition or 
congeries of alienations, by being impersonal.' 49 
Smith clearly does not advocate any form of isolated individualism, yet, in 
my opinion, there remains an overvaluation of the individual aspect of 
religious life at the expense of the corporate. 
c. The Impossibility of Knowing the Faith of Another Person. 
If Smith's understanding of religion in terms of cumulative tradition 
and faith is accepted, there remains the question as to whether it is 
possible to investigate and know the faith of another person. A.R.Gualtieri 
has produced several articles which sympatheticaiiy analyse Smith's concept 
of faith50 yet he finds it necessary to ask 'Can We Know the Religious 
Faith of Others?' 51 He follows Smith with an affirmative answer based on 
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the evidence of inferences from external behaviour, of disclosures of faith 
by friends, and of the interpretive rSle played by the personal faith of 
the enquirer. 
Smith himself insists that there are limits to an observer's ability to 
penetrate another's faith: 'the student's first responsibility is to 
recognize that there is always and in principle more in any man's faith 
than any other man can see.• 52 But Gualtieri observes that there is another 
limitation. The possibility of knowing another's faith is limited to 'where 
there is an essential similarity of faith in the observer and the 
observed•. 53 The extent to which this limits the task of knowing others' 
faith depends upon how widespread is such similarity of faith. For: 
'the kind of apprehension of the faith of another about which Smith is 
talking is fundamentally the recognition that the personal faith or 
selfhood of another person, though induced and expressed by a 
different tradition, is akin to one's own. It is not a matter of 
knowing another faith, strictly speaking, but of recognizing the 
essential identity of another's self-understanding with one's own'.54 
The question of how far it is possible to know the faith of another is 
taken a step further by R D Baird55 in a telling assessment of Smith's The 
Faith of Other Men. This book was first published in 1963, although it had 
been delivered as a series of radio broadcasts in 1962. It is, in my view, 
one of Smith's most delightful books, attempting to reach a non-specialist 
audience and constituting an excellent non-technical introduction to his 
approach. 
The Faith of Other Men aims to provide an understanding of what it feels 
like to be Buddhist or Muslim, etc., to come to an understanding of a 
Buddhist's or a Muslim's faith. In order to reach this aim, Smith attempts 
to present his listeners with a single item from the tradition of each of 
the religious communities under consideration and tries to understand the 
meaning which these items have for the participants. It also involves 
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treating seriously what religious adherents have to say for themselves 
about their faith and the particular items under consideration. In my view 
Smith fails to achieve his aim. 
In the case of the Hindus, for example, after introducing tat tvam asi 
as the item from the Hindu tradition, Smith immediately turns not to Hindu 
eyes but to his listeners/readers: "'you'' - (each one of you reading this 
book) - are in some final, cosmic sense the total and transcendent truth 
that underlies aU being'. 56 AU his examples or applications of this 
dictum are Western, and he concludes the chapter with a theological 
comparison with Christianity. One comes away with a profound sense of what 
a Western comparativist intellectual has understood by tat tvam asi, but 
still wondering what it feels like to a Hindu to view the world through 
this symbol. 
The same may be said for the chapter on the faith of Muslims. Here the 
symbol examined from the Islamic tradition is the shahadah 'there is no God 
but God, and Muhammad is his apostle'. In asking the question 'What belief 
is presumed, for those who go on to commitment?' 57 Smith deliberately 
chooses aspects which are not particularly representative of Muslim 
thought. For example 'This (belief) has not been widespread, even ammg 
(the mystics); yet I mention it because I personally find it attractive•. 58 
Again in the chapter on 'The Chinese', Smith writes 'what I myself see in 
the yang-yin symbol if I may be allowed this personal note .... •59 So 
much for seeing the matter through Muslim or Chinese eyes. 
It is the chapter on the faith of Buddhists that R D Baird criticises in 
a similar way. The symbol chosen here is a Burmese village initiation rite 
of Shin Byu - a reenactment of Siddhartha Gautama's Going Out. As elsewhere 
Smith's aim is to understand the faith of the participants: 'Can we learn 
something of that faith, and appreciate in part the inner meaning, by 
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exploring the significance of these outward forms? .... the task of 
comparative religion (is) to ascertain .... what these things mean to those 
who participate in them •. 60 Much of what follows in the chapter consists 
of descriptive material such as one might find in a text book of a 
phenomenologist of religion (it is difficult to see how it could be 
otherwise). Only two pages are devoted to an attempt to apprehend the 
meaning of this ceremony to the participating parents and boys. Smith 
admits that we cannot fully apprehend what the ceremony means to the 
participants, and that it will differ from boy to boy. He therefore resorts 
to the expedient that we must 'generalize, but we should remember that that 
is what we are doing'. 61 Finally Smith can say no more than 'I leave you to 
judge•62 what are the impressions, spiritual overtones, sense of nostalgia, 
sense of mischief, etc., which a boy might feel as he seets off to the 
monastery outside the village; and 'who can tell', he asks,63 what the 
ceremony means to the sophisticated, educated man as he remembers his 
experience. It is here that R.D.Baird comments, 'this is precisely the 
point: who can tell?• 64 
It is i mpossib1e to know the faith of another - that seems to be the 
conclusion forced upon us by this work. If Smith with all his insight 
cannot penetrate and bring to light the personal faith of another, how 
shall a less experienced student? But even if this is the conclusion to 
which this book points us, it also shows us the value of the attempt. For 
here is a book which gives central place to the personal qualities of 
observer and man of faith in the study of religion. 
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(iv) Faith and Belief 
The basic thesis that faith is not the same as belief has received 
almost universal support from scholars of various persuasions. 65 For some 
this has led to the sort of radical reappraisal for which Smith yearns.66 
Others have held that this thesis is not as radical as he supposes.67 But 
other scholars, whilst accepting his thesis that faith is not the same as 
belief, continue to wonder if Smith has properly elucidated the nature of 
faith and its relation to belief. 68 
Before considering some of the more fundamental objections to Smith's 
elucidation of faith and its relation to belief, there are a number of 
writers who criticise specific aspects of his presentation. These are 
primarily concerned with the Christian material, since this constitutes the 
major portion of both Belief and History and Faith and Belief, and also 
because the work has not yet received as much critical attention as it 
deserves from scholars of other traditions.69 
First, his treatment of Aquinas has been described as 'shallow' by 
Horvath and confusing by Swinburne. 70 It appears that Smith has confused 
Aquinas's notion of faith (fides) with that of formed faith (fides 
formata). Secondly, although Swinburne finds Smith's treatment of baptism 
in St Cyril of Jerusalem persuasive/ 1 I have subjected it to analysis m 
section 4.2. above, and found it to be inadequate. Thirdly, Smith's 
treatment of Vatican I, Augustine and other varia receive brief critical 
comments in the reviews of Horvath and Swinburne.72 
As to the more substantial matters, Smith's treatment of modern 
linguistic philosophers has been subjected to considerable criticism. It 
has already been noted abov/3 that Smith admits a lack of serious 
acquaintance with their work, and he is criticised for failing to show the 
158 
same sensitivity to their endeavours as he does to those from other 
religious traditions. 74 This means that Smith's use of terms like believe, 
presuppose, recognise, see, know, etc., are not related to modern 
75 philosophical usage; and 'new' and 'modern' are used as pejorative terms. 
This leads to 'tendentious' 76 distinctions being made between these terms. 
Wiebe accuses Smith of a naive epistemology because of the way he tries to 
distinguish between belief and presupposition such that he wrongly equates 
unconscious presuppositions with knowledge.77 Swinburne also argues that 
Smith's preference for the term 'recognise' in biblical passages does not 
achieve his purpose of excluding a notion of holding propositions, for to 
recognise already includes the idea of 'believing - that'. 78 
His failure to consider some of the issues raised by modern 
philosophical treatment of faith and belief has left Belief and History and 
Faith and Belief 'philosophically obscure'. 79 In view of this philosophical 
obscurity, a number of writers are left puzzled about how to understand 
Smith's concept of faith, and wha~ precisely is its relation to belief. 
Cupitt 'doesn't quite know whether he is a thoroughgoing American 
pragmatist who in the end takes a non-cognitive view of faith - or whether 
his view is in some sense cognitive.' 80 It is perhaps a similar confusion 
which made Hick uncertain about whether Smith included creeds and 
theologies as parts of the cumulative tradition.81 Wiebe is similarly 
bewildered by Smith's capacity to give seemingly incompatible definitions 
of faith: some explaining faith as 'inseparable from belief', others as 
'quite other than ·belief'. Wiebe feels that Smith does not determine 
'whether the relationship (between faith and belief) is one of necessity or 
1 f . ,82 mere y one o contmgency. 
In my view it is clear that Smith's concept of faith is 
non-propositional - he repeatedly insists that faith is a human quality, 
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not a holding of various propositions. Yet Smith's concept of faith has to 
do with man's total response to the transcendent. He cannot accept an 
understanding of faith as solely a matter of the will or the intellect or 
any other 'part' of our human life. It is precisely the orientation of the 
whole of human life which Smith calls faith. Our participation in all the 
dimensions of the cumulative tradition, including beliefs, is made 
meaningful by faith. But Smith's presentation of his non-propositional 
position is sometimes obscured by his almost total concentration on the 
intellectual dimension or expression of faith, 83 and his insistence that we 
still have an obligation to get our beliefs right. 84 For Smith, belief 
remains a major category in Religious Studies, but it can never be regarded 
h . 85 as t e maJor category. 
(v) Faith and Truth 
Smith's understanding of truth has rec-eived considerable attention from 
reviewers of his work.86 There is a major strength in Smith's affirmation 
that the locus of truth is persons. Truth is not merely a matter for 
abstract philosophical debate, but an issue of moral integrity for all 
people. Smith's affirmation has established the conviction that Race 
expresses: 'Truth, especially in religious matters, belongs within a whole 
context of life and culture'. 87 
A further strength is Smith's formulation that religious material can 
become true for participants by faith. This has given encouragement to the 
view that the various religious traditions are 'historical embodiments of 
the same impulse to realize - to make real and authentic - the experience 
of God - in the lives of individuals'. 88 On this personalist understanding 
of truth, the r8le of faith is clear: 'a personal response in faith to a 
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divine initiative which only becomes authentic as a consequence of the 
inidividual's response to the divine. Truth is to be attained, or better, 
experienced, in the situations of everyday life•. 89 In this sense the 
personal appropriation and moral dimension of truth are more important for 
the development and maintenance of faith. 
But the problem remains as to how faith may be expressed in terms of 
true beliefs. It has already been noted that Smith considers this to be an 
'imperative obligation• 90 upon men and women of faith. In Swinburne's 
terms, the obligation is in earnest, for 'you cannot get to London, Jet 
alone to heaven, without some true beliefs•. 91 For he insists that even 
viewing faith in terms of commitment and response, this includes 
recognizing, seeing the truth, and that already implies the 'belief-that' 
h. 0 d 92 t mgs are as recogmze . 
This inevitably leads to the problem of conflicting truth-claims. For 
differing religious traditions, and indeed differing religious persons, 
have responded to the 'imperative obligation' to express their faith m 
terms of true beliefs. In the process they have come up with expressions 
which are not just different, but contradictory. For example, Smith in one 
place describes the Christian movement as 'an upsurge of a new recognition 
in human history .... (the insight that) ...• God is not simply high and 
lifted up, in the sanctuary, He is a carpenter in a small town'. 93 But 
using the word recognize does not remove the problem of conflicting 
truth-claims, for, as I observed above,94 there are also those who have 
recognized a God who is so exalted and set apart that he could not possibly 
be a carpenter; and such people have lived a life of faith in the light of 
this insight. 
Even if we accept Smith's reservations,95 the problem of conflicting 
truth-claims remains. Differing statements concerning the truth are not 
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only an invitation to synthesis by the process of dialogue,96 they also 
remain as pointers to fundamentally differing apprehensions of ultimate 
reality. 97 In the eyes of traditional people of faith their own 
apprehensions of reality are seen as sufficiently close to the mind and 
purpose of God to negate Tillich's dictum 'faith, if it takes its symbols 
literally becomes idolatrous'. 98 In this case our discussion has returned 
99 to the question of the place given to the religous phenomena. Is it 
possible to distinguish 'assent to the truth as such', from assent to the 
symbols which 'become true by faith', and 'through which the truth is 
100 
conveyed'? 
(vi) World Community 
This study of faith m Wilfred Cantwell Smith would be incomplete 
without a statement about its implications for world community. Since his 
very earliest works Smith has been concerned for the political outworking 
f. h 0 0 11 1 0 1 0 1 o 1s mte ectua mterests. 
For this reason there is always a visionary element in Smith's writing 
which sometimes makes it come across like a sermon. One reviewer has 
102 
refered to Smith's 'dream' of a world community and world theology; 
another writes of the 'complex motivation' which inspires Smith's work. 103 
Faith must g1ve rise to socio-political expression. In our religiously 
plural world there is an obvious need for respect, for clarifying our 
mutual understandings and relating together in the formation of a new world 
community in which the transcendent is recognized. 
Smith's vision of a world community is based upon a specific theological 
understanding of the gospel. In his view the gospel imperative demands 
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'reconciliation, unity, harmony, and brotherhood .... all men are included: 
we strive to break down barriers, to close gulfs; we recognize all men as 
neighbours, as fellows, as sons of the universal father ..•. At this level, 
we do not become truly Christian until we have reached out towards a 
community that turns all mankind into one total "we'". 104 
At one level, no Christians would wish to disent from thiS call for 
justice for all, but many would feel it necessary to keep hold of the more 
divisive and painful aspects of the gospel, which find little place in 
Smith's package. It may also be argued that Smith is willing to sacrifice 
too much of the particularity of each tradition in achieving his dream. He 
wants Christians, for example, to move away from a Christocentric theology 
t d 1 bl . h . 1 0 5 owar s a ess pro emat1c t eocentnsm. 
(vii) Approaching Islam and Christianity 
Chapters 3 and 4 examined Wilfred Cantwell Smith's treatment of various 
items from the Islamic and Christian traditions. These chapters included 
critiques of his presentations and his approach. Despite his known dislike 
for methodology, 106 his approach embodies a methodology of his own. 107 
Islam and Christianity are to be understood in terms of faith and 
cumulative tradition, all the emphasis being on the demonstration that 
faith has primacy over all other considerations. 
But one comes away from a study of his approach to Islamic and Christian 
material with a distinct impression that he has in many cases read his 
conclusions into the data. Examples of this in the case of Islam: it is far 
from clear that a gradual process of reification can be observed from a 
study of Arabic booktitles; 108 it is far from obvious that those who held a 
'reified' notion of islam were 'less sensitively religious', and he makes 
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no attempt to examine the strengths they saw in an institutionalized, 
. d . 1- 109 systematize ~· In the case of Christianity: in his treatment of 
the biblical material, Smith is simply wrong to say that the first 
Christians did not think that they believed anything. 11 0 In the case of 
Aquinas and St Cyril, Smith seems to have missed the material which does 
d "hh" 1 .. 111 1 h" . not accor wit IS conceptua presuppositiOns. n IS excessive 
emphasis on the inner dimension of faith, Smith almost seems to Jose sight 
of the major part which the outer dimensions of belief and institution also. 
play in the religious life. In several sections of The Meaning and End of 
Religion further evidence and substantiation is required to support his 
h . 112 t eSlS. 
This leads on to a further criticism. If the study of religion is the 
study of personal faith, and the quality of a student's research is to some 
extent determined by his ability to empathize with the faith of another, 
then this approach seems to have a built-in filter which will ensure the 
exclusion of divergent material and the inclusion of spurious material. 
There are several examples of this in Smith, such as his treatment of St 
Cyril on beliefs, and his inclusion of an obscure mystical interpretation 
of the shahadah which happened to 'speak' to him. 113 
Finally, in my opinion, Smith's insistence on the universal quality of 
human faith and his vision of world community have led him to an 
unacceptable treatment of religious pluralism. It has Jed to a gross 
underplaying of the significance of particularity in religious life, as was 
discussed above in some detai1. 114 It has also led to an unacceptable view 
of human integrity. In his treatment of Christian and Muslim understandings 
of the Qur'an, Smith holds that it may be possible for Christians and 
Muslims to reach a point where intellectually they agree on the status of 
the Qur'an as the word of God, whilst 'morally they choose to respond 
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differently'. 115 This follows directly from Smith's notions of faith and 
truth. But in my opinion, if Muslims and Christians can agree 
intellectually, there can be no place for moral divergence without 
subscribing to a view of human integrity which seems quite irreconcilable 
with Smith's most treasured ideals. 
(viii) Conclusion 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith's concept of faith is of considerable value in 
focusing attention in Religious Studies upon persons. His distinction 
between faith and belief is particularly useful. The concept of faith 1s a 
helpful tool which· encourages us to se~ the meanings which religious 
persons attach to their religious activities, beliefs and experiences. 
Along with this goes the necessary reminder to students of religion that 
they need to become much more involved existentially in the object of their 
study if they are rightly to penetrate the inner dimension of another's 
faith. 
But Smith's understanding of religion cannot be regarded as fully 
satisfactory without limiting or distorting those complex realities which 
have been known as Islam and Christianity, (etc.), and have been 
experienced by men and women of faith. The following points may be 
mentioned especially: 
a. First there is the problem of studying faith in Smith's terms. The need 
for empathy between the observer and participant inevitably leads to 
selectivity in the material to be considered - the material is limited by 
the faith of the observer and by that which 'speaks' to him. 
b. Secondly there is the unhelpfully negative attitute which Smith seems to 
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have towards the corporate, structured aspects of religious life. He 
suggests that these have been of little importance to the most 'sensitively 
religious' persons. This undervalues the symbolic function of the externals 
of religion as vehicles for the encounter with the divine, and depreciates 
the intrinsic worth attached to these elements by participants in the 
tradition. 
c. Amongst the many external factors of religion, beliefs and opinions 
about the nature of reality seem to have been self-consciously held since 
the beginning. This is certainly the case with Islam and Christianity, even 
if the terms with which those beliefs have been described have evolved over 
the centuries. 
d. In my opinion Smith's scheme is ill-equipped to handle the conflicting 
truth-claims found between the various religious traditions. 
e. It seems unhelpful to dispense with words like religion, Christianity, 
Judaism, etc., even if more care must be exercised in their use. There is 
always a tendency to reify human constructs, and Smith's new 
conceptualizations of faith and cumulative tradition are no exception from 
the same tendency. 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith's concept of faith is a helpful tool for 
approaching and understanding Islam and Christianity, especially in their 
inner dimensions. But it can only be regarded as one of many items within 
the student's tool bag. The concept of faith must be used alongside other 
concepts and theories of religion which give insights into the nature and 
functions of the external, corporate and proposi tiona! aspects of human 
religious life. 
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4. See p 200, below. 
5. See p 204, below. 
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and World Community in the work of Wilfred Cantwell Smith', in The Journal 
of the American Academy of Religion, Vol XLI, No 4, Dec 1973, pp 573 - 590; 
and by W. G. Oxtoby (ed) Religious Diversity, (New York: Harper Row, 1976) 
pp xv f. Neither of these are able to take into account the developments of 
the later books: Belief and History (Charlottesville: University Press of 
Virginia, 1977), hereafter B&H; Faith and Belief (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1979), hereafter F&B; or Towards a World Theology 
(London, Macmillan, 1981), hereafter TWT. One recent article in which Smith 
himself has raised some of the issues is 'History in Relation to both 
Science and Religion', in Scottish Journal of Religious Studies, Vol 2, 
Part 1, 1981, pp 3 - 10. One interesting aspect of this question is the 
extent to which his early attraction to Marxism has left its mark on his 
view of history. 
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9. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, 'Comparative Religion: Whither - and Why?', in 
Mircea Eliade and Joseph M. Kitagawa, eds., The History of Religions: 
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10. Reported in World Mission: Report of the Commission on World Mission 
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much to an understanding of the use of this word in the Qur'an and 
tafarsir. 
27. Smith discusses the words: daena, den, dyn, ~ in Persian; dath in 
Aramaic and Hebrew; den in Parthian and Sogdian; den in Armenian; din in 
Arabic and other languages of the Semitic family, eg Syriac. See MER, pp 98 
- 100. --
28. MER, p 102. 
29. Documented variously by Smith, see especially MER, chapter 2; and see 
pp 19 - 23, above. 
30. MER, p 105. 
31. MER, p 104. 
32. MER, p 106. 
33. 'Comparative Religion: Whither - and Why?', p 42. 
34. ~' p 106. 
35. MER, p 105. 
36. See MER, chapter 3. 
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37. MER, p 107. 
38. MER, p 108. 
39. MER, p 108. 
40. MER, p 109. 
41. MER, p 110. 
42. MER, p 110. 
43. MER, p 111. 
44. Based on information from MER, p 111, and pp 295 - 296, nn 88 - 92. I 
have confirmed the figures for islam, muslim and !man. 
45. MER, p 111; for Smith's distinction between faith and belief, see 
section 2.2., above. 
46. MER, p 112. 
47. MER, p 112. 
48. MER, p 112. 
49. MER, p 112. 
50. MER, pp 112 - 113, p 297, n 100. 
51. MER, p 113. 
52. MER, p 110. 
53. MER, p 113. 
54. MER, p 114. 
55. See below, section 3.l.(li). 
56. MER, p 115. 
57. MER, p 115. 
58. 'The Historical Development in Islam of the Concept of Islam as an 
Historical Development', in Bernard Lewis and P.M.Holt, eds., Historians of 
the Middle East (London: OUP, 1962) pp 484 - 502. 
59. OUI, pp 41 - 77. 
60. OUI, p 57. 
61. OUI, pp 63 - 64. 
62. OUI, p 54. 
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63. So MER, chapter 4. 
64. MER, p 116. 
65. 'The Essence of Religious Experience in Islam', p 189, n 6. 
66. OUI, pp 48, 47, 53, 53, 48, 55. 
67. Smith, 'Rejoinder' in R.D.Baird, ed., Methodological Issues in 
Religious Studies (Chico, Calif.: New Horizons Press, 197 5), p 123. One 
reviewer has, however, described Smith's paper as a 'well-written excellent 
essay', although he finds some of its conclusions 'astounding' and 
'contradictory'; Ziaul Haq, in Islamic Studies, Vol XXI, No 3, Autumn 1982, 
pp 117- 122. 
68. 'Telling Muslims what is a truer understanding of their scriptures' is 
hardly a fair assessment of 'a substantial part of his book', al FaruqT, 
op. cit., p 188. 
69. Namely the assertion that the second tendency or process of reification 
to which Muslims have been subject in history was the 'influence .... of 
the reifying hypostases of Greek thought upon Islamic thought', al Faruql, 
op. cit., p 188. See above, section 3.l.(i). 
70. al Farliql, op. cit., p 187. 
71. al Faruql, op. cit., p 188. See my own argument to that effect below, 
section 5.(i).b. 
72. al Faruql, op. cit., p 190. 
73. MER, p 113. 
74. al Faruq1 op. cit., p 190. 
75. MER, p 113. 
76. al FaruqT, op. cit., p 190. 
77. MER, p 297, n 100. 
78. al Faruql, op. cit., p 190. 
79. Slirah 5.4, as cited in MER, p 81. 
80. MER, p 297, n 102. 
81. al Faruql, op. cit., p 192. 
82. Jane I. Smith, op. cit. 
83. A. Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur'an, m loc. 
84. FOM, p 17. 
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85. FOM, p 19. 
86. FOM, p 19. 
87. FOM, p 20. 
88. FOM, p 55. 
89. Although Smith himself feels this is a late interpretation of the word 
credo, and this will be discussed in detail in chapter 4, section 2. 
90. FOM, p 60. 
91. ~' p 61. 
92. FOM, p 62. 
93. FOM, p 62. 
94. FOM, p 63. 
95. FOM, p 64. 
96. FOM, p 65. 
97. FOM, p 65. 
98. FOM, p 53. 
99. FOM, p 57. 
100. See chapter 5, section (iii), below for a further critique· of this 
book. For further studies of shahadah, see Kenneth Cragg's Call of the 
Minaret. Cragg exemplifies a similar desire to understand the faith of 
Muslims, and if anything displays a greater sensitivity .to both Muslim and 
Christian attitudes. The shahadah is treated in chapters 2 and 3 in rather 
more depth than Smith's broadcast allowed. For a Muslim treatment of the 
shahadah, see eg., Abu1 A cHi: MawdCidT, Towards Understanding Islam, new 
revised edition (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1980), pp 61 - 86. 
101. FOM, p 19. 
102. FOM, p 55. 
103. Smith, 'A Human View of Truth', p 34. 
104. FOM, p 63. 
105. Eg., FOM pp 32 - 38, 79. 
106. See Chapter 5, section (iii).c., below. 
107. The rest of the conference material presented in John Hick, ed., Truth 
and Dialogue, is omited here, as are Hick's conclusion and Smith's --
reJoinder, as these are not primarily Islamic in purpose or content. See 
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chapter 2, section 3.(v), above. 
108. Smith says here that there is no clear opposite to this root; 
elsewhere he suggests that the root s-q-m is a possible opposite, see OUI, 
p 313, n 10; saqTm means sick, ill. ---
109. Smith, 'A Human View of Truth', p 24. 
110. Smith, op. cit., pp 21, 22. 
Ill. Smith, op. cit., p 23. 
112. Smith, op. cit., p 22. 
113. Smith, op. cit., p 25. 
114. As was seen m our discussion of Belief and History m Chapter 2, 
section 3, above. 
115. Smith, 'A Human View of Truth', p 27. 
116. It is interesting to note that ta$diq appears only twice m the 
Qur'an, both times in this sense. In both cases the wording is walakin 
ta?dTqa-1-ladhi bayna yadayhi, refering to the way in which the Qur'an 
confirms those holy books which went before it. SGrahs 1 0.37, and 12.111. 
117. Smith, op. cit., p 28. 
118. Smith, op. cit., p 28. 
119. Smith, op. cit., p 28, Smith's italics. 
120. Smith, op. cit., p 29. 
121. Smith, op. cit., p 37. 
122. Smith, 1oc. cit. 
123. Smith, loc. cit. 
124. OUI, chapter 7. Also published as 'Faith as Tasdiq', in Parvis 
Morewedge, ed., Islamic Philosophical Theology, (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1981) pp 96 - 119. 
125. H.A.Wo1fson, 'The terms ta~awwur and ta~dig in Arabic philosophy and 
their Greek, Latin and Hebrew equivalents', in Moslem World, Vol 33, 1943, 
pp 114 - 128. Here Wolfson argues persuasively for a continuity in meaning 
with the Greek philosophical tradition. 
126. Smith, 'A Human View of Truth', p 38. 
127. It is also reproduced in OUI, pp 282 - 300, and the theme is further 
developed in 'The True Meaning of Scripture: an empirical historian's 
non-reductionist interpretation of the Qur'an', in International Journal of 
Middle East Studies, 11, 1980, pp 487 - 505. 
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128. OUI, p 292. 
129. OUI, p 292. 
130. OUI, p 296. 
131. Cragg has also produced two works specifically relating to the Qur'an 
in which his warm sympathy is very evident: The Event of the Qur'an 
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1971) and The Mind of the Qur'an (London: Allen 
and Unwin, 1973). See also Cragg's attempt to make a Christian response to 
Mu~ammad, Muhammad and the Christian: A Question of Response (London, DL T, 
1984), especially chapters 6 and 7. 
132. OUI, p 298. 
133. QR T, p 59; OUI, p 299. 
134. QR T, p 61; OUI, p 299. 
135. Smith, 'The True Meaning of Scripture', p 504. 
136. Mawdudf, 'The Meaning of the Qur'an', in A Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur'an, 
pp xxi - xliii. 
137. OUI, p 298. Smith resorts to a rather dubious expedient in 'The True 
Meaning of Scripture', where he sweeps the problem away with the words that 
God 'must be a pretty good historian', p 504. 
138. Originally 'Faith and Belief', subtitled 'some considerations from the 
Islamic instance', and 'some considerations from the Christian instance', 
now reproduced in OUI, chapters 6 and 15 (in part only). 
139. OUI, p 121. 
140. OUI, p 121. 
141. OUI, p 122. 
142. OUI, p 123. Smith comments that the mutakallim al TaftazanT uses the 
Persian-word giravidan (girav means virtually the same as the French gage) 
to explain the meanmg of iman. --
143. OUI, p 124. 
144. OUI, p 123. 
45. OUI, p 123; Ali translates 'And they rejected those Signs In iniquity 
.nd arrogance, Though their souls were convinced Thereof', in Ioc. 
46. Arberry's verse 103, in loc. 
47. The meaning of this sentance is part of the purpose of this section. 
~8. OUI, p 164. 
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Notes to Chapter 4 
1. The first chapter deals with the work of the linguistic philosophers, 
(who are given a far from fair treatment, it is clear that Smith has not 
entered imaginatively into their worldview. As he himself admits, he is no 
philosopher, but an historian. See above, p 37; and 'Traditional Religions 
and Modern Culture', in Religious Diversity, pp 67 ff). The second chapter 
has already been commented upon in our section 2.2., above, and the third 
chapter contains the discussion of the biblical material. 
2. II Thessalonians 2.13. 
3. B&H, p 46. 
4. B&H, p 72. 
c. .. , 5. KJV; 
TTot£..-1~ · 
()v "TTI<:J\£v£.1~ 011 £-tS £<JTIV 
\:::.,_, 10( )oro..tj-'OV(""-. 1TI<fi£.UotJ()(V 
6. B&H, p 75. 
7. See Section 3.5., above. 
8. RV; Smith's translation, 
lo l) Y&V£-(f"" 90( ( Cfl/<1--
' 0 / £~.._} £ 'J'I. 
B&H, p 75; l oL1T 
Gsos; KDL >--. ws 
l:::.d- I 4F I \fc:fOV(T I J . 
9. KJV; A wp ~~ b.£.. -rTt(f'TI:..llJ£ /.t.. ~ vVot-!ov £.~c~-p£<rT"1 <ref. I · 1T' <rT£U<ro<-1 
ool--f ~£..1 -r--ov -rrpo<J(.f-x.o.t,£_\.}0\1 'Tt.;J C9£~ I OTI i<:JIIV l.:.ot-1 "101_{ 
£,.:::.-' ..,Tov<:rt V o<..ZJToV )' 1 ((8,._ Tlo ~oT"'\~ o' vc£ T"'-1 . 
10. B&H, p 79. 
11. B&H, p 81. 
12. v. 1 o, '"1" ~00(rr1 v , 15 ~ >.."'\9t-, "'-s and v. 13, -rtl<::rT ,~ ~ >-. 1 9£_1()1...~ 
and v. 11, .,-o Trl~.!-~oLI '"Y \.f£-O~.t.-1 and v. 12, &O~t:n::\~Jo<-VTL> T;l ~~~~~~. 
13. B&H, p 82. 
~~ -rn--TTI<J.,----£-l)KO(f'[_\1 
"1 /"' v . 
15. B&H, p 84. 
16. B&H, p 85. 
17. There are 71 occurences in the New Testament; 8 describe things, 14 
relate to God or Christ, 49 to human beings. 
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18. B&H, p 87. 
19. B&H, p 87. 
20. 1T I <:r-r£ V f_.'<(""f... 
21. B&H, p 90. 
22. B&H, p 90. 
23. B&H, p 90. 
24. B&H, p 91. 
25. 'E-x.c..-rf.. ·rn.rnv 9£ou , Mark 11. 22, even here Smith speculates on the 
translations 'faith from God', 'divine faith', B&H, p 126, n 32. 
26. B&H, p 126, n 32. 
27. B&H, p 91. 
28. iv Xf•Q'""-r~. 
29. B&H, pp 94, 95. 
30. B&H, p 91. 
31. B &H, p 9 1. 
32. B&H, p 92. 
33. B&H, p 92. 
34. B&H, pp 95, 96. 
35. B&H, p 96. 
36. B&H, p 99. 
37. B&H, p 96. 
38. C. E. B. Cranfield's Commentary on Romans, A Critical and Exegetical 
Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 2 vols., (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 
197 5 & 1979), is just one which treats faith in considerable detail; see 
index entries 'faith', ,.,..,~, 1 s' and 'rrt~-of:.V£ 1 v '. 
39. B&H. p 72. 
40. B&H, p 92. 
4 1. B &H, p 9 1. 
42. See pp 121, 122, above. 
43. Matthew 9.28, 18.6, 21.32 (3 times), Mark 9.42, 11.23, 11.24. 
187 
(Notes to chapter 4: pp 114 - 14-4-) 
4-4-. Matthew 24.23, 24-.26, Mark 13.21, Luke 22.67; and possibly Matthew 
8.13. 
45. Matthew 8.13 (?), 21.22, Mark 3.36, 9.23, (16.16, 16.17), Luke 8.13, 
8.50. 
46. B&H, p 99. 
47. ~' p 88. 
4-8. A text which expresses this very clearly is 1 John 2.22, in which 
denial of a propositional statement is seen as denial of Christ himself. 1 
John 5.1 puts it positively - he who believes that Jesus is the Christ has 
a relationship with God. 
49. B&H, p 87. 
50. Mark 8. 27 - 30, Matthew 16. 13 - 20, Luke 9. 18 - 21. 
51. Matthew 16. 17. 
52. As in John 6. 68, 69. 
53. B&H, p 87. 
54-. For a further analysis of the distinction between believe and 
recognize, see R Swinburne, Faith and Reason (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1981 ). He demonstrates that to recognize already includes to 
believe. 
55. F&B, p 73. 
56. F&B, p 73. 
57. F &B, p 74. 
58. The analogy of marriage is also made by St. Cyril, but for a rather 
different purppose; cp. F&B, p 75, p 252, n18. 
59. -r-.,v <J"-''"'1'\e rov ~,..vo'>-.o?:l' ov , My st. II.4. 
Citations from St. Cyril in this study are as follows: the Procatechesis 
(referred as Procat.) and the five Mystagogical catecheses (referred as 
Myst.) from Frank Leslie Cross, St Cyril of Jerusalem's Lectures on the 
Christian Sacraments, (London: S. P. C. K., 1950; the 18 catechetical 
lectures (referred as Cat.), from E. H. Gifford, Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Christian Fathers, (1893) 
60. My st. II. 4; Smith translates, 'if he commited himself to 
73. 
61. F&B, p 75. 
I 
.... ' F&B, p 
62. Credo, Smith observes is a cognate of sraddha, a Sanskrit word which is 
analysed in chapter four of F&B (see esp. pp 59 - 68, and 208 - 24-6). 
Sraddha seems to be a compound of srad (or srat) heart, and dha, to put. 
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The term does not appear in the B.g-Veda, but iri later Hindu religious usage 
it means 'to place, put or set one's heart on'. 
63. F &B, p 76. 
64. The last two pages of Smith's section on St. Cyril and credo generate 
some 19 pages of notes. 
65. F &B, p 77. 
66. F&B, p 255, n 28. 
67. F &B, p 77. 
68. Eg., F&B, pp 254 f., n 27, quoting J. N. D. Kelly; and p 272, n 38, 
quoting Dom Gregory Dix. 
69. F &B, p 76. 
70. F &B, p 77; pp 255 - 258, n 29. 
71. F&B, p 78. 
72. F&B, p 77. 
7 3. F&B, pp 264 - 267, n34. 
74. F&B, p 77. 
7 5. See, eg., J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrine, 5th edn., (London: 
A & C Black, 1977), p 44. 
76. F&B, p 272. 
77. Dom Gregory Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy, 2nd edn., (London: A & C 
Black, 1 945), p 485. 
78. F&B, p 73. 
79. Procat. 7. 
80. Clement of Alexandria, Strom. II.c.l2.; Apostolic Constitutions, 
VIII.c.l; and St Chrysostom, Hom. XXIX in 1 Cor XII.9.1 0; E. H. Gifford, 
op. cit., p 31, n 5; p 32, n 5-)--
81. In 1st Apology, LXI, in Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Vol II, (Dods, 
Reith & Pratten; Edinburgh, T & T Clark, 1867). 
82. ,....,5'TI1crn:ws ~So<..<r~ee~.J,O<., Cat. IV. 2. 
83. ~oofd-T"vJV d<r£9wv; np·•-Sc..wv ~~.,.9~..>v Cat. IV.2. 
8'+. ~vot. 0unJv~oof'DlT..vv, cat. Iv.3. 
85. ~o0,.v~To: 11€f' 6)c..ou , Cat. IV.'+. 
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86. Cat. IV.2. 
87. 1i L<JI[t)£_ ~[.. c , Cat. IV.9. 0/1 
88. Cat. X.20. 
89 Cat. XI.l. 
90. iT I <r-r£,LJ~£._ v ' Cat. XI.21. 
91. Cat. XI.22. 
92. Cat. V.lO, 11. 
93. The first definition of ~" of-'CJI.... given by Liddell and Scott is 'that 
which seems to one, an opinion', and b"oOf~--nK.otis given as 'of or for 
opinions'. 
94. Reported in FOM, p 121; from an address at Scarborough, Ontario, 
October 18th, 1958. 
95. FOM, p 124. 
96. A possible solution is offered in precisely these terms by John Hick, 
in God and the Universe of Faiths, (London: Macmillan, 1973). 
97. FOM, p 126. 
98. See pp 136 - 140, below. 
99. FOM, p 127. 
100. FOM, p 128; see also p 96. 
101. FOM, p 96. 
1 02. Or 'transcendentological', TWT, p 183. 
103. 'The Christian and the Religions of Asia', a sermon delivered at the 
Sunday morning service, Canadian Institute of Public Affairs/C. B. C. 
Conference, Geneva Park, Lake Couchiching, Ontario, and broadcast over the 
Canadian Broadcasting Commission radio service, August 9, 1959. 
104. For excellent expositions of this Christian imperative, and examples 
of its practice, see A. K. Cragg, The Call of the Minaret, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1956) and The Christian and Other Religion, 
(Oxford: Mowbrays, 1 977) and more recently, Muhammad and the Christian, 
(London: D. L. T.; and Maryknoll, New York: Orbis, 1984); Roger Hooker, 
Uncharted Journey, (London: CMS, 197 3), Journey into Varanasi, (London: 
CMS, 1978), Voices of Varanasi, (London: CMS, 1979); also, in a different 
vein, Kosuke Koyama, Waterbuffalo Theology, (London: SCM, 1974) and Three 
Mile an Hour God, (London: SCM, 1979). 
105. FOM, pp 94, 95. 
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106. P 507, 'Chrisitianity's Third Great Challenge', in The Christian 
Century, April 27th, 1960, pp 505 - 508. In MER, p 299, n 108, Smith notes 
that this title was the editor's, not his own. 
107. FOM, pp 128, 129. 
108. FOM, p 129; this 1s, so far as I am aware, Smith's only reference to 
the ressurection. 
1 09. FOM, p 129. 
110. This phrase was under discussion by the United Church of Canada's 
Commission on Faith; FOM, p 130. 
111. FOM, pp 130, 131. 
112. FOM, p 130. 
113. FOM, p 131. 
114. Smith later argued that religion must become true in the lives of the 
faithful, QRT, 'A Human View of Truth', see section 2.3., above. 
115. Smith, 'Christianity's Third Great Challenge', p 507; 'The Christian 
and the Religions of Asia', p 11. 
116. FOM, pp 131, 132. See also 'Christianity's Third Great Challenge', pp 
507, 508; and 'The Christian and the Religions of Asia', pp 11, 12. 
117. ' .... this conflict between our theology and our ethics has never been 
resolved. If I had to choose, I personally would choose the moral dimension 
of Christian faith; for I feel that of the two, it is the more truly 
Christian.' FOM, p 94. 
118. MER, p 157. 
119. Eg., the woes of Matthew 23, and Luke 11. 
120. Eg., 'You vipers' brood!', Matthew 12. 34, NEB. 
121. As Smith puts it, the doctrine 'is arrogant. At least, it becomes 
arrogant when one carries it out to the non-Western world'. FOM, p 130. 
122; FOM, p 130. 
123. FOM, pp 130, f; although this bears a marked similarity to some of the 
Johannine sayings of Jesus, see eg., John 8. 55, 'But you have not known 
him; I know him'. 
124. quoted above, p 137; FOM, p 131. 
125. FOM, pp 132, f. It seems that even Smith 1s unable to avoid the use of 
'non-Christian' here! See above, p 136. 
126. FOM, p 133. 
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127. FOM, p 133. 
128. FOM, p 133. 
129. FOM, p 135. 
130. FOM, p 135. 
131. See above, p 138; FOM, p 131. 
132. Smith, 'The Mission of the Church and the Future of Missions', p 163, 
emphasis mine. 
133. FOM, p 136. 
134. Smith, 'A Presentation of Islam', a review of Emmanuel Kellerhals' 
book Der Islam, in International Review of Missions, 49, 1960, pp 220 -
226; pp 225 f. 
135. FOM, p 139. 
136. FOM, p 139. 
137. For a sample of some recent Christian thinking, see Board for Mission 
and Unity of the General Synod of the Church of England, Towards a Theology 
for Interfaith Dialogue, (London: CIO, 1984), and Paul Knitter, No Other 
Name? A Critical Surve of Christian Attitudes Toward World Reli ions, 
(London: SCM, 1985 
138. See p 140, above. 
139. For a survey, see E. J. Sharpe, Comparative Religion, (London: 
Duckworth, 1975) 
140. See p 141, above. 
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3. Sykes, op. cit., p 291. 
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5. Al Faruqi, op. cit., p 186. 
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17. See MER, p 10. 
18. Ninian Smart, The Religious Experience of Mankind (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1969; 2nd Edition Glasgow, Collins, 1971) 
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Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol 9, Fall 1981, pp 186 - 198. 
22. Miller, op. cit., p 188; quoted from David Miller 'The Guru as the 
Centre of Sacredness', in Studies in Religion, Summer 1977, pp 527 -533. 
23. Smith himself examines this aspect in an interesting study, 'The 
Crystallization of Religious Communities in Mughul India', in Mojtaba 
Minovi and Iraj Afshar, eds., Yad-Name-ye-Iraini-ye Minorsky (Tehran: 
Instisharat Daneshgah, 1969) pp 197 - 220. 
24. p 150. 
25. Sharpe, op. cit., p 97. 
26. Pyle, op. cit. 
27. Pyle, op. cit., p 352. 
28. Carl F. Hallencreutz, New Af.proaches to Men of Other Faiths (Geneva: 
World Council of Churches, 1970, pp 83 -89. 
29. Hallencreutz finds that any comparison between Smith's dialectic and 
that Barth and the dialectical theologians can only be superficial, for the 
Barthian dialectic is between Christian faith and human religion. See 
discussion above, pp 149, 15 0. 
30. Hallencreutz, op. cit., p 89. 
31. The reviewer Huston Smith makes this point vividly. He quotes Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith's assertion that for a century scholars have been studying 
the data of the traditions of religious life and that this should now be 
followed by a "next step" of discovering and making known the personal 
faith of those involved, the reviewer observes: 'it is not clear how his 
"next step" differs from what the phenomenology of religion had been trying 
to do for some time. ("Phenomenology" does not appear in the book's index.) 
Richard Bush asked in an early review whether Otto, van der Leeuw, Heiler, 
Petazzoni, Danielou, Massignon, Eliade, and Benz overlook(ed) the 
faith-kernal inside the husks they studied. They all worked before Smith's 
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